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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION 
 
From Dreams to Deportations: The Case of Tunisian 
Irregular Migrants in Italy After 2011 
 
 
by  
 
Rayed Khedher  
Doctor of Philosophy in Anthropology 
University of California, Los Angeles, 2016 
Professor Sondra Hale, Co-Chair  
Professor Suzanne E. Slyomovics, Co-Chair 
 
This dissertation contributes to the study of transnational migration and human mobility by 
ethnographically documenting the lives of 60, male, Tunisian, irregular migrants—part of a mass 
migration of 30,000 people—who fled the 2011 Tunisian uprising by crossing the Mediterranean 
Sea and landing in Italy where they created, according to Italian authorities, an “emergency 
situation.” Although most of these migrants intended to use Italy as a gateway to other countries, 
such as France and Germany where they already had established social networks, many found  
themselves stuck in Italy where they were considered “illegals” under Italian law. A number of 
them faced human rights abuses such as deportation back to Tunisia, suffered violence and 
oppression at the hands of the Italian police and Italian society at large, and were stigmatized as 
 iii 
 
“potential criminals” and “hidden terrorists” by both state and non-state actors, i.e., employers, 
media and the larger public.  
 
Using narratives and oral histories from the study population, this research explores 1) the 
processes of criminalizing and dehumanizing the migrant “Other” such that violence perpetrated 
against him is permitted and rationalized; 2) the irregular migrants’ experience, discussion, 
negotiation of, and resistance to, their socially constructed “illegality” and “criminality”; and 3) 
the trends in anti-migrant violence and oppression and their consequences for the migrants’ 
identities, survival strategies, and daily struggles. Transnational migration scholarship and its 
idea of the “permeability” of national “borders” as shifting political spaces provided a theoretical 
foundation for this multi-sited research. The project transcends geographical boundaries to reach 
a macro-level understanding of the study population and to demonstrate the processes through 
which transnational movements are produced, forged, and maintained. The relevance of this 
research cannot be overstated as political turmoil in the Middle East continues, and irregular 
migrants and refugees pour into Europe. Thus, although the number of Tunisian migrants to Italy 
has significantly dropped since the 2011 uprising, hundreds of thousands of Syrians have been 
landing on Italian southern shores since 2015 when Syria entered into a civil war.  
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Tareq’s Story 
After spending four months in the Milo Center (Centro) in Trapani, Sicily, and receiving a 
deportation order, Ajmi and Farid, two men in their late 20s, slit their wrists, using pieces of 
broken glass. The idea was to end up in the hospital and avoid being sent back to Tunisia. Ajmi 
and Farid were treated by the local Red Cross team and then were handcuffed and taken back to 
the Centro to be deported a few days later from the port of Palermo to the port of La Goulettes in 
Tunis. As an act of solidarity and resentment against their forced expulsion, a huge 
demonstration broke out at the Centro. A group of angry detainees started chanting 
revolutionary slogans, including those used in Al Qasba Square in Tunis during the popular 
uprising such as “Gas kartouch ittwansa ma ykhafouch” (Teargas and bullets, Tunisians are not 
afraid) and “Khobz w’ maa w’ Milo laa” (Bread and water, but no Milo). Other enraged 
detainees suddenly started yelling, “Allahu Akbar” (Allah is Great), and used their feet and the 
force of their bodies to break the Centro’s facilities, including furniture, plumbing, windows, and 
doors. The riot ended in a huge clash between the Centro stuff, the Carabinieri (Italian police), 
and the detainees. Rafiq, a 22-year-old man, whose penchant for violence had earned him the 
nickname “Mafioso” among his friends, was immediately arrested, violently punched, and 
beaten with a water hose as he was about to set fire to one of the mattresses in the dormitory. 
Rafiq’s left eye was badly damaged from the violent beating (Fieldnotes, 08/23/14).  
 This account was told to me by Tareq, a tall, soft-spoken, malnourished, severely fatigued, 
28-year-old former detainee at the Milo Trapani center, which, as one of the most crammed 
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centers in Sicily, was ironically referred to as Abu Ghraib. Tareq embarked with over 80 young 
men from Zarzis, a peninsula in Southeastern Tunisia from which most irregular departures took 
place during the Tunisian uprising, and landed on the island of Lampedusa, Italy, on March 14, 
2011. I met him on a very hot and humid Sunday afternoon in July on the steps of a popular 
gelatteria in Agrigento, Sicily. Tareq gave me a warm and welcoming smile that was belied by 
the desperation and anger emanating from his eyes. Despite the heat of the day, Tareq was 
wearing a heavy navy-blue pullover which made me sweat just to look at him1 Tareq had 
escaped the Centro two months earlier and had been living on the street ever since, sleeping on 
the benches of la stazione centrale (Central Station) in Piazza Marconi, on flattened card boxes 
in local parks, or on the beach. Tareq had been trying to find a job on a farm in Ragusa where his 
friend, Abdel Haq, was harvesting watermelons, but to no avail. To eat, Tareq, like many other 
Tunisian irregular migrants, relied on whatever he could get from the local charitable and 
religious organizations operating in Agrigento, such as the Catholic Church’s Caritas 
Internationalis.  
The story Tareq recounted about Ajmi, Farid and Rafiq echoes many other compelling 
stories of this research’s study participants who revolted against their predicaments and potential 
deportations by damaging centers’ facilities, going on hunger strikes, and harming their own 
bodies with acts such as slitting their veins, sewing their lips, and burning their fingertips.  This 
destruction and self-violence constituted a message of anger and contestation for the Italian 
authorities and the larger public, but were also ingeniously used as a way for a number of 
Tunisian migrants to gain time and circumvent their impending deportation. 
 
                                                          
1 It turns out that the pullover was donated to Tareq by Caritas International, a confederation of Roman Catholic 
relief, development and social service organization. 
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I. Background: Post-uprising Tunisian Migration to Lampedusa 
Since January 2015, the irregular sea crossings into Europe, mainly through Italy and Greece, 
carried a highest-ever, recorded peak of over a million migrants and refugees entering the 
European Union (Kingsley 2015). The migration started during the popular uprising that shook 
Tunisia in December 2010, which created massive social and political turmoil and led to the 
subsequent fall of the 23-year-old, totalitarian regime of Zine Al Abidine Ben Ali on January 14, 
2011. Between January and September 2011, 42,807 persons entered Italy by sea and landed in 
Lampedusa, an island that is closer to Africa than to the Italian mainland and is located south of 
Sicily, about 113 kilometers from Tunisia. Approximately 25,000 were from Tunisia (UNHCR 
2011), creating what Cuttitta calls “the Tunisian turn” (Cuttita 2014:203). The new, massive 
flows of migrants totally and quickly altered the demographic and socio-cultural landscape of the 
island creating an unprecedented “human emergency.” Since mid-February 2011, the beginning 
of the crisis and up to mid-April 2011, the words and images used by the Italian Prime Minister 
Berlusconi and his ministers were highly charged and discriminatory. They used expressions 
such as “North African emergency,” “exodus of biblical proportions,” “human tsunami,” 
“invasion,” and “black danger” (Livi 2011). According to a Caritas Internationalis volunteer in 
Lampedusa, many residents were still terrified by the sudden invasion of Tunisian migrants and 
the newly arrived Syrian refugees: “They truly believe that most Tunisian migrants are terrorists 
and dangerous criminals who fled Ben Ali’s prisons, escaped the country, and came to destroy, 
steal, take jobs by force, and convert the island to Islam.” A local of Lampedusa demonstrated 
this mind-set:  
Every day, you hear about a car that has been stolen, a house that was broken into, 
food disappearing from supermarkets, etc. And guess who the perpetrators are? 
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They are the marrocchini 2. I do not see any solution except to throw them out and 
keep closing our borders against these dangerous human invasions. [Pause.] Now, 
we are receiving Syrians and Libyans and the situation has become even worse. It 
is una invasioni humana (a human invasion). Basta vuol dire basta (Enough is 
enough). These invasions have to stop immediately. We are no longer talking 
about being fascist, racist, or xenophobic. We are now talking about our basic 
daily survival and safety. If Sicily, this legendary and beautiful island has been 
sadly converted into the trash bin of Europe, it is simply because of all these 
immigrants. Gaddafi was the true guardian of the Lampedusan gate. Killing him 
was the biggest mistake. Now the gates are open, the human invasions will never 
stop. The whole continent will be flooded… those parasites use our system, steal 
our jobs or get welfare money… Povera Italia! Via tutti i clandestini da casa 
nostra” (Poor Italy! Out for all the clandestine people from our house) 
(06/02/2014). 
 
 Given the general state of lawlessness in Tunisia and the partial breakdown of border controls 
along the coast, the Tunisian authorities were unable to control this massive out-migration, and 
the number of Mediterranean crossings kept increasing dramatically during the Libyan uprising 
and the ongoing Syrian armed conflict. A large number of these migrants and refugees failed to 
be rescued and died because distress calls had not been answered or were sometimes deliberately 
ignored (Heller and Pezzani, 2014). The increased deaths were also due to the fact that migrants 
and smugglers were constantly trying out unconventional passage routes to escape being detected 
by border control agencies and coast guards. These alternative routes were often unfamiliar and 
did, in fact, cause a number of shipwrecks (Cuttitta 2014:197). Several non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs)3 and human rights groups have become increasingly concerned with 
calculating border-related deaths as they advocate for migrant rights and endeavor to reduce all 
kinds of border-related tragedies involving human loss (Fekete, 2003). According to the Tunisian 
Consul General in Palermo, Italy, more than 850 Tunisian irregular migrants drowned en route to 
Italy near the end of March 2011. A total of 120 migrants were missing, i.e., no bodies were 
                                                          
2 Italian term usually refers to Moroccans, but the Italians use it to refer to Tunisians and other migrants from North 
Africa. 
 
3 UNHCR, ARCI, Amnesty International, human rights Watch, Caritas Europa were amongst these NGOs. 
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found, but they were suspiciously announced still alive by the Italian authorities. The Consul 
concluded that many deaths remain officially unaccounted for either on the Italian or the 
Tunisian sides (Interview 07/23/2014).  
Nidhal, a 29-year-old young migrant noted that  
A week after we landed in Lampedusa on March 22, 2014, a boat loaded with 
over 60 people was rescued by the coast guards. Many died in the sea including 
Aymen and Nasserdine, two friends of mine from Jebal Lahmar4  whose bodies 
have never been found. I was shocked when I heard that rescued bodies5  were 
collectively buried in one single grave in Lampedusa’s cemetery, ironically called 
Il cimitero umano (the human cemetery). I secretly visited the cemetery with my 
friend Bilel…normally, it is forbidden and noticed that many graves have no 
names, and others have something such as the date of death and an inscription in 
Italian such as “Here lies a young man most likely from the Maghreb 
approximately in his 30s.”  Other graves, for reasons we did not understand, had 
plastic flowers on them” (Interview 06/22/2014). 
 
Migrants arriving at Italy’s southern shores comprised various categories of people, 
including Tunisians aspiring to have better life opportunities in the EU and others who claim to 
have worked for the former Ben Ali regime and fled to Lampedusa to request political asylum. 
Irrespective of their claims, all of these migrants fell under the United Nations (UN) 1951 
Refugee Convention and were, therefore, humanitarian cases entitled to international protection. 
Yet, many were unlawfully subjected to immediate repatriation, a situation that troubled many 
local and international NGOs and human rights groups. Amnesty International argued that being 
removed from the island within one or two days of arrival would certainly prevent migrants from 
filing for political asylum—a serious human rights violation. Such deportation practices are 
                                                          
4 A popular neighborhood in Tunis with characteristics similar to Hay Ettadhamen. 
 
5 The dead bodies were of mixed nationalities mainly from Sub-Saharan Africa, but included Tunisians. 
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strictly prohibited under international, regional, and domestic human rights as well as refugee 
law and would, in turn, constitute a breach of the non-refoulement principle.6  
It is important to note that, for the majority of the study participants, Italy was not always 
a final destination, but a gateway to European and Scandinavian countries including Germany, 
Holland, and Sweden, but mainly France.7  
 
Fig 1. “La Porta d’Europa,” Work of the Artist Mimmo Paladino 
 
A number of migrants believed that political asylum applications in these countries are 
less bureaucratic and are often easily processed. In addition, the majority of Tunisian migrants 
have the most social and economic networks, which were established in the sixties and seventies, 
within these countries. Using these networks of primarily family and friends, migrants were able, 
either via communication technology, e.g., Facebook (FB), Skype, WhatsApp, and Viber, or in 
person, to get access help: survival tips; material support, i.e., food, accommodation, and money; 
emotional support; information about, and access to, jobs; and other resources and benefits in the 
                                                          
6 Non-refoulement, a key facet of refugee law, concerns the protection of refugees against being returned or 
repatriated to places where their lives or freedoms could be endangered. 
 
7 According to the Office of Tunisians Abroad the number of Tunisians residing in France in 2012 is 668,668 
Source : Office des Tunisiens à l’Étranger (OTE)/Direction de l’Information et des Relations Publiques (DIRP). 
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country of destination. The same online strategies and social media, as I will demonstrate in 
Chapter six, enabled migrants to instantaneously spread their migration stories about the sea 
passage and detention conditions, which thus gained more visibility and attracted more support 
and empathy for victims. 
II. Transnational Research: Methodological Considerations 
Researchers of anthropology who study migration have started to question some of the 
traditional methodological frameworks of the discipline, e.g., “doing ethnography.” 
Anthropologists argue that this method is no longer appropriate or feasible with regards to 
research on current transnational processes (Appadurai 1991; Marcus 1995; Clifford 1997; Gupta 
& Ferguson 1997; Hannerz 2003; Levitt and Glick Schiller 2004; Wolff 2004; Hage 2005; Gielis 
2009; Scheper-Hughes 2010; Levitt and Waters 2002; Ley 2004; Pries 2001). Much of the 
literature generated through the use of transnational ethnographies and reflexive case studies 
demonstrates how transnational practices can become structural tools yielding plausible patterns 
of analysis, revealing intricate dynamics of the subject under study, and the bringing to light the 
larger structures in which they are embedded—results that “positive” science fails to do. Levitt et 
al. (2008) argue that migration ethnographic research, which focuses on the local and the global 
and employs micro-territorial units with micro-cultural communities, has the capacity to 
elucidate complex transnational phenomena and dynamics that earlier methodologies failed to 
capture. This type of research emphasizes the importance of different personalized life 
experiences, taking into consideration the socio-historical context and the risk involved in 
making “universalistic generalizations which dramatically obscure critical shades of difference” 
(Levitt et al. 2008: 4). This type of ethnographic research methodology gives importance to 
individual agency and transnational socio-cultural and personal practices, thus pushing scholars 
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to interrogate a number of categories that had been taken for granted, such as gender, race, 
ethnicity, citizenship, identity, and borders. This kind of research, often qualitative, enables 
participants to provide their own accounts of migration experiences and challenges by expanding 
on most aspects of those categories. As Bogdan and Bilken (1992: 30-31) observe, “The 
qualitative research approach demands that the world be approached with the assumption that 
nothing is trivial, that everything has the potential of being a clue that might unlock a more 
comprehensive understanding of what is being studied.” 
 This dissertation, which focuses on irregular migrants who came into Sicily after the 2011 
uprising in Tunisia, investigates ways in which this group of migrants was, and still is, 
categorized, positioned, and represented in Italian dominant public discourse. I ethnographically 
document what happened to the migrants who landed in Lampedusa and Sicily by examining the 
various human rights abuses perpetrated against them. In doing so, I scrutinize the survival 
strategies of the study population and argue that these strategies were a mechanism, used by both 
individuals and sometimes groups, to reject the humiliation and various forms of stigma they 
experienced in detention centers as well as in the larger Italian society. To illustrate my analysis, 
I draw upon selective oral histories collected from migrants in Lampedusa, Sicily and Hay 
Ettadhamen, Tunisia. I also include various narratives of Italian protagonists to better understand 
the way residents shaped the Tunisian migrants’ negotiation of their position and individual 
subjectivities in the host society. I analyze the various survival tactics, both individual and 
collective, that Tunisian migrants employed to see how they informed, challenged or disrupted 
the dominant social constructions of migrants “as a threat.” In my analysis, I focus on local, 
transnational, individual, and collective acts of survival and resistance and their ability to disturb 
the power structures and the xenophobic migration discourse used in Italian society. I examine 
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how Tunisian migrants managed to reverse their situation of vulnerability and invisibility by 
actively affirming their “right to claim a right” (Isin 2009:380). 
One of the main goals of this dissertation is to explore the ways in which migrants 
undermined their enforced invisibility and potential deportability by engaging in various forms 
of resistance to produce new practices of political belonging (Isin 2009), claimed their rights, and 
avoided deportation. I examine how migrants experienced their socially constructed “illegality” 
and “criminality” engaged with their migration project by moving away from being considered 
“sub-humans” and non-status persons to becoming active subjects. I argue that the 
criminalization narrative put forth by Italian migration laws, in addition to the essentialized 
images channeled by mainstream Italian media, has served to normalize deep, negative 
stereotypes that Italian citizens held about the Tunisian migrant population—stereotypes that 
resulted in more restrictive migration policies and tighter border-control operations. The 
criminalization of the study population was also used to justify the deportation of a number of 
migrants back to Tunisia, thus delegitimizing their claims for political asylum either in Italy or 
elsewhere in the EU. I argue that the unlawful deportations, criminalizing policies, and negative 
representations could be demeaning and dehumanizing for the irregular migrant, but also could 
function as a starting point for that migrant to craft various types of survival mechanisms and 
resistance strategies. Two main questions that I address in the dissertation are: what are the 
processes of the criminalization and dehumanization of the Tunisian migrants, and how did these 
processes impact their daily lives. I explore how these dehumanizing processes and the irregular 
status label made it difficult for these migrants to function as “normal” human beings by 
blocking their access to numerous life opportunities, by denying them rights and benefits, and by 
hindering their participation in Italian society. For instance, I was interested to see how the 
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Tunisian irregular migrant population could effectively protest against their potential 
deportability while, at the same time, be a “hidden,” vulnerable, and often silenced population. In 
doing so, I draw upon James Scott’s (Scott 1990) concept of “weapons of the weak” to study 
migrants’ everyday forms of resistance and the ways in which they contribute to the protection of 
their rights and the advancement of their claims regarding their “non-status” situation. I am 
interested in strategies used by the study population, from the complex, i.e., self-inflicting bodily 
harm to avoid deportability, to the simple, i.e., acquiring fraudulent documents to access the 
labor market. 
 The conceptual framework for this dissertation is embedded in transnational migration 
scholarship that is particularly influenced by the idea of the “permeability” of national 
boundaries and the resulting economic, socio-cultural, and transnational political exchanges 
taking place across borders (Appadurai 1991, Schiller and Blanc 1993, Yuval-Davis 2011, 
Ossman et al. 2007). This “permeability” and “blurred” borders, I argue, have been strategically 
employed by members of the study population to rethink their positions in mainstream Italian 
society so that they could combat ongoing discrimination and other forms of subordination and 
oppression that they encountered. I use the concept of “transnationalism” as an analytical tool to 
describe the “process by which migrants, through their daily activities, forge and sustain various 
social, economic, and political relations” that connect them with a number of social networks 
across national borders (Bach, Glick-Schiller, and Szanton-Blanc 1994: 6).  My study engages 
these debates to reframe the question of “borders” as shifting political spaces which, by virtue of 
their fluidity and overlapping exchanges between people, goods, ideas, etc., defy any bounded 
and fixed characterization or classification. Evidently, globalization creates and increases the 
intensity and interconnections of human actions, as well as producing new sites and logics of 
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representation, but also resistance, both actual and virtual. The use of social media in sparking 
the North African popular uprisings is a strong example of the massive transformation of the 
means by which transnational political organizing is gained, maintained, and diffused, as well as 
its ability to forge spectacular new forms of resistance and political participation.  
This study also looks at how Tunisian migrants use transnational networks, 
communication technologies, and social media to reject their label as “passive victims” by re-
enacting their resistance against the state’s hegemonic practices and its oppressive migration 
policies. Throughout the dissertation, and to illustrate my arguments, I employ various narratives 
to help readers better understand aspects of some of these pertinent issues as they relate to the 
plight of post-uprising Tunisian migrants. I sometimes quote the study participants directly to 
give vibrancy to their voices which can vividly portray the problems they are facing. 
Occasionally, I paraphrase their perspectives to illustrate their various experiences of irregularity 
in the Italian host society. These narratives and perspectives present examples of how some 
migrants were active agents and able to move away from “invisibility” to “visibility,” inducing a 
shift which Ruggiero calls “reappearance” (Ruggiero 2000:54). 
A transnational perspective for doing multi-sited ethnographic migration research, such 
as the one I am employing, should advance new explanations and incorporate multiple types and 
forms of ethnography and processes of theory development to tackle the complexity of the 
migratory phenomena at stake. A multi-sited qualitative design is motivated by the idea of 
increasing the variability of the sample size across multiple locations to ensure enhanced validity 
of the research data. The goal behind doing this type of ethnography is, not to arrive at a single 
paradigm or master narrative, but to find ways to place these different theoretical frameworks 
and conceptual and methodological trends in fecund conversation with one another. Marcus 
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(1998) argues that single-sited ethnography is incapable of capturing the complex situations of 
fieldwork, especially those dealing with transnational mobility and requiring multiple localities. 
According to him, a multi-sited ethnography has the potential of revealing the full scope of the 
migration experience in its micro- and macro-aspects. In his description of multi-sited fieldwork, 
he states that “it moves out of the single sites and local situations of conventional ethnographic 
research designs to examine the circulations of cultural meanings, objects and identities in 
diffuse time-space” (Marcus 1998: 86). This idea is well demonstrated by a number of 
ethnographic studies dealing with human mobility and transnationalism (White 1995; Guarnizo 
1997; Wolf 1997; Schiller and Fouron 1998; Fitzgerald 2000; Salih 2002; Stoller 2002; Collins 
2012; Holmes 2013; Ossman 2007; 2013). Most of these ethnographies are highly interpretive 
and reflexive. They stress the need to examine people’s movements via the lens of transnational 
global forces in order to take into account the multi-dimensional, socio-cultural, and political 
scopes shaping migrants’ subjectivities and the meanings they give to them. A number of these 
ethnographic studies emphasize the role of agency when dealing with transnational movements, 
demonstrating through ethnographic qualitative research how migrants negotiate and contest the 
various socio-economic and political pressures they encounter in host societies (De la Cruz 1995; 
Kearney 1995; Guarnizo 1997;  Levitt 2001; Salih 2002, 2003; Worby 2010; Khosravi 2010; 
Vora 2008; Mahdavi 2011; Khalaf and Alkobaisi 1999; Akesson et al. 2010; Levin and Fincher 
2010; McMurray 2000; Ben Salah 1994; Driessen 1991; Attiya 2010). 
My ethnographic strategy employs a people-centered approach to transnationalism by not 
focusing on macro/structural dynamics of phenomena but, instead, by examining the subjective 
experiences of the Tunisian migrant population of the study and the way in which they negotiate 
their identities and the myriad of asymmetrical power relationships that govern their everyday 
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lives. My intentions are not to produce a sample that can stand as a representative of the overall 
irregular migrants in my five research sites. Rather, I purposefully use this qualitative, 
exploratory, multi-sited research methodology to reach a deeper understanding of how these 
individuals interpreted their experiences and engaged with their local and transnational physical 
and socio-cultural environments through their everyday routine. The everyday, as Clayton says, 
“is a useful conceptual tool through which to examine the spatial and temporal dynamics of 
identity” (2009:483). A good ethnography is one that succeeds in interpreting “a situation that 
incorporates the participants’ symbolic meanings and ongoing patterns of social interactions” 
(Merriam and Simpson 2000:108). 
Thus, a multi-sited qualitative research design was the most appropriate method to 
address my research questions and to collect accurate data and valuable details from the study 
participants’ perspectives. Marcus (1995) contends that multi-sited ethnographic research is 
useful in analyzing transnational processes since it helps researchers reach a macro-level 
understanding of their study population by tracing their movements and interactions through time 
and space across manifold locations.  
A qualitative research approach that puts great emphasis on the researcher’s immersion in 
the field, such as the one I employed, helped me better understand the meanings Tunisian 
migrants attached to the experiences of “vulnerability” across various physical and virtual 
spaces. Vulnerability as defined by Chambers: 
means not lack or want, but exposure and defenselessness. It has two sides: the external 
side of exposure to shocks, stress and risk; and the internal side of defenselessness, 
meaning a lack of means to cope without damaging loss. Loss can take many forms— 
becoming or being physically weaker, economically impoverished, socially dependent, 
humiliated or psychologically harmed (Chambers 1995:20). 
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III. “Irregular” versus “Illegal”: Which Term to Use?  
Throughout the dissertation, and as I will demonstrate in Chapter five, I use the term 
“irregular” rather than “illegal” in compliance with existing migration scholarship. The migration 
literature has often contested the term “illegal” as being loaded with negative associations 
towards human beings (De Genova 2002, 2005; Ngai 2004; Duvell 2006). This critique is given 
voice by the famous human rights quote, credited to Elie Wiesel: “No human being is illegal.” 
Therefore, the ideologically loaded adjective “illegal” has been substituted by the term 
“irregular.” Referring to a person as “illegal” obscures the historical and political construction of 
migrant categories, confuses the changing nature of the migration status, and diminishes the 
humanity of the migrant. The migration experience is a dynamic one; an individual can adhere 
(or be made to adhere) to multiple categories during his or her migration journey. Based on 
ethnographic evidence, the migrants of this study have moved into, and out of, different 
migration statuses due to the continuously shifting migration legislation and regulation that keep 
taking place in Italy. Migration status is historically specific and changeable; this is 
demonstrated, in part, through regularization programs that give states the power to 
construct migrants as either legal or illegal (Baldwin-Edwards and Kraler 2009). Others by 
forging fake identities via criminal networks can move from an irregular status to a perfectly 
regular one by simply paying a bribe. Hence, the term is highly blurred and occasionally 
contested since irregularity does not define the migratory experience nor the worth of an 
individual. The adjective “irregular” is never frozen, but remains always very fluid. It may 
describe the migration flow as a whole, but only with regards to its interactions with states’ 
actions, which may deeply affect the course and structure of a migratory process (Cvajner and 
Sciortino 2010). 
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 My ethnography focused exclusively on the Tunisian irregular male migrants who 
successfully arrived in Italy, either by themselves or via the assistance of a third party, and who 
happen to be the least protected under migration law.  My assumption is that for this category of 
migrants, their irregular status is the main source of their constant vulnerability to human rights 
abuses, discrimination, marginalization, exclusion, and social stigma—a theme that I explore in 
more detail in Chapter 5.   
IV. Research questions, Methodology, Significance and Plan of the Dissertation 
 i. Research Questions 
 By using a qualitative design, I aim to research two levels of human rights abuse: 1) violations 
of human rights by non-state actors, i.e., smugglers, employers, and the public; and 2) human 
rights abuses by the Italian authorities within detention centers at the point of entry. I discuss this 
topic by ethnographically exploring the construction of the Tunisian irregular migrant as the 
“violent Other,” the “potential criminal,” or the “hidden terrorist.”  
The following research questions guided my observations, interviews and data analysis 
throughout the writing of this dissertation:  
1) What are the processes of criminalizing and dehumanizing the migrant “Other,” and how do 
they permit and rationalize the violence perpetrated against him?  
2) How did post-uprising Tunisian migrants and refugees experience, negotiate, understand and 
discuss their socially constructed “illegality” and “criminality”?  
3) What are the trends of these forms of violence and oppression and their consequences on the 
migrants’ identities but, more importantly, on their survival and resistance strategies and 
transborder social engagements?  
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ii. Methodology  
 To answer these research questions, I employed a mixture of qualitative ethnographic 
methods, i.e., archival research, participant observation, life histories, and open-ended 
interviews, carried out over a 14-month period (June 2013-October 2014). I used a snowball 
sampling technique to recruit 60 young Tunisian males across the study’s various locations (see 
Chapter four on Methods) between the ages of 20 and 35 years. My focus on male migrants is in 
no way intended to imply that women were not involved in the sea crossings, but their number 
compared to men remains very negligible. This multi-sited research was carried out in three main 
locations that hosted a large number of Tunisian irregular migrants: Sicily, i.e., Agrigento, 
Trapani, Palermo, and Sciacca, the island of Lampedusa, and a previous migration research 
site—the Tunisian township of Hay Ettadhamen, which had a large population of deported 
migrants. 
V. Purpose/Significance 
Through the proposed study, I hope to establish a basis for understanding the racialization of 
the irregular migrants’ Muslim identity, the politicization of their experience of displacement, 
and their resistance and survival strategies in southern Italy. This project engages with 
discussions concerning transnational flows of ideas and larger, transborder, socio-political 
activities by studying the processes through which transnational movements are produced, 
forged, and maintained. There is a huge gap in the migration scholarly literature regarding the 
experiences of Tunisian irregular migrants in Italy. My dissertation responds to this gap by 
providing an ethnographic documentation of the members of this under-represented group and 
the way they handled the vulnerability of their lives, their survival strategies, and their rebellion 
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against their precarious living conditions within detention centers and mainstream society. This 
study could contribute to the ongoing academic and legislative debates in the field of 
transnational migration, human mobility, and migrants’ human rights. It could also be of special 
relevance to practitioners and policymakers working on the issue of irregular migration of 
Tunisians and its wider socio-economic and political implications.  
VI. Dissertation Outline 
The dissertation is composed of eight chapters, including introductory and concluding 
chapters. 
Chapter 2 is divided into two parts: an historical overview, and an examination of major 
Italian migration laws. First, I examine the history of migration trends in Tunisia prior to the 
migratory wave following the 2011 Tunisian popular uprising. I focus on different historical 
phases from the early 1940s until the uprising. I demonstrate how the implementation of visa 
requirements and the toughening of the visa procedures made irregular migration the only option 
for a number of Tunisians who were unable to enter Italy or Europe through official or legal 
channels. Secondly, I examine the major Italian migrant legislation, scrutinizing these laws by 
analyzing their socio-legal dimensions and arguing that their central goal is to fight against 
irregular migration through the implementation of more restrictive border control policies. I 
discuss the “criminalizing” content of the Italian migration laws such as the Bossi Fini law (Law 
189/30 July 2002) and the ways in which it has contributed to the emergence of the irregular 
migration phenomenon as a “crime,” a “security issue,” and a question of “public order,” thereby 
exacerbating anti-migration feelings not only in Italy, but also in the EU as a whole. In the last 
part of the chapter, I attempt to show how the situation of “illegality” is the product of Italian 
migration laws. 
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 Chapter 3 sets up the conceptual framework that I adopt for the dissertation, which draws 
from transnational migration scholarship and its idea of the “permeability” of national 
boundaries and “borders” as shifting political spaces. This “permeability” and “blurred” borders, 
I argue, have been strategically employed by my study population to rethink their positions in 
mainstream Italian society in order to combat the ongoing socio-political stigma and other forms 
of oppression that they encounter. I review and discuss the major theoretical paradigms and 
conceptual framework with regards to transnational migration research and their relevance to 
anthropology. I then discuss the multi-sited research design and assess its utility in addressing 
postmodern constructs such as “mobility” and the “spatial turn.” I also show how multi-sited 
research is valuable in helping researchers literally transcend geographical boundaries to reach a 
macro-level understanding of a study population. In addition, I analyze the phenomenon of 
irregular migration, arguing that it is a product of the transnational condition. Finally, I examine 
social network theory and demonstrate through theoretical and ethnographic evidence that social 
networks play a crucial role in the lives of irregular migrants by acting like a dynamic engine 
that fuels “chain migration,” which stimulates and accelerates the process of irregular migration. 
Chapter 4: As a start, and in order to familiarize the readers with the research site and 
give a sense of context, I incorporate a detailed “thick” description of the five locations of my 
research, infusing each setting description with brief narrative sketches of a few informants to 
give readers a sense of who these people are, the way they think, and how they live their lives. I 
then explain the multiple techniques that I employed to facilitate immersion in these different 
field research sites and to recruit study participants. I describe in detail data collection strategies, 
i.e., archival research, participant observation, and open-ended interviews, as well as data 
analysis and management techniques. Finally, I discuss the importance of conducting ethical 
 19 
 
research and review the procedures I followed to protect the privacy and confidentiality of the 
study participants. I reflect upon the challenges of conducting such ethnography and share my 
positionality experience as a Tunisian anthropologist conducting fieldwork in both my native 
country as well as a foreigner in Italy.  
In Chapter 5, I start by explaining the metaphoric usage of the expression “harqa” in the 
Tunisian vernacular as a reference to the phenomenon of irregular migration. To explore the 
various hardships, dangers, violence, and suffering that Tunisian migrants undergo from their 
departure point to their landing in Lampedusa, I discuss six specific stages of the migrant’s 
journey—pre-departure, sea-crossing, rescue or interception, detention, expulsion, and 
removal—with detailed, ethnographic-rich description of each step to depict the reality of these 
experiences. In doing so, I highlight the emotional and psychological impacts on migrants 
through the various testimonies from the study population in Lampedusa, Sicily, and Hay 
Ettadhamen, Tunisia. I then turn to the “industry of irregular migration”: how it is structured; 
who the people involved are; and what roles they play. I identify the various tactics involved in 
this “industry,” such as the recruitment of migrants, the cost of the passage, and the different 
strategies employed to collect money. The last part of the chapter includes narratives depicting 
the deplorable conditions, ill-treatment, and abuse Tunisian migrants go through in the Italian 
reception and detention centers. The migrants’ stories of their detention experiences include 
accounts of life-threatening situations, violence, humiliation, hopelessness, anxiety, and 
frustration—all demonstrating how detention affects migrants’ physical and mental well-being, 
exacerbates their existential precariousness and vulnerability, and degrades them until they feel 
no longer human.  
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Chapter 6 is organized into two sections. In the first section, I cover aspects of the 
context and “criminalizing” content of Italian policies and reactions towards the “illegal” human 
flows taking place during and after the post-Tunisian uprising. I provide a critical analysis of the 
social construction of the Tunisian migrant as the “Other” or the potential “criminal” by 
exploring the sensational and derogatory rhetoric in the local media. I explore the ambivalence of 
the Italian migration laws, such as the restrictive Bossi Fini law (Law 189/30 July 2002) and its 
introduction of the crime of “illegal migration,” to explore their impacts on the everyday life of 
the Tunisian migrant and the construction of his “criminalization.” I discuss the security 
argument, noting that it is often combined with the nationalist, xenophobic, racist discourse 
resulting in the exclusion of the migrant “Other.” In the second section of the chapter, I examine 
the “racialization” of Muslim migrants and how this narrative is used to implement an increasing 
number of restrictive migration policies and programs that, in turn, normalize new forms of 
islamophobic attitudes that exacerbate anti-Muslim rhetoric. In my analysis, I use a few 
narratives of study participants that echo the many other voices of the larger migrant population 
and give meaning to their experiences of suffering. The aim is to improve understanding of the 
experiences and impacts of Islamophobia on the identity construction and daily lives of this 
particular migrant population.   
In Chapter 7, I argue that earlier conceptions of migrants as victims and passive objects do not 
always hold true, as demonstrated by the study participants in this dissertation who, to some 
degree, were able to thwart their normative representation by turning the discursive power 
relations and oppression into strategies of struggle and resistance. First, I lay out the theoretical 
framework in which my empirical findings will be grounded. I draw upon James Scott’s (Scott 
1990) concept of “weapons of the weak” to study migrants’ everyday forms of resistance and the 
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ways in which they contribute to the protection of their rights and the advancement of their 
claims regarding their “non-status” situation. I demonstrate how acts of resistance, when 
efficiently and collectively enacted; can help reverse the situation of vulnerability, oppression, 
and stigma. When migrants become politically active, they can create a political space in order to 
challenge detention policies, common stereotypes, and state hegemonic practices. I use the 
concept of “transnationalism from below,” (Michael Peter Smith and Luis Guarnizo 1998) that 
examines people's mundane activities and everyday forms of agency within and across nation-
state borders to demonstrate that the reliance on transborder and local social networks can be 
extremely useful in providing migrants with various strategies to navigate their migration 
journey and to adopt and engage in various resistance strategies. This chapter also looks at how 
Tunisian migrants use transnational networks, communication technologies, and social media to 
reject their label as “passive victims” by re-enacting their resistance against the state hegemonic 
practices and its oppressive migration policies. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
 
TUNISIAN MIGRATION TO ITALY: HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
 AND MIGRATION POLICIES/LAWS 
 
I. Introduction 
In 1980s, Italy's population was 56.4 million people, 423.000 of whom were migrants from 
North Africa, the Middle East, sub-Saharan Africa, Eastern Europe, Latin America, and Asia. 
Most arrived in the 1980s when Italy did not require an entry visa (Hamilton and Jachimowicz 
2002). However, this migration pattern changed, starting in the early 2000s and intensifying in 
2011, a time of popular uprisings in the Middle East. A huge number of Arab migrants, who 
were mostly irregular, crossed the Mediterranean Sea into Italy. Since the beginning of 2015, 
which has been labelled as the “migration crisis year,” the number of migrants heading to the 
EU, mainly through Italy and Greece, reached a peak: more than 1 million migrants and 
refugees, the highest number ever recorded. Despite massive, border-control operations by 
countries on the Mediterranean Sea, this body of water has become the most porous and 
dangerous border between Europe and its neighbors. Based on media reports, an Italian NGO 
estimated that 15,016 migrants had died or were missing at sea between January 1998, and 
September 30, 2014 (Fargues and Bonfanti 2014).  
This chapter provides the context, both historical and legal, for a specific migrant flow as 
described in the introduction, that of young, male, irregular Tunisian migrants who landed on the 
small island of Lampedusa, Italy, which had become a prime transit point for Tunisians fleeing 
turmoil from their country’s 2011 popular uprising. This content is organized into four sections: 
1) an historical overview of Tunisian migration before 2011; 2) Tunisian migration from 2011 to 
the present time; 3) Italian migration policies/laws from the 1970s to the present time; and 4) a 
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socio-legal critique of those policies/laws to demonstrate their inadequacy in the overall 
management and governance of the migration phenomenon, as well as how they contributed to 
the concept of the migration phenomenon as a “security issue” not only for Italy, but for the EU 
as a whole.  
II. Historical Overview 
i. Migration Trends Before 2011  
This section traces the first movements of Tunisians, who were mainly seasonal migrants, to 
Italy, and the increase in their numbers over time. As will be demonstrated, historical, 
geographical, and cultural connections developed between the two countries, created a strong 
“pull” for Tunisian agricultural and other low-skilled workers despite the rise of an anti-migrant 
movement in Italy and the crackdown on irregular migration.  
The earliest of the large migrations of Tunisians occurred during World War II, when a large 
number of Tunisians went to France because that country needed manual labor from the 
Maghrebi region of north Africa, i.e., Tunisia, Algeria, and Morocco. These Tunisians replaced 
French workers who had been conscripted for war and those carrying out military operations in 
the Maghrebi region (Singer-Kerel 1985). Thousands of Tunisians migrated to France, working 
in farming, service, construction, and various other sectors that did not require professional skills 
or college diplomas. For the majority of Tunisians, the socio-economic, post-colonial links, their 
mastery of the French language, and pre-existing kinship ties and social networks made France 
the primary migration destination in the ten years following Tunisia’s independence in 1956.  
 However, in the 1970s and 1980s, Italy became a desirable migrant destination for many 
Tunisians. Factors such as geographic proximity and favorable income and demographic 
differentials attracted migrants fleeing unemployment and poverty, and they became the first 
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generation of Tunisians in Italy. Another factor was political. For example, in 1983, the political 
conflict that took place between Tunisia and Libya led to the expulsion of a massive number of 
Tunisian migrants from Libya, which fueled more out-migratory movements towards Italy.  
These early migrants landed in the coastal towns of western Sicily, which was 
geographically close, i.e., only 72 miles away from Tunisia and to which Tunisia had maritime 
links. During this period, the Italian agricultural sector required an increased flow of manual 
labor (Koch 1989:190), and a new category of seasonal migrants came primarily to work either 
in olive and orange groves; grape, tomato, and watermelon fields; or the fishing industry.  
Seasonal migration was extremely useful to the Mediterranean type of agriculture practiced in 
the south of Italy, which requires a low level of technology and which may be performed with 
large numbers of unskilled and highly flexible workers. This early seasonal migratory wave also 
acted as “replacement migration” for local Sicilian workers who left their traditional agriculture 
and fishing jobs to work in the “industrial triangle” in Italy’s north where employment was more 
formal and secure (Faini and Venturini 1994: 327). As well, an influx of Tunisians started to 
rapidly fill gaps in the fishing industry, especially in the coastal Sicilian towns of Mazara del 
Vallo, Marsala, and Trapani. The surge of migrants, Daly states, escalated due to “the leniency 
and corruption of many local police officers and the increasing involvement of organized gangs, 
including the Mafia which created a boom in the migrant smuggling business into the south of 
Italy” (Daly 2001: 191). Other migrant destinations were Naples and the localities of the 
Campania region (Carchedi 1992; Vaccina 1983; Vizzini 1983) where a number of Tunisians 
took up various irregular jobs in vineyards as well as in construction.  
The conjunction of seasonal labor and a particular demand, e.g., the harvest, produces a 
form of migration that Fassmann Hein (1995) calls “invisible” because it is barely evident to 
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authorities and often is confined to the countryside. Social services remain unaware of this 
migration, and the public only becomes cognizant of it if there are documented disputes and acts 
of violence between migrants and Italian workers who make up this irregular labor market. 
Fassman states that “this type of migration is hard to control and the provisions made by 
migration policies have little effect on it” (p. 85). He argues that “invisible” migration primarily 
involves people whose main purpose is to accumulate as much capital as possible to use in their 
home countries, i.e., reinvestments and/or financing of family networks (1995).  
During the 1970s and 1980s, no entry visa was required for Tunisians traveling to Italy, 
and the Italian government actually encouraged the arrival of migrants from North Africa whose 
labor was necessary for building the Italian economy, especially in the agricultural sector.  This 
situation of open borders created waves of several hundreds of North African migrants, mainly 
Tunisians and Moroccans, who were lured by better and more lucrative income to settle in Italy 
while the waves of seasonal and sporadic migration decreased (Koch 1989:190). In 1985, the 
number of Tunisian migrants in Italy was estimated at 4,400; by 1993, it had escalated to 50,000 
(Giubilaro 1997: 64). Other factors also contributed to the escalating Tunisian migratory flow to 
Italy, e.g., the change in Tunisian political leadership in 1987. Under the new President Zine Al 
Abidine Ben Ali, the Tunisian focus turned away from France and its old colonial ties towards 
Italy with the goal of fostering new bilateral economic and political relations. These Tunisian 
migrants generated various social networks, which were reinforced by the arrival of more 
migrants. The phenomenon of chain migration, in which one migrant brings a pool of other 
migrants, played a significant role in making Italy the second destination after France for 
working- and middle-class Tunisians (Mabrouk 2003).   
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Fig 2. Lampedusa: only 72 miles from the Cap-Bon region in Northern Tunisia 
The absence of Italian entry rules also attracted various independent traders, primarily 
women and students, who took 35-minute flights to Palermo to purchase products, e.g., 
wholesale clothing, jewelry, and other items used for wedding ceremonies and other 
celebrations, for re-sale at profitable rates in Tunisia.  Moreover, Italy continued to be a 
destination for many Tunisian students who arrived during summer vacation to engage in 
seasonal agricultural jobs located primarily in Sicily, e.g., Palermo and Trapani, and other 
southern cities, e.g., Naples. Many students would spend their liras, i.e., former Italian currency, 
earned from these jobs on merchandise such as electronic equipment, small household 
appliances, leatherwear, and clothing. They, in turn, sold these products in Tunisian markets, 
specialty stores, and on the streets, thereby creating a marginal and chaotic market activity of 
smuggled goods. This business, referred to as “le commerce de la valise” (suitcase trade), was 
very lucrative because Italian goods were highly prized.  The trade in untaxed, imported Italian 
goods contributed to the wealth of individual households and encouraged the growth of the 
informal, local economy.  Some migrants returning to Tunisia for a summer visit would 
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sometimes hire locally unemployed young men, often relatives, to sell these consumer goods. 
This socio-economic phenomenon flourished in the 1980s, creating new ways for Tunisians to 
earn a living, especially the urban poor.   
In 1990, however, the Italian government introduced stricter travel protocols requiring an 
entry visa for Tunisian nationals, among others.  The visa was instituted because of the 
increasing numbers of Tunisians and people of other nationalities, who were arriving on Italian 
shores to escape poverty and unemployment and to find better life opportunities.  These migrants 
came mainly from Tunisia, but also from Morocco, Senegal, Libya, and some sub-Saharan 
African countries. These new waves of migrants started to fuel Italian political debates, which 
arose from a widespread public anxiety and fear in relation to migration in general.  While 
migrant labor was increasingly needed, especially in northern Italy, public opinion continued to 
associate high immigration levels with increased crime, poverty, and local unemployment 
(Woodcock 2010). Consequently, the number of legal migrants decreased, especially during the 
first half of the 1990s.  
After toughening its visa procedures, the Italian government decided to reinforce control 
of its maritime frontiers, thus solidifying its borders and creating the phenomenon of irregular 
migration for the first time (Mabrouk 2003, Fargues 2004). This irregular migration became the 
only alternative for many Tunisians and other young African men who were, and still are, unable 
to enter Italy or Europe through official or legal channels. In fact, during the last four decades, 
Italy has become one of the most important European destinations for an ever-growing number 
of irregular migrants arriving primarily from North Africa and Eastern Europe, i.e., from 143,800 
in 1970 to 4,279,000 million in 2010 when they constituted 7.1% of the Italy’s population 
(Rusconi 2010: 7-9). During this time, Italy transitioned from being traditionally a “sending” 
 28 
 
country to becoming a “receiving” one, especially after the steep decline in the birth rate during 
the 1990s (King 1993; King and Rybaczuk 1993). Myron Weiner (1995:59) describes Italy as the 
“soft underbelly” of Fortress Europe, being the main entry point for many migrants looking for 
“a backdoor entrance to the European Union.”  
 
Fig 3. Geographic Distribution of Tunisian Emigrants, 2002 and 2012 
Source: Office des Tunisiens à l’Etranger (Office of Tunisians Abroad) 
 
The current requirements for a visa to Italy are rigorous, requiring at a minimum, 1) an 
application form; 2) a valid passport; 3) proof of payment of the visa fee; 4) round-trip 
reservations or an itinerary with dates and flight numbers specifying entry and exit; 5) proof of 
sufficient funds for duration of stay; 6) proof of travel/health/accident insurance; 7) proof of 
accommodation; 8) a certificate of employment and proof of leave; and 9) a personal interview 
after deposit of all the required documents. Not surprisingly, obtaining a visa to Italy and Europe, 
in general, is perceived by the majority of Tunisians as an insurmountable hurdle, thereby 
making irregular migration the only option to enter Europe. As one informant nicely put it “Visa 
littalyene…hahahah…hkaya mustahila…Wallah ki tbous iiinik” (“Visa to Italy, hahah. It is an 
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impossible story…you won’t get it even if you kiss your eye.”8. During the early 1990s, the first 
sea crossings from Tunisia to Lampedusa were generally spontaneous, but soon became lucrative 
sources of income for a booming business organized by professional smugglers. In his discussion 
of the relationship between the visa implementation and emergence of irregular migration in the 
Mediterranean, Cuttitta writes 
First, it may be worth remembering that the roots of Lampedusa’s current 
“borderness” originally lie in the birth of Schengenland and in the adoption of more 
and more restrictive immigration regulations at national and EU levels, beginning 
with the two most “classical” instruments of migration control: the imposition of the 
visa obligation on citizens of most non-EU countries, and of sanctions on carriers 
transporting undocumented migrants across state borders. Without these measures, 
undocumented boat migration would not exist, for migrants would possibly take an 
aeroplane to Rome or London, or a ferry to Palermo or Marseille, but surely not a 
dinghy to Lampedusa (Cuttitta 2014: 202). 
 
 Irregular migration flows increased considerably during the first decade of the 21st century 
due to uneven opportunities on both shores of the Mediterranean, the EU’s continuous dwindling 
population and labor force, and the Tunisian labor-supply growth which outstripped economic 
development (Khachani, 2004: 35). By 2008, the number of arrivals to Lampedusa had increased 
to 31,250 people from 12,184 people in 2007 (Boubakri 2013:2).  In 2008, Tunisian irregular 
migrants were ranked first among all other migrants arriving in Lampedusa, i.e., 6,762 migrants 
including 52 women and 184 minors (Boubakri 2013:2).  During the pre-uprising period, 2010-
2011, the climate of political repression, regional disparities, and widespread corruption, in 
addition to the global financial crisis, exacerbated Tunisia’s labor market problems, elevating the 
unemployment rate for Tunisian youth from 27.5 per cent in 2010 to 40 per cent in 2011. This is 
significantly higher than the total unemployment rate that went from an average of 13 per cent in 
2010 to 18.3 per cent in 2011 (NIS: 2011). In addition, the number of unemployed College 
                                                          
8 Kissing the eye” is a Tunisian expression referring to the impossibility of getting anything done. 
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graduates has more than doubled since the early 2000s with rates jumping from 14.4% in 2005 to 
32% in 2010 (NIS 2011). 
Despite these socio-economic hardships, Lampedusa continued to be the primary 
obsession and the stepping-stone for thousands of desperate Tunisian youths who dreamed of 
finding their fortune in the “European paradise” (Khedher 2008). Situated in the middle of the 
Sicilian channel only 72 miles from Tunisia’s coast, Lampedusa is the largest of 
the Italian Pelage Islands in the Mediterranean Sea. The island, known as the “isola bella” (the 
beautiful island), has a population of approximately 6,000 people and is famous for its pristine 
beaches which make it one of the major tourist destinations for Italians and travelers from other 
European nations. Its main industries are fishing, agriculture, and tourism. Ironically, the island 
has now also become the symbol of Europe’s migration crisis, as it is a gateway for an 
unprecedented number of irregular migrants and individuals claiming asylum in many European 
states. 
ii. Migration Trends During/After the 2011 Uprising  
 
On December 17, 2010, Mohamed Bouazizi, a poor fruit vendor in Sidi Bouzid, protested 
against the Tunisian government by committing an act of self-immolation. The enormous 
outrage that followed led to a national popular uprising against deplorable living conditions, 
political repression, and massive unemployment. On January 14, 2011, President Zine Al 
Abidine Ben Ali fled the country leaving a political vacuum, a widespread socio-political and 
economic crisis, and disruptive chaos.  
This popular uprising dramatically transformed the politico-migratory climate in the Euro-
Maghreb region. Soon after, migrants and refugees began leaving Tunisia in small groups sailing 
north. From January to September 2011, a “human tsunami,” according to the Italian media, of 
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42,807 undocumented migrants and candidates for political asylum entered Italy by sea, with 
25,867 landing in Lampedusa. This latter number is a dramatic contrast with the numbers two 
years prior: less than 5,000 in 2010 and less than 10,000 in 2009. Italy, as a whole had had an 
annual average of 18,788 in the previous decade (Fargues and Fandrich 2012:4).  
In addition to being the closest point to the North African shore, Lampedusa has a center 
for entering migrants that includes a first-response facility, a reception facility, a first-aid center, 
and a detention center.  Migrants stay at the center for a maximum of two days before being 
relocated to various centers on mainland Italy. Since 2009, the same center, located within close 
proximity to the small Lampedusan airport, has become a location for identification procedures 
and direct expulsion of newly arrived migrants. The Contrada Imbriacola Reception Center, 
which later became the “Centro di identificazione ed espulsione” (Centre for Identification and 
Expulsion) is administered by the Italian Ministry of Interior and strictly guarded by the Italian 
police. The facility has a capacity of 800 people, but due to the emergency situation, it was 
forced to host over 2,800 people (Severoni, 2011:6).  
Migration to Lampedusa increased exponentially when civil war broke out in Libya in 
February 2011, and President Muammar Gaddafi was ousted and then killed.  This civil war 
engendered an extreme state of violence and turmoil across the country, resulting in tens of 
thousands of casualties in early 2011. Several thousand Libyans, as well as Tunisians, Somalis, 
Eritreans, Sudanese, Nigerians, and other south Asian nationalities, e.g., Bangladeshi, Indians 
and Pakistanis, most of them ex-foreign workers in Libya, sailed to Lampedusa in old fishing 
boats and rubber dinghies to seek political asylum in Europe. These crossings caused many 
deaths, including those of young Tunisian men, women, and minors. The UNHCR declared that 
over 2,000 people died in the Mediterranean in 2011 alone, making it the deadliest year on 
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record (Wilkes 2012). According to Fortress Europe, over 13,500 people have perished in these 
dangerous crossings since 1998 (Fortress Europe 2012).  
 
Fig 4. Tunisian Major Departure Points to Lampedusa and Sicily 
 
In the midst of the uprising, the port city of Zarzis, which is located in the southeastern part 
of Tunisia, became a popular “migration hub.” From Zarzis, young Tunisian migrants escaped 
towards Lampedusa, only 162 miles away. It is estimated that 6,300 departures took place from 
Zarzis and its neighboring areas between January 15 to January 30, 2011, with an average of 400 
departures per day (Boubakri 2013:4-5). The departure points quickly spread to other locations 
and ports in Tunisia, such as Sfax, Mahdia, and the Cap Bon region. Departures were organized 
openly and publicly in a number of ports along the coastlines with migrants paying people 
smugglers between $500 to $1,000 US, and many were even ferried free of charge.  In less than 
three months, January to March 2011, more than 25,000 Tunisians arrived in Lampedusa 
(Frontex 2011). In the meantime, hundreds of thousands of sub-Saharan Africans and other 
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migrant workers fled the Libyan civil war, and for the first time in its history, Tunisia itself had 
to deal with unprecedented refugee and humanitarian crises due to the massive number of 
civilians coming from Libya in February 2011. In three months, February to May 2011, 885,000 
people from Libya crossed borders towards neighboring countries, half of whom entered Tunisia: 
48,500 were Tunisians, 208,000 were Libyans, and 185,000 were nationals of third countries 
(IOM 2011:1). 
As I discussed earlier, the massive and immediate character of these migratory flows 
towards Italy had causes ranging from political instability to high levels of corruption, rampant 
unemployment, and economic insecurity, and the widespread security relaxation and state of 
lawlessness following the fall of the Ben Ali regime. A large number of Tunisian security forces, 
such as police and the National Guard had abandoned their police stations, many of which had 
been burned down, since they themselves had become targets of attack and violence during the 
2011 uprising. Only the Tunisian army remained a visible force of law and order, attempting to 
protect the territory and its coastline. During this atmosphere of extreme lawlessness, migrant 
traffickers were able to operate openly, transporting young male migrants, minors included, on 
old fishing vessels to Lampedusa. At this time, migrants arriving on Lampedusa included 
different categories of people. Of the Tunisians, some were economic refugees aspiring to better 
life opportunities in the EU while others may have been involved with the Ben Ali regime and 
were fleeing potential persecution—a status that enabled them to file for political asylum. The 
human flows coming from Libya were, however, refugees fleeing an ongoing war, many of 
whom fell under the UN’s 1951 Refugee Convention and were, therefore, humanitarian cases 
entitled to international protection.  
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The 2011 wave of migrants arriving in Lampedusa sparked a diplomatic conflict between 
Rome and Tunis when an Italian minister proposed sending Italian police forces to Tunisia to 
stop this migration. The Tunisian government condemned Rome for interfering with its 
sovereignty, pushing Italy to seek EU assistance from the European Agency for the Management 
of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the European Union 
(Frontex). This organization manages cooperation between national border guards that is 
undertaken to secure the external borders of the EU, and it oversees issues of “illegal migration,” 
human trafficking, and terrorist infiltration. Frontex was put in charge of patrolling the Sicilian 
channel. On the Tunisian side, surveillance activities were undertaken by the Tunisian coast 
guard and navy during the two months following the uprising. These activities succeeded in 
intercepting and returning thousands of migrants back to Tunisia, with 64,000 detections 
recorded in the central Mediterranean area (Frontex 2012). 
 Despite these measures by the Italian and the Tunisian governments, migrant arrivals of many 
nationalities continued to fill up Lampedusa, quickly reconfiguring the socio-cultural and 
demographic landscape of the island. Not surprisingly, its residents protested in various ways 
against the congestion, the chaos, and their overall state of anxiety and panic. Prime Minister 
Berlusconi reacted immediately and visited Lampedusa, vowing to solve the problem by 
transferring the migrants within 60 hours to detention centers in mainland Italy. He also 
promised an immediate, enforced repatriation of most of these migrants to Tunisia and Libya. “In 
48 to 60 hours, Lampedusa will be inhabited only by Lampedusans,” said Berlusconi (Kington 
2011). As discussed in the Introduction, this was unlawful decision and a serious human rights 
violation that breached the non-refoulement principle.  
[T]he principle of non-refoulement has crystallized into a rule of customary law, 
the core element of which is prohibition of return in any manner whatsoever of 
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refugees to countries where they may face persecution. The scope and application 
of the [customary] rule are determined by [its] essential purpose, thus regulating 
State action wherever it takes place, whether internally, at the border or through its 
agents outside territorial jurisdiction (Goodwin-Gill 1996:143). 
 
Amnesty International stated that a  
“Humanitarian emergency” demands a humanitarian response, not a law and order 
one. Boats carrying migrants and asylum-seekers from Tunisia, Egypt or other North 
African countries must not be pushed back. Everyone arriving is entitled to be 
treated with dignity, to be granted assistance as well as access to a fair asylum 
procedure” (Amnesty International 2011). 
  
However, the Italian public did not perceive of the Tunisian migrants as vulnerable; 
rather, they were considered counter-figures to the “refugee,” i.e., a rebellious group that had 
escaped Tunisia in search of better economic opportunities in Europe (Vaughan-Williams 2011). 
Italians made many complaints about the migrants’ “excessive” demands and “exaggerated 
complaints” about their reception on the island, the poor living conditions in the centers, and the 
low quality of food. The Italian public was also concerned about the fights that Tunisian 
migrants had with center personnel and refugees of other nationalities, especially the Libyans 
(Fieldnotes 07/15/2014). This portrayal of Tunisians as pseudo-refugees was used by the Italian 
government to criminalize their entry into the country, support the notion that the country was 
being overwhelmed by an unsustainable number of migrants, and encourage their repatriation, a 
stance that garnered the support of the Lega Nord (Senato della Repubblica, 2011b: VIII). 
Irregular migrants, the subject of this research, constituted yet another group of migrants. 
In comparison with asylum seekers, regular migrants, and trafficked persons, irregular migrants 
have no clear status or form of protection and are often unable to access their basic rights. By 
living outside the law, they are unable to access humanitarian treatment. Although differences 
among migrants enable the state to determine whether individuals are eligible or ineligible to 
claim certain rights associated with their status, these decisions remain very difficult to apply in 
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practice because migration has a dynamic and fluid character. As I will demonstrate in later 
chapters, the status of illegality, such as that given to the irregular migrants to Lampedusa, may 
change over time and overlap with the status of legality (Duvell, 2006, Mitsilegas 2004).  
III. Italian Migration Policies from the 1970s to the Present 
Migration policies, such as border restrictions, police interventions, and state asylum policies, 
can play a crucial role in shaping both regular and irregular migration movements (Brochmann 
and Hammar 1999; Castles, De Haas and Miller 2014; Collyer, 2006). Since 1990, Italy and 
other European states have implemented anti-immigration policies and legislation (Rusconi 
2010), with Italian policies and laws often based on the prevailing idea that migrants, as a whole, 
are involved with the illegal and underground labor market (Zincone and Caponio 2006). World 
attitude toward migrants shifted after the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks in the United 
States, and countries such as Italy have since developed tougher migration laws and stricter 
internal and external border-control policies, thereby turning the phenomenon of irregular 
migration into a “security issue.” The terrorist activities of the Islamic State of Iraq and Greater 
Syria (ISIS) continue to boost xenophobic feelings in the European public, allowing for the 
political criminalization of irregular migrants to become normalized. Most recently, attention has 
shifted towards the possible risks for national security, due to the political turmoil in the Middle 
East and North Africa (MENA) region, especially the unstable situation in Libya and Syria. The 
proliferation of jihadist movements is considered to be a direct threat to the security of Europe, 
which increased the surveillance of the Mediterranean and implemented stricter migration 
policies.  
Due to its economic instability and xenophobic politics, Italy has become increasingly 
restrictive in terms of its migration laws and border control policies (Campesi 2011; Teitelbaum 
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& Weiner 1995; Valtolina 2010). According to many scholars, migration in Italy, in addition to 
being a major policy issue, is still characterized by a “politically opportunistic stance” and a 
“short-term and emergency-based approach” (Bonifazi 2000; Boswell 2003; Campesi 2011). In 
order to scrutinize these inconsistencies and the poor design of these policies, it is necessary to 
describe and examine the origin and evolution of the Italian migration legal framework. This 
section begins with a review of main legislation and policies9 with a focus on the background 
and circumstances of their development and evolution. I then discuss the recent policy debate on 
migration in response to the popular uprisings in North Africa.  
 i. Law 39/1990 Legge Martelli 
The 1990 Legge Martelli was the first legislation passed by the Italian government to manage 
migration flows to Italy. For the first time in the nation’s history, most foreign nationals had to 
obtain residence permits in order to reside legally in Italy (Rusconi 2010: 4). This act also 
reformed legal procedures for the recognition of asylum-seekers and the expulsion of irregular 
migrants, as well as introducing sanctions for migrant smugglers (Rusconi 2010:4).  Under this 
act, some aspects of the Italian asylum-seeking procedures were revised, allowing non-
Europeans to seek asylum in the country (Rusconi 2010: 4-5). The act also implemented new 
regularization schemes and recognized the demand for a foreign workforce, setting up an annual 
“Planned Contingent” of legal entries of foreign workers (Rusconi 2010: 4-5). These 
regularization procedures functioned according to quotas based on migrants’ ability to secure 
places in the job market. Irregular migrants got two-year, renewable permits of stay that were 
contingent upon continued employment. Migrants who remained in Italy after the expiration of 
                                                          
9 Most Italian migration laws bear the names of their promoters, with each one grounded in the one that 
precedes it. Thus, these laws present a certain continuity in their implementation and development, despite the 
frequent changes in Italian political programs and government alliances.  
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their permits were considered “illegal immigrants” and liable for expulsion. As I will later 
demonstrate, these restrictive regularization policies did not stop the irregular migration 
phenomenon but, paradoxically, fueled the desire of Tunisians to enter Italy with the help of 
various smuggling networks.  
 ii. Law 40/1998 Legge Turco-Napolitano 
In the early 1990s, the civil war in Somalia and the breakdown of the former Yugoslavia and 
Albania transformed Italy into a host nation for irregular migrants and asylum-seekers. The EU 
claimed that the Italian borders were too “porous” and asked Italy to regulate them in accordance 
with the 1995 Schengen Convention, which allowed EU citizens of signatory states to travel 
across EU borders without passports. The aim of these regulations was to implement tighter 
border-control policies in order to protect EU member states against irregular migration. In the 
second half the 1990s, Italy implemented various legal provisions to curb the influx of irregular 
migrants by enacting the “Turco–Napolitano” law. This law regulated many aspects of 
migration, such as migrants’ rights and the protection of their claims to services. Under this law, 
a migrant who was employed could apply for a carta di soggiorno (permanent residency permit) 
and even have the opportunity to apply for Italian citizenship after ten years of legal residency in 
the country (Bertocchi and Strozzi 2010). In addition, Italian citizenship was also granted to 
foreigners who married an Italian national and have resided legally in Italy for at least six 
months. In general, this law was aimed at fostering integration and multicultural initiatives by 
providing rights and duties to migrant workers in Italy so that their protection from exploitation 
could be guaranteed (Wexler 2007). 
However, new repressive measures were implemented to put a halt to irregular entries and to 
make repatriation procedures more operational. Thus, the Centri di Permanenza Temporanea 
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(the Centers for Temporary Detention) for irregular migrants were created in the mid-1990s; 
these centers hosted the migrants for a 30-day detention period to ensure identification until their 
deportation could be recognized (Cardia 2011, Cheli 2010). Despite its modification in 2002, this 
Act remains the main legal vehicle for regulating, at the national level, all aspects of migration, 
including irregular migration, migrants’ fundamental rights, and entitlement to services (Finotelli 
and Sciortino 2009:123-124).  
 iii. Law 189/2002 Legge Bossi-Fini 
The extreme right party, the Lega Nord (Northern League), was founded in 1991 for the 
purpose of transforming Italy into a federal state with a greater regional autonomy, especially for 
northern regions (Corriere della Sera 2002a: 4; Palidda 2009). Operating under the former Italian 
Prime Minister, Silvio Berlusconi, the party developed an anti-immigrant, security rhetoric which 
gradually became the main agenda of their political campaigns. The party took a tough position 
on irregular migration, especially from Muslim countries, to protect the “Christian identity” of 
Italy and Europe.  The party is still widely known to be xenophobic and anti-immigrant (Biorcio 
1999; Palidda 2009; Woods 2010). 
In 2002, the Lega Nord was influential in imposing a new law called “Bossi–Fini” (n. 
189/2002) that made it extremely difficult for undocumented migrants to enter Italy and acquire 
regular permits. This law is named after Umberto Bossi, secretary of the Lega Nord, and 
Gianfranco Fini, secretary of a right-wing party, Alleanza Nazionale (National Alliance).  With 
regards to security measures, the “decreto-sbarchi” (sea landings decree) gave the Italian navy 
the right to control and push back any boat suspected to be carrying clandestine immigrants 
heading to Lampedusa. As well, both the navy and local police could carry out all border-control 
activities, including expulsions (Veugelers 1994). Thus any migrant found in international waters 
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could be immediately sent back to his or her country of origin. Irregular migrants, caught by 
police on Italian soil without the required documentation, were automatically identified, 
detained, and deported to their countries of origin. Further, for migrants who did make into the 
country, the 30-day temporary detention for identification purposes was prolonged to a 
maximum of 60 days. As well, a residency permit required both a job contract and rental 
agreement that had to be presented to the authorities. Delvino states: “This law brought stricter 
conditions for migrants to reside, work and access public services and strengthened measures 
against irregular migration, including providing for its criminalization” (Delvino 2014: 4). 
Moreover, no entry for employment could take place before a job offer has been obtained, 
abolishing the possibility of granting permits for the purpose of searching for employment. 
However, Bossi-Fini did not stop the inflow of migrants into the Italian population. As Rusconi 
notes, “Despite the restrictive provisions of the law, the largest regularization ever granted in 
Europe occurred under it, and 634,728 people were regularized during the right-wing 
government” (Rusconi 2010:2-7). Frontex complemented the Bossi-Fini Act in 2005 when it 
started operations. This organization implements various actions to combat irregular migration, 
such as external border surveillance and patrol activities by land, sea, and air. It also works in 
close contact with the EU’s law enforcement agency, the European Police Office (Europol) and 
he European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Training (Cepol), which brings together senior 
European police officers for cross-border co-operation. 
 iv. Security Set 94/2009 Pacchetto Sicurezza 
In May 2008, the Italian Interior Minister, concerned about the persistent and extraordinary 
influx of non-EU citizens, declared a “state of emergency,” which launched the 2009 “Pacchetto 
Sicurezza” (Security Package). This bill made it a crime to enter or stay in Italy without the 
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proper documents such as a visa or the residency permit (Rusconi 2010). Irregular entry and stay 
became a crime punishable by law, making irregular migrants liable to detention by the authorities 
for more than six months with a fine ranging from 5,000 to 10,000 Euros. Accordingly, all 
public officers and public workers, including postmen and ticket controllers on public transit, 
had to now report the presence of an illegal immigrant to the police or run the risk of facing 
criminal charges themselves. In addition, anyone who knowingly rented property to an irregular 
migrant is liable to a prison sentence of up to three years (Monzini 2007). A number of new 
penalties were enforced, such as the “mandatory arrest and fast track trial for foreigners who 
remain in Italy notwithstanding an expulsion order,” and fines were issued for illegal entry 
(WGAD 2009, Merlino 2009:7-8). Police actions were augmented by military interventions and 
citizen “rondes” (patrols), organized by civilian associations to notify security forces of any 
suspicious acts or social unrest caused by irregular migrants.  
Monzini writes: 
 
In 2009, Italy instituted a set of legislations criminalizing the movement andresidence of 
irregular migrants.  These laws have made irregular entry or stay a crime, punishable by 
a fine from between 5,000 to 10,000 Euros.  In addition, being present irregularly in the 
country has been made an aggravating circumstance for migrants who commit an 
offence.  Also, civil servants and public employees (doctors, teachers and municipal 
employees) are obliged to report irregular migrants to the police or face criminal 
charges.  In addition, anyone who knowingly rents property to a migrant in an irregular 
situation is liable to a prison sentence of up to three years.  The law also allows civilian 
vigilantes (known as ronde) to conduct organized patrols in order to alert police to 
public order offences or suspected criminals. While these vigilante groups would not 
have the power of arrest, critics of the law fear that it will enable extremist groups to 
embark on campaigns of violence and intimidation against migrants in Italy” (Monzini 
2007:19). 
 
Finally, the Centers for Temporary Detention were renamed “Centri di identificazione ed 
espulsione” (Centers for Identification and Expulsion) and the detention term of irregular 
migrants was extended from 60 to 180 days (Merlino: 2009). These measures have many 
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implications not only in terms of the public perception of migrants as a cause of crime and 
security problems, but also in terms of exacerbating feelings of anxiety, xenophobia, and distrust 
among the Italian population.  
 v. “North African Emergency”: Recent Policies  
The historic migration of Tunisians landing on Lampedusa was framed in a context of 
invasion and emergency, fueling the anxiety of authorities and the Italian public. Italy committed 
itself “to engage in extraordinary and urgent measures in order to provide humanitarian 
assistance in North Africa, while ensuring the effective fight against illegal migration within the 
national territory” (Presidenza del Consiglio dei Ministri 2011b). Faced with this “exceptional 
influx” (Consiglio dei Ministri 2011a), Italy turned to the EU, requesting immediate assistance in 
dealing with this migration crisis, claiming the “burden sharing” rule of the Schengen area. In 
April, 2011, the Italian government nominated the national Department of Civil Protection as the 
managing unit for the “refugee crisis” in relation to the “North Africa Emergency” (Garelli et al. 
2013) This was an unexpected action since the Department of Civil Protection’s task is to cover 
natural catastrophes, such as forest fires, floods, volcano eruptions, and earthquakes, and not to 
manage issues pertaining to migrants and refugees (Garelli et al. 2013: 1008). The EU reacted 
with a security-based solution: “Joint Operation (JO) Hermes 2011.” Frontex would patrol the 
Sicilian channel to prevent more influx of irregular migrants and to manage their repatriation 
procedures. Other important objectives of this operation were to deter the increasing number of 
human smugglers, considered to be the primary facilitators of irregular migration in the 
Mediterranean. From the beginning of JO Hermes 2011 until February 2012, 165 traffickers 
were arrested by the Italian authorities (Frontex 2012). However, according to the UNHCR, 
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despite all the effort deployed, more than 1,500 people lost their lives trying to cross the 
Mediterranean Sea in 2011 (Fleming 2015).  
Interestingly, during the period between February and May 2011, a clear-cut distinction 
emerged between “Tunisians hence clandestines” and “Libyans hence war refugees” (Garelli et 
al. 2013: 1012). This negative perspective of Tunisians negatively affected Italian willingness to 
help them. Although, on April 5, 2011, the Italian government decided to grant a six-month 
temporary protection visa for Tunisian migrants entering Italy between January 1 and April 5, 
2011 (Consiglio dei Ministri 2011b), this exceptional and special visa was not a path to claiming 
refugee status. Rather, it was a form of temporary international protection that Italy offered to 
qualifying Northern Africans, mainly Tunisians. As such, approximately 25,000 Tunisians 
migrants were granted temporary protection status and, in principle, free circulation within the 
Schengen area (Pascouau 2011:1). 
The Italian right-wing party, Lega Nord objected and insisted on the immediate repatriation 
of irregular migrants. The Lega parliamentarian, Lorenzo Bodega, declared,  
The anxiety felt by many Italians, who fear the arrival of potential terrorist fugitives 
or mere profiteers exploiting the confusion in order to land in Italy in the guise of 
refugees, is justified. Maroni is therefore right to request support from Europe. This 
should not be used to facilitate the stay of abusive migrants but should be used to 
encourage their repatriation (Senato della Repubblica 2011b: VIII). 
 
The Lega Nord and the Italian government continuously blamed the European Union for not 
taking a strong stance on the issue of migration and for failing to support Italy in what was a 
totally unmanageable situation (Geddes 2008: 358). 
This six-month temporary protection visa issued in April 2011 also created diplomatic 
tensions between France and Italy, with the former blaming the latter for not complying with the 
rules of the Schengen Agreement. The majority of migrants landing in Italy were transiting to 
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France and Germany where they had family and social ties. France criticized the Italian 
authorities for laxity and objected to the entry of Tunisians into its territory, quickly creating 
checkpoints on its border with Italy to catch and turn back migrants. Finally, the interior 
ministers of both countries agreed to increase cooperation to ease the stream of migrants across 
the Mediterranean (Donadio 2011). French Interior Minister told the French parliament that 
between February 23, 2011, and March 28, 2011, French authorities intercepted 2,800 Tunisian 
migrants, 1,700 of whom were deported back to Italy (Giuffrida 2011). As a reaction, Umberto 
Bossi—head of the powerful, xenophobic Lega Nord—boasted that, when the immigrants arrive, 
“we will just send them to France and Germany” (Der Spiegel 2011). 
On April 5, 2011, Italy signed an agreement with Tunisia to combat irregular migration. 
The agreement committed the Tunisian authorities to strengthen controls on departures and to 
accept the accelerated return procedures for Tunisians arriving after April 5. Those migrants who 
had come to Italy before April 5 were granted a temporary permit as required by law. During the 
period between April and October 2011, the Italian government with the help of Tunisian 
consular authorities returned 3,385 Tunisian nationals to Tunisia (Ministero dell’Interno, 2011e). 
In October 2013, Italy enacted the “Operation Mare Nostrum (OMN)” (Operation Our Sea) 
immigration policy (Faiola 2014). OMN was a military and humanitarian operation for the 
southern Mediterranean aimed at tackling the “exceptional influx of migrants” coming into the 
country through Italy's southern border (Camera dei Deputati 2014, Matassa 2014). Between 
October 2013 and August 2014, OMN rescued over 115,000 people, mostly refugees, and 
transferred them to Italian territory. During the same period, about 2,000 people were estimated 
to have lost their lives in the Mediterranean. Overall, it is estimated that more than 15,000 
 45 
 
Tunisians were forcibly returned to Tunisia between 2011 and 2013 (Interview with Tunisian 
Consul in Palermo). 
IV. Italian Migration Laws and Policies: A Critique 
As most of these policies demonstrate, the migration debate in Italy was, and continues to be, 
visibly and exclusively focused on external dimensions such as border control, repatriation, 
detention, and forced removal, despite Italian legislation that clearly upholds the fundamental 
rights of irregular migrants. As stipulated in Article 2(1) of the immigration law name of law 
required, a non-citizen “regardless of how he is present in the territory of the State” should have 
his fundamental rights respected (Jastram and Achiron 2001). In addition, Article 10 of 
the Italian Constitution stipulates that foreigners’ legal statuses are regulated by law in 
conformity with international norms and treaties and endorses the right of non-citizens to 
political asylum. In addition, Article 13 of the Constitution provides that “personal liberty is 
inviolable and that detention shall only be allowed for judicial reasons and in a lawful manner” 
(ICJ  2011). However, despite these constitutional and legal pledges, the Italian Ministry of 
Interior proceeded to distinguish between various types of non-citizens, with the intention of 
circumscribing the application of these rights to certain groups of non-citizens. The ministry’s 
website indicated:  
Foreigners who entered Italy without a regular entry visa are illegal immigrants. 
Foreigners who lost the conditions necessary to stay in Italy (i.e. expired and non- 
renewable permit of residency held upon entering Italy) are irregular immigrants. 
According to regulations in force, illegal immigrants must be removed (Di Martino 
et al. 2013).  
 
Forced deportation in international waters was, and is, a violation of Article 13 of the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948, which states: “Every man is free to leave his 
land.” The international agreements that preclude those forced deportations include the 1950 
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European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Freedoms and the 1990 UN 
Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and their Families. 
Returning boats back into the open sea allowed Italian officials to prevent migrants’ 
access to any humanitarian protection and their potential request for political asylum. Right-wing 
parties greeted these forced deportations with approval, especially Lega Nord, which encouraged 
detention as well as massive deportation and expulsion at the borders.  Although Italian law 
allows authorities to detain non-citizens under certain conditions, a number of experts argue that 
the Italian authorities consistently have detained non-citizens outside the framework of the law 
(Masera 2012). These unlawful detention procedures have created situations in which migrants 
are frequently held for unlimited periods of time without the presence of a legal authority or any 
legal information. It is also important to note that living conditions in detention centers are 
extremely difficult; detained migrants have often complained about poor hygiene, over-
crowdedness, and lack of translators who can help them get their needs met.  As I will 
demonstrate in Chapters 5 and 7, various cases of abuse and violence have often been reported 
and documented. In fact, a number of Tunisian detainees have organized various riots to protest 
these conditions.  While many have escaped, others have attempted to commit suicide or 
threatened to immolate themselves (field notes 2014-2015).  
These criminalization procedures, forced detentions, and removals have had many 
unfortunate repercussions. Irregular migrants are fearful of accessing public services and thus 
unable to enjoy some of their legal entitlements. Increased “illegality” has resulted in more 
sophisticated smuggling techniques, the adoption of new, dangerous migratory sea routes, and 
more tragedies in the Mediterranean Sea (Monzini et al. 2006). Migrants’ inability to legally 
access the Italian labor market has increased the number of irregular entries who work in 
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underground and illicit work activities. As Zincone notes, “the policy of closing the front door of 
legal entry, while keeping the back door for illegal entry half open” made possibilities for legal 
work almost inexistent (Zincone 1998:17) and created what Reyneri calls the “underground 
economy trap” (Reyneri 1998: 313-331).  This also happened extensively under the 1990 Legge 
Martelli, as I have discussed earlier, when various legalization measures were instituted within a 
short-term and emergency framework, rather than through an effective policy that operated 
within a clear legal framework (Nascimbene 2000). These legalization measures have forced 
migrants to create illegal ways to remain in Italy, such as forging documents when they fear 
lapsing into “illegal” status because of job loss. As Lidia Santos (1993: 111) aptly put it, “this is 
an institutionalized irregularity.”  
The relationship between legal status and legal employment has created a dilemma for 
migrants because legal status is the only precondition for legal employment and, therefore, for 
the preservation of the legal status. When legalized migrants fail to find, or maintain, legal 
employment, they are prevented from securing renewals of their residency permits and 
automatically fall into a state of illegality (Reyneri 1998).  
Furthermore, the Tunisian popular uprising and the ensuring unprecedented, migration 
crisis has further intensified Italian discourse about security and migrants. As Zolberg puts it, a 
sense of crisis emerges from a perceptible upsurge in the burden that migrants inflict on a host 
community (Zolberg 1989: 415). This sense of crisis often is intensified by right wing, populist 
rhetoric which is increasingly widespread not only in Italy, but also in other European countries 
(Guibernau 2010). Far right, extreme political parties throughout Europe often treat “foreigners” 
as the single, most pervasive challenge to the receiving society and often frame this position vis-
à-vis migration as a “threat” or “crisis.” This prevailing anti-migration rhetoric in the public 
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sphere has always been a determining factor for the extreme right to win elections. As Geddes 
states, “politicians may want to be seen to build the fortress because when immigration is a 
salient issue, there are likely to be votes in seeking ‘zero immigration’” (Geddes 2000 27). 
According to a recent survey in Europe showed that Italy’s population had the greatest concern 
about the migration phenomenon with security foremost in citizens’ minds (Crumley 2011, 
Valtolina 2010).  
Unfortunately, international humanitarian organizations and UN programs for migrants 
can address certain issues, such as the rights of migrant workers, refugee cases, and the treatment 
of detained irregular migrants, but they have little influence as to whether states will adopt or 
alter particular migration policies. I argue that the issue of migrants’ human rights is limited in 
scope because, as the Italian case demonstrates, the final enactment and enforcement of these 
policies continue to remain within the domestic political system of receiving societies. As 
Zolberg (1999) claims, states are the most important actors with respect to migratory 
movements; their existing national migration policies shape whether these movements will be 
expansive or restrictive. State sovereignty is also crucial in its enactment of migration policies 
deemed appropriate, thereby making it difficult to dismiss the importance of the nation-state and 
national citizenship. 
However, some scholars (Howard 2009, Soysal 1994) are now discussing the decline of 
the sovereignty of nation-states. For example, Soysal believes in the power of the “post-national 
model,” arguing that various instruments and international institutions, e.g., the European Court 
of Human Rights and UNHCR, act as effective global forces that are capable of influencing 
some European states to be more open to dealing with various cases of political asylum, family 
reunification, and so forth. Her example is France, where recent, restrictive laws concerning the 
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nationality code, family reunification, and illegal migration were quickly opposed by 
international civil rights groups, as well as prominent cabinet members in the French 
Government (Soysal 1994). However, Soysal (1994) and Geddes (2008) also point out that 
European migration policies remain highly restrictive when it comes to potential flows of 
irregular migrants and is also discriminatory vis-à-vis certain categories of individuals such as 
women and persons of color (Geddes 2008; Lahav and Guiraudon 2000; Soysal 1994).   
I approve that the post-national model may serve a certain category of immigrants such as 
bona-fide political refugees and individuals seeking family reunification. Yet, I argue that it will 
be unlikely to include other categories of migrants such as the “irregulars” of this study because 
the boundaries of citizenship and nationhood are still drawn by the nation-states, and not by 
universal laws, human rights charters, and global conventions. The impact of these laws, 
charters, and conventions on state policies is not always as powerful as it may seem because they 
depend on ratification by individual states—an outcome that does not always occur, e.g., Italy 
breaching the non-refoulement principle, making the efficacy of these instruments negligible. 
Thus the influence of global institutions is mainly confined to human rights commitments on 
asylum and family reunification with little challenge to the sovereign state, which remains the 
sole guarantor of migrants’ rights and the main designer of either expansionary or exclusionary 
policies. Although the concept of post-nationalism is being discussed within the discourse 
concerning universal human rights and principles, the nation-state model remains significant in 
its power over migration law, sovereignty, territory, and citizenry (Sassen, 2006; Benhabib, 
2001). As Favell writes, “[the] nation-state point of view of spatial mobility is (still) the 
dominant conventional view of the world” (Favell, 2007: 271).  
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V. Conclusion   
In this chapter, I first provided a brief historical overview of Tunisian migration, focusing on 
its various historical phases from the early 1940s post-war period until the 2011 Tunisian 
uprising. I then turned to the recent history of Tunisian migration to Italy and the various 
circumstances that have led to the emergence of the irregular migratory phenomenon. The 
second part of the chapter describes a summary of Italian migration laws and policies, examining 
their origin and evolution from the 1990 Legge Martelli until the recent popular uprising in 
North Africa. I critically evaluated these laws by examining their inconsistencies on aspects such 
as admission criteria, citizenship, and migrants’ rights. It became clear that Italian migration laws 
and policies have often oscillated between a politically opportunistic stance and a short-term, 
emergency-based approach. I paid particular attention to the implementation of each law and 
policy and its impact on the growing politicization of migration in Italy and Europe as a whole. I 
paid particular attention to their ad hoc nature, their socio-legal dimensions, and the way in 
which they contributed to the emergence of the irregular migration phenomenon as a “security 
issue” that has to be managed by security agencies such as Europol or Frontex, among others.  I 
demonstrated how the growing politicization of migration in Europe has occurred at a time when 
Europeans started to perceive the phenomenon as a challenge to the very idea of their nation-
states. In turn, the EU and Italy’s management of the North African crisis has negatively affected 
the legal status and mobility of Tunisian migrants, by creating new “illegal” entries and 
situations. The strict, border-control procedures implemented by Italy and other EU member 
states have pushed migrants and refugees ever closer towards new and perilous situations of 
human trafficking and dangerous forms of border crossing.  I concluded the chapter by arguing 
that migration policies are exclusively drafted by the nation-states despite the emergence of the 
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post-national model and the increasing relevance of international agreements concerning human 
rights. The migrant population of this study is subjected to laws and boundaries of citizenship 
and nationhood that are drawn by the Italian state and not by universal laws on human rights and 
human mobility. 
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CHAPTER THREE  
RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY 
“...tales in search of an excuse for their telling.”  
― John Van Maanen, Tales of the Field: On Writing Ethnography 
 
I. Introduction 
Much research in anthropology and other fields is being undertaken to better understand the recent 
transnational migration and refugee phenomena within the context of an increasingly complex and inter-
connected world. A main question for researchers is: What methodological approaches and strategies are 
appropriate when conducting transnational research? As I discussed in the Introduction, I decided to 
undertake multi-sited, ethnographic, migration research for the purpose of studying a specific set of 
Tunisian irregular migrants in Italy. This chapter covers the methodological frameworks and tools used 
for this ethnography, which was undertaken from June 2013 to October 2014 in Tunisia and Italy. It 
includes the following: 1) the rationale for my multi-sited, ethnographic perspective; 2) a detailed 
description of the data collection process; 3) a description of the multiple methods used to collect data; 4) 
an explanation of my data analysis and management strategies; and 5) a reflection upon my research 
experience as a Tunisian anthropologist conducting fieldwork in both my native country and a foreign 
host country. 
II. Research Setting and Methods 
In this research, I employed a mixture of qualitative ethnographic methods: archival research, 
participant observation, and open-ended interviews, all of which generated a valuable set of narratives. 
The use of this multi-sited, qualitative approach to data gathering allowed for a multi-dimensional 
analysis and, overall, an enhancement of the process for crosschecking the data. 
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i. Multi-sited Locales 
I undertook my research in two sets of locations: 1) the Tunisia set, which included three districts of 
the Tunisian township of  ﻲﺣﻦﻣﺎﻀﺘﻟا  (Hay Ettadhamen), i.e., Dawar Hicher, El Intilaka and El Mniihla; 
and 2) the Italian set, which included the island of Lampedusa and four provinces on the island of Sicily, 
i.e., Agrigento, Trapani, Palermo, and Sciacca. These multiple sites were chosen to increase the variety of 
the sample size and to ensure enhanced validity of the research. 
 
Fig 5. The 2 rims of the Mediterranean: Tunisia, Lampedusa, Sicily 
The first set, the Tunisian township of Hay Ettadhamen and its three districts, was an important 
site because I was thoroughly familiar with its culture, having had extended social networks in it and 
connections with a number of local NGOs and youth community organizations. The township is 1) home 
both migrants deported back to Tunisia between 2011 and 2014 and irregular migrant candidates; and 2) a 
place where migratory attempts take place, creating a well-defined “migration culture” that characterizes 
its districts.  In addition, I had been able to nurture friendly, long-lasting relationships with a number of 
its youth during ethnographic fieldwork that I undertook for my M.A. in 2005.10 I remained in good 
contact with many of them. Finally, the NGOs in Hay Ettadhamen, such as Endra Inter-Arabe for which I 
worked in 1996, were valuable sources of archival data and also acted as institutions through which I 
gained easy access to potential participants. 
                                                          
10 This fieldwork resulted in the thesis, “The Motivations of Tunisian Men to Migrate to Italy: An Ethnographic 
Study of the Hay Ettadhamen Township.” 
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The second set of field sites included two Italian islands: Lampedusa and Sicily with its four 
major provinces. These islands are important research sites for this study because many Tunisians who 
crossed the Mediterranean landed there, and the islands hold large communities of irregular migrants and 
refugees who came from Tunisia, North Africa, and sub-Saharan Africa. 
 The fieldwork process, which included identifying potential participants and data collection, took place 
over a 16-month period between 2013 and 2015. Data collection consisted of four main phases of inquiry, 
i.e., Tunisia-Sicily/Lampedusa-Tunisia. This ethnographic expedition required a 16-month residence and 
travels within, and between, the two sets of sites. I spent seven months in Hay Ettadhamen from June to 
December 2013 and the nine months from April to October 2014 in Sicily and Lampedusa. I returned to 
Tunis by the end of October 2014 and remained there conducting data analysis. This extended period of 
time was sufficient to establish significant relationships with Tunisian irregular migrants in order to 
explore their life experiences, including the oppression they faced and the various strategies that they 
adopted to resist it.   
 To provide a more comprehensive background for the study population so that readers can gain more 
understanding about it, I now offer detailed description of the field sites.   
 1. Hay Ettadhamen  
Hay Ettadhamen is an Arabic term, which literally means “solidarity township.” It is located about six 
kilometers west of the capital city of Tunis. For sampling purposes, the data in Hay Ettadhamen was 
collected in the three main districts of Dawar Hicher, El Intilaka and El Mnihla as each district possessed 
different characteristics. Dawar Hicher is a poor, urban, crowded district known for overpopulation, 
unemployment, violence, and crimes. El Intilaka is located at the entrance of Hay Ettadhamen and is 
relatively less crowded and equipped with schools and facilities such as a metro line. El Mnihla, in the 
countryside, represents Tunisian village life, replete with chickens, donkeys, tabounas (clay, bread-
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making ovens), women in their malyas (Berber traditional dress), and so forth. The inhabitants of El 
Mnihla are the least adapted to urban life (Kaaki 2003:300-305). 
The township of Hay Ettadhamen emerged between 1970 and 1985 when rural migrants, mainly 
from the western part of Tunisia, who were searching for better life opportunities (Kaaki 2003), erected 
hundreds of informal settlements.  Long-time residents recall that, in the late 1960s, Hay Ettadhamen was 
a massive colonial farm with olive trees and grass for sheep grazing (Khedher 2007). Due to continuous 
settlements and high population growth, Hay Ettadhamen became the most heavily populated region in 
Tunisia with a 2010 population density of 24,560 inhabitants per square kilometer (NIS: 2010).  
The neighborhood was substantially transformed after the 2011 uprising—a transformation that 
included the growth of informal businesses, poverty, pollution, religious extremism, prostitution, gang-
related violence, drugs, and alcoholism. A number of study participants felt that their situation had 
deteriorated after the 2011 uprising because of escalating living costs, unemployment rates, crime, 
rampant corruption, drug addiction, and clandestine migration. Many of these youth are perceived by 
mainstream Tunisian society as troublemakers, drug addicts, and criminals. Taoufik, a 28-year-old 
student commented,  
We are now living in a different era than that of the pre-uprising. We have no aspirations or 
hopes for the future. One has no option but to survive, and the way to do it is by getting 
enough money to pay for a harqa11 to Lampedusa (Interview 07/2013). 
 
Another problem is a recently escalated religious fundamentalism. Indeed, I was shocked by the 
dramatic increase in Salafist Islam, a phenomenon that has become bound up with the shared social 
consciousness and the self-image of some youth. The Salafist phenomenon has grown exponentially since 
the Tunisian uprising and gained significant local and international media attention. In fact, many 
informants stated that they knew of a few young men from their Houma (neighborhood) who went to 
Syria for jihad. Ahmed, a 25-year old mechanic from Hay Ettadhamen, recounts, 
                                                          
11 Harqa is the Tunisian word for irregular migration used by all Tunisians. 
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A number of Salafists are harmless, but others are very dangerous. These ones have the 
backing of Al Nahdha (the moderate Islamist political party). Nobody can touch them or 
interfere with them. These are the extremists who tarnished the reputation of our township 
and the whole country. They have to be severely persecuted because they can brainwash a 
number of innocent young men and eventually pave the way for Daesh (ISIS) to infiltrate 
into our country (Interview 05/2013). 
 
 What is happening in Hay Ettadhamen resonates with many others in townships surrounding Tunis, such 
as Hay Hlel, Ezzahrouni, El Mallacine, and EL Kabbariyya, where the levels of socio-economic 
disparities were more distinct and thus frustration was rampant, especially after the uprising.  
  2. Sicily 
Sicily, the largest island in the Mediterranean, is located south of the Italian Peninsula and has an area 
of 9,927 square miles and a population of 5,082 million. The island is visited regularly by tourists and is 
home to important archaeological and ancient sites. With its coastal towns, congested cities, and multi-
ethnic population, Sicily is an island where the boundaries between east and west, Europe and Africa, 
Christian and Muslim seem to blur.  Because of its close proximity to Tunisia, the movement of Sicilians 
to Tunisia and Tunisians to Sicily has a long history, involving different categories of people such as 
missionaries, merchants, fishermen, peasants, service workers, students, and recently irregular migrants. 
The presence of Italians in pre-colonial Tunisia was documented by Ganiage, who estimated that, by the 
time of Tunisia’s independence in 1956, there were 255,000 Europeans in Tunisia, constituting 9 per cent 
of the total population, and among those, there were 57,000 Italians (Ganiage 1960:15). The Sicilian 
community arrived in Tunisia between the 19th and 20th centuries, and its members congregated in La 
Goulette, a coastal northern suburb of Tunis where they created an enclave named “Piccola Sicilia” 
(Little Sicily). The impact of Italian culture in Tunisia is still visible, including linguistic, architectural, 
and gastronomical influences. On the other hand, the influence of Arab and North African culture are also 
still visible in many parts of Sicily as a result of the 200-year Muslim conquest of the island. For example, 
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Muslim architectural patterns can be seen in the intertwined arches and Arabic inscriptions in the main 
cathedral of Palermo, which was a mosque during the Muslim rule.   
 a. Palermo 
The Sicilian capital, Palermo, which is closer to Tunis than to Rome, is the biggest city on the island, 
but also its poorest. It is the fifth largest city in Italy, with a population of 654,858 in the urban area and 
1.2 million in the metropolitan area (Lo Piccolo and Leone 2008). As a mecca for conquest throughout 
history, the city has architectural and cultural traces of the invasions of Phoenicians, Greeks, Romans, 
Byzantines, Arabs, Normans, and Spanish. It was also a key cultural and trading center in the 
Mediterranean. As Zaccaria puts it, “The Mediterranean Sea represents a water that licks/laps the lands of 
three continents; it is a water route that has created and still creates cultural intercourse—even through 
wars and colonialism—between different populations, economies, ideas, and discourses” (Zaccaria 2011: 
10). Unfortunately, Palermo is characterized by crime, high unemployment rates, and an informal 
economy. Palermo is known for its tourism, agriculture, and services.  A number of North African 
migrants, especially Moroccans and Tunisians, traditionally filled jobs in these sectors. Being the home of 
the Sicilian Mafia, Palermo is also known for its high levels of corruption, organized crime, and black 
market and other illicit activities. However, Palermo is continuously transitioning towards a new socio-
economic and transnational locality as a result of tourism and the migratory flows that keep shaping its 
landscape.  
I stayed in Palermo for seven months and, due to the large migrant community, I was able to 
conduct twenty-two interviews and collect a great deal of data. This research was conducted 
primarily in two main locations: the medieval, impoverished neighborhoods of La Kalsa and 
Borgo Vecchio,12 which are both situated in the historical part of Palermo. La Kalsa is a 
                                                          
12 Both names demonstrate the Arabic influence in Sicily. La Kalsa is derived from the Arabic Al-Khalisa (the 
purest) and Borgo Vecchio, from Arabic Al Borj (the tower). 
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rundown, poor quarter known for crime, drugs, and youth-related violence. Since its rents are 
low, this neighborhood houses migrant communities, such as Nigerians, Senegalese, Ethiopians, 
Romas, Tunisians and, most recently, a Bangladeshi costume jewelry, merchant population. La 
Kalsa is famous because of its narrow labyrinthine streets, lively night life, wandering stray 
dogs, rotting piles of rubbish, clotheslines hanging from balconies, multiple liquor stores, 
pickpocketing, petty theft, drug dealing, and wall graffiti. Borgo Vecchio is another popular, but 
poor and congested neighborhood near the port, and is the landing site for hundreds of migrant-
rescue disembarkations. The residents are a mix of working-class Italians, Romas, and Tunisian 
migrants. Like La Kalsa, Al Borgo’s graffiti-covered, dilapidated buildings host a number of 
migrant communities among which are groups of irregular Tunisian migrants. As one local 
resident jokingly stated, “Al Borgo has become a Tunisian district” As I was conducting my 
ethnography in these two neighborhoods, I felt an extraordinary sense of connection to them 
because their smells, colors, and sounds reminded me of Hay Ettadhamen’s and other Tunisian 
neighborhoods ’chaotic, busy streets.  
 While in Palermo, I also visited Mondello, famous beach destination, to research a small group of 
Tunisian migrants who lived there. Mondello is a location where many Tunisians hang out and take up 
odd jobs such as selling lighters and African bracelets to locals and tourists. During the summers, when 
the beach was crowded, Tunisian irregular migrants were able to find seasonal work in restaurants, 
pizzerias, and local cafés/bars, washing dishes and helping in the kitchens. Mohamed, a 24-year-old man, 
told me that a few Tunisians came to Mondello to engage in male prostitution and other paid sexual 
activities with gay local men and tourists, especially at night behind the bushes. He also added that he 
knew many who also engaged, at night, in these activities at the central train station in Palermo and in the 
park near the port. Since he had arrived, Mohamed could not find shelter and had been living in the streets 
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of Mondello, although occasionally staying at a friend’s studio apartment. On Saturdays, he would take 
the local bus into old-town Palermo to pick up food packages from Caritas and to meet some of his 
Tunisian and Egyptian friends for a drink.  
 b. Trapani 
Trapani is a town located on the west coast of Sicily that has many North African features, such as its 
landscape, an Arab-influenced cuisine, and a couscous festival. It also contains almost half the vineyards 
in Sicily and its local products include wine and high-quality olive oil.  Like many other Sicilian towns, 
Trapani has been shaped by migrant flows that influenced its demography, culture, stories, organization, 
and its overall landscape. During my fieldwork in Trapani, I was the guest of a Tunisian family who had 
been in Sicily since the 1980s. They graciously offered me space, food, and time, showing me around and 
helping me connect with local NGO workers who, in turn, introduced me to a few newly arrived Tunisian 
migrants. Trapani has an open center, Centro di Accoglienza per Richiedenti Asilo, known as CARA, that 
provides food, medical, legal, and social and psychological assistance for irregular migrants and refugees. 
As well, newcomers can take Italian lessons and engage in various sports and leisure activities. Zied, a 
22-year-old Tunisian migrant, told me that he was able to take carpentry classes. He also informed me 
that most migrants there made political asylum claims, the majority of which was rejected. CARA also 
hosts a number of minors and provides them with specialized care such as psychotherapy sessions. Even 
though the Trapani Center is in much better condition than those of Lampedusa and other towns in Sicily, 
it lacks facilities such as functional toilets, proper beds, and sufficient showers. Trapani also hosts an 
infamous detention Center called Milo where a number of migrants are detained in jail-like situations 
suffering from poor detention conditions such as over-crowdedness, lack of hygiene and violence. I spent 
fifteen days in Trapani, undertaking 12 open-ended interviews with migrants and having conversations 
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with locals, CARA’s personnel, and NGO staff of the International Organization of Migration (IOM) and 
the UNHCR.  
 c. Sciacca 
The name Sciacca is derived from the Arabic xacca (fracture or crack). An hour and a half away from 
Palermo by car, Sciacca is a coastal fishing town in southern Sicily. It is known for its delicious, fresh 
seafood and is famous for its ceramics, thermal springs, religious festivals, and large fishing fleet. 
Historically, Sciacca was a busy port with a very robust North African trade exchange. The Tunisians 
living in in Sciacca work in the fishing industry as well as in restaurants, cafés/bars, and pizzerias. I spent 
a week from June 12 to 19, 2014, in Sciacca and was able to interview six Tunisian migrants, i.e., three 
fishing assistants and three restaurant workers, whose employment was sporadic due to the lack of 
tourism. At Piazza Scandaliato, the central square, Tunisians and other African migrants, mostly 
Nigerians and Chadians, wandered around or sat on public benches, simply watching passers-by. Sami, a 
young Tunisian in his early twenties, was one of the desperate migrants I met in Sciacca. He was 
hopelessly wandering around an empty beach with a black plastic bag that carried his few clothes and 
other personal possessions. Sami asked me for money to buy a panini (sandwich) and agreed to be 
interviewed that evening in front of the main church. However, he never showed up. Fabio, a man in his 
fifties, said “Italy’s migration policies are dysfunctional. The floods of migrants and refugees are huge 
and unmanageable. The detention and reception centers are full. This is what forces thousands of 
immigrants to live in the streets” (Interview 06/2014). 
 d. Agrigento 
Agrigento is a city of 470,000 people on the southern coast of the Sicilian shore. It is known for its 
natural landscapes and the Valley of the Temples, a Greek archaeological site, and hosts tourists from 
both Italy and abroad. Agrigento also has a large migrant community from North Africa, many of whose 
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members are Moroccans and Tunisians. Agrigento is also the location of the Centro di permanenza 
temporanea ed assistenza “Contrada S. Benedetto”, which hosts diverse migrants who have often been 
transferred from Lampedusa. I spent a week in Agrigento from July 10th to July 17th, 2014 conducting 
eight interviews with migrants, taking field notes, and interviewing one of the UNHCR staff about the 
local situation and conditions within the detention center.  
 3. Lampedusa 
As a destination for hundreds of thousands of undocumented migrants, Lampedusa, which I have 
described in Chapter 2, was key to my research. I flew to Lampedusa from Palermo and spent three weeks 
there from July 18 to August 4, 2014. Due to the depressed economy in the island, most families in 
Lampedusa rent out a studio or rooms for tourists, and I was able to find accommodations during my stay 
with a Lampadusan family. When I was in Palermo, I had made an official request to visit the Center in 
Lampedusa through the Tunisian Consulate but, unfortunately, my request had been denied.  However, as 
the Tunisian consul informed me, it was easy to talk to migrants in the Center’s vicinity and all over the 
island. Because the Center was over-crowded, migrants of various nationalities moved freely in 
Lampedusa and could come and go to the Center as they pleased.   
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Fig 6. Two Migrants Teasing Each Other on the Beach in Lampedusa 
Photo taken by Rayed Khedher on 08/04/2014 
 
In Lampedusa, I conducted 14 interviews and made fieldwork observations. My interviews included 
migrants, asylum seekers, personnel from different NGOs, medical volunteers, staff of the Center, and 
local journalists. Due to the many migrants landing in Lampedusa, the Italian Ministry of the Interior 
decided to transform Loran, an ex-NATO, unused, military base, into a temporary reception center. A 
couple of informants who stayed in Loran complained about the non-hygienic conditions of their 
detention as well as the over-crowded conditions and their ill-treatment by the on-site carabinieri (Italian 
police) (Interview 07/2014). 
 ii. Preparation for Fieldwork 
Despite my middle-class background and education, I share some socio-cultural experiences with 
many study participants because I was born and raised in a neighborhood only ten minutes away from 
Hay Ettadhamen. In addition, thanks to my previous M.A. research and volunteer work for Environment 
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and Development Action in the Third World (Enda-Inter Arabe), I had become very well acquainted with 
the township and nurtured a number of friendships, acquaintances, and connections throughout its various 
districts.  
Being fully aware of how long the recruitment of potential participants might take, I started to 
contact my Tunisian friends in Hay Ettadhamen during the summer of 2012, informing them about my 
research and asking them to spread the information to their friends. I did some follow-up phone calls from 
the U.S. to keep in contact, to learn the recent happenings in the neighborhood, to find out about the latest 
Tunisian jokes, and to discuss my research and the phenomenon of irregular migration as whole. I 
received regular feedback on what was going on in the township, e.g., how many were leaving, how many 
were being deported, who these people were, and what were the reactions of the government, the media, 
and society. 
I arrived in Hay Ettadhamen in the spring of 2013, and it was very easy to blend into the social 
scene and to get swift access to the study population. As well, the study participants were able to relate 
quickly to me as someone whom they could trust. Upon my arrival in Hay Ettadhamen in June 2013, I 
started a preliminary phase of comprehensive archival research about its community. I collected articles 
that appeared in important national Tunisian newspapers, including those, new to me that had emerged 
after the 2011 uprising, such as Al Hiwar, Al Dhamir, and Attanouir. I also met with close friends who 
had helped me during my M.A. research, and with whom I remained in touch. Publicity about my study 
was done by word of mouth via a network of friends and also by the staff of ENDA-Inter Arabe, some of 
whom I had worked with in 1996. Through informal conversations, I explained that I was a Ph.D. student 
and that my research was purely academic. I told them that they could ask me anything and that I would 
be happy to provide them with information and clarifications.  
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In Sicily, the situation was different because I did not have as many networks of friends, except 
for those whom I had learned about from my Tunisian informants in Hay Ettadhamen and whom I would 
meet for the first time. My first site and overall base in Italy was Palermo, and I arrived there on April 03, 
2014. One day later, I met with Monji and Housine (two pseudonyms), two Tunisian migrants whose 
contact numbers I had gotten from a Tunisian informant in Hay Ettadhamen. Monji and Houcine already 
knew about my research and were very friendly to me, explaining “il Sistema” (the system) and 
answering questions about Palermo, what to do, and what not to do. I met with them almost daily in the 
Borgo Vecchio area where I lived, sharing a coffee, a few beers, or a simple lunch at the local bar. Our 
meetings were easy and convenient because the two of them shared a small, dilapidated studio in Al 
Borgo, a five-minute walk from my apartment. They both had cell phones, like the majority of the study 
population, and were always available and excited to meet with me. I spent the first month of my arrival 
in Palermo hanging out with Housine and Monji and other Tunisians whom I met through them. I also 
started to go out alone in order to immerse myself in the local culture, to meet other people relevant to my 
research, and to obtain the migration articles that appeared daily in local newspapers such as Giornale di 
Sicilia, Qui Palermo, Il Corriere della Sera, and La Stampa. I bought myself a bicycle, which I used to 
discover the town’s street life and to identify and select other sites where Tunisian migrants would be 
hanging out, such as La Kalsa, Ballaro, Albergheria, Il Capo, and Castellammare. 
 iii. Recruitment of Participants 
As I have mentioned, I recruited 60, male, Tunisian migrants between the ages of 20 and 35 for 
participation in this study, either for long-term, participant observations, open-ended interviews, or a 
combination of both. To recruit volunteers for the interview process, I relied largely on a snowball 
sampling technique (Le Compte and Schensul 1999:55) without applying any pressure on individuals to 
join the study. I informed my network of friends in Hay Ettadhamen and key informants in Palermo, 
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Agrigento, Sciacca, Lampedusa, and Trapani about the goal of my research and asked them to share it 
with their own networks of friends, family, and acquaintances. The snowball sampling procedure proved 
less awkward than distributing papers or handouts. However, to speed up the recruitment process and give 
myself more credibility, I posted flyers at Enda-Inter Arabe in Hay Ettadhamen; however, I was not 
allowed to post flyers at charitable organizations in Palermo. To compensate for this restriction, I used 
word-of-mouth and relied on the cooperation and trust of a few informants and NGO volunteers who 
were very enthusiastic about helping me out. Merriam (1998) describes the researcher’s use of theoretical 
sampling as beginning with “an initial sample chosen for its obvious relevance to the research problem” 
in which the data will guide the investigator to “the next person to be interviewed, and so on” (p. 63). 
At the beginning of each phase of the study whether in Hay Ettadhamen, Palermo, Lampedusa, 
Agrigento, Trapani or Sciacca, only the participants who agreed to be part of the study were given a flyer 
in Arabic that explained, in detail, the aims and purpose of the research. I also asked them to let me know 
if they have any questions related to their participation. For transparency, trust, ethical purposes, and as 
regulated by the Institutional Review Board (IRB), consent forms in Arabic were distributed to be read, 
filled out, and signed. 
 vi. Data-Gathering Strategies 
Ethnography is a “family of methods involving direct and sustained social contact with agents” (Willis 
and Trondman 2000:1). Due to the nature of this project, I used a mixture of qualitative ethnographic 
methods, i.e., archival research, participant observation, life histories, and open-ended interviews. These 
methods were employed at the community, social, and individual levels, as well as with groups of youth 
who were divided based on their socio-demographic characteristics across the three main field sites. This 
mixture of data-gathering techniques enabled me to see the differences or similarities between various 
categories of youth in terms of their experiences of abuse and their strategies to reverse inhumane and 
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oppressive migration policies and treatment. Using this mixed ethnographic design also helped to ensure 
an enhanced crosschecking of the collected data. Finally, the theoretical framework of this study (see 
Chapter 4) acted as a guiding principle with regards to the macro-level process of observation, data 
collection, interpretations, management, and analysis.  
 v. Archival Research 
Since the 2011 uprising, I have been collecting articles written about Tunisian migrants fleeing to Italy 
and gathering press releases from local newspapers in Tunisia and Italy, many of which came from the 
prominent Italian newspaper, Corriere della Sera.  Throughout my research, the press releases provided 
me with a continually updated framework of the irregular migration phenomenon. I also conducted other 
major archival research when I was in Tunisia and Sicily. In Hay Ettadhamen, I consulted ENDA’s 
publications, annual reports, and other literature to gain a broad overview of the township as well as pre- 
and post-uprising, demographic, statistical data that helped clarify my perceptions about it. Enda-Inter 
Arabe and other local youth associations’ annual reports and publications provided me with additional 
material that was particularly useful in understanding the post-uprising youth dynamics in the township 
and their connection to the issue of irregular migration. The collected data provided important 
information on Hay Ettadhamen: the challenges it faced after the 2011 uprising and the massive 
movement of its youth to Lampedusa. The archival material showed possible directions that my research 
might take by refining the initial framework of my ethnography.  This preliminary phase, also confirmed 
that very little academic research was being conducted on the issue of irregular migration from Tunisia to 
Italy during or after the uprising.  
In addition to consulting Sicilian newspapers and magazines, I also browsed websites from which 
I gathered pertinent articles and current facts about the irregular migration phenomenon on the island. In 
addition, I was able to examine popular TV programs, songs (Ray, Rap and Mizwed), documentaries, blog 
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postings, and social media spaces about the Tunisians’ irregular migration. This archival material gave 
me a general idea about Tunisian irregular migrants, such as the way they think, their group domains of 
action, social networks, and places of interaction. Moreover, during the last couple of years, the migrant 
situation in Lampedusa was the focus of many international news reports, documentaries, and feature film 
productions. This plethora of archival material provided a thorough and more contextualized idea of the 
overall phenomenon that I was studying.  
Other archival documents included NGO reports, online publications, and documents posted by 
the Italian Ministry of Labor and Social Policy, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the Ministry of the 
Interior, in particular, its Department for Civil Liberties and Immigration and Department of Public 
Security. These documents provided data such as those related to the current EU regulations on 
immigration, the Italian laws on irregular migration, and Italian border control policies. Moreover, I 
carefully read bilateral agreements and official documents on the management of migration in Italy and 
the EU that provided an understanding of the regulations and the practical measures implemented in 
border controls, before and after 2011. A thorough review of the research project, “Clandestino - 
Undocumented Migration: Counting the Uncountable,” which was implemented between 2007 and 2009 
and funded by the European Commission, provided me with data and detailed estimates on the irregular 
migration trends in Italy and across Europe as a whole. Unfortunately, there is no recent report with the 
wealth of data that “Clandestino” offered.  
In all, archival research continued throughout the study until the midpoint of my fieldwork, and it 
was extremely helpful in guiding and informing my larger theoretical and methodological framework. 
vi. Participant Observation 
The use of participant observation took place throughout the study, sometimes overlapping with the 
semi-structured interviews, and sometimes occurring simultaneously. The aim of observation was to 
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provide a more comprehensive picture of migrants’ experiences in the various field sites. I made sure to 
ask the study participants about things I had observed during site visits, such as my visit to Caritas in 
Palermo, where I noticed the different treatment of Tunisians as compared to other migrants. Depending 
on the situation, I employed both overt and covert techniques of observation, generally trying to be as 
discrete as possible. One important locale for observation was the public square in Al Borgo where those 
migrants, not constrained by factors such as money, spent several hours a day, drinking, playing cards, 
exchanging information, and connecting with the other migrants and the residents of the district.  
I also attended many events such as soccer matches, political rallies, and even birthdays, trying to act 
spontaneously as a friend rather than a researcher. I visited some of the participants’ homes and 
workplaces, if they were employed, frequented bars, charitable organizations, game rooms, barber shops, 
markets, Palermo’s small mosque, youth centers, stadiums, public gardens, the beach, and the port. 
Additionally, during the process of field observations, I was able to engage in casual conversations with 
NGO personnel and journalists, which significantly deepened my understanding of the issues at stake. 
Participant observation alone would not have allowed me to “learn the answers to questions I would not 
have had the sense to ask if I had been getting my information solely on an interview basis” (Whyte 
1982). 
I tried to share as intimately as possible the life, personal stories, testimonies, fears, concerns, and 
interests of young people in their different settings across the three main research sites. As Guba and 
Lincoln (1981) aptly state when discussing the crucial practice of observation in ethnographic qualitative 
research,  
[T]he inquirer’s ability to grasp motives, beliefs, concerns, interests, unconscious behaviors 
and the like…allows the inquirer to see the world as his subjects see it, to live their time 
frames, to capture the phenomenon in and on its own terms, and to grasp the culture in its 
natural, ongoing environment (p. 193). 
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The purpose of such participation is to become intimately connected to the study participants’ 
subjectivities and to develop an insider’s view of what is happening from the participants’ own 
perspectives and on their own terms. Clifford (1986) writes that “the ‘method’ of participant-
observation…enact[s] a delicate balance of subjectivity and objectivity” (p.13). Later in this chapter, I 
will address my position as a participant researcher, acting as both an insider and outsider, in order to 
discuss the subjective issues in this project. 
The power of participant observation is that it can help validate the collected data by revealing the 
potential inconsistencies between the informants’ responses during interviews and what they actually do 
when they socially interact among themselves. While observing and participating, I paid particular 
attention to discourses around what it means to be an irregular migrant from Tunisia, what determines his 
vulnerability, and whether he is part of any local or transnational socio-cultural/political alliance or 
network. Moreover, in order to document and record the different aspects of the participants’ daily 
routine, I used different strategies. First, I looked for extended opportunities to gain a better 
understanding of my participants’ lives by attending their daily activities, such as going to the game 
rooms, bars, and charitable organizations, and accompanying them when they were looking for jobs. In 
certain situations, however, I discretely recorded field notes both while “hanging out” with the migrants 
and immediately after visiting a location, as my role was sometimes limited solely to observation. I kept a 
separate notebook for each field site and wrote down information, such as the socio-demographics and 
economic characteristics of people, the description and layout of the physical space and the context, the 
events that occurred, conversations amongst migrants and their friends, behavior, body language, and 
reflections on my own conversations with migrants, NGO personnel, journalists, and local residents.  
While conducting my ethnography, I was overwhelmed; every migrant I encountered seemed to 
have a powerful story to tell with extraordinary insights. This resulted in a huge amount of information 
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that provided an extremely rich narrative and data set for my research. Also, I was surprised to be 
spontaneously approached by many migrants, especially by deportees in Hay Ettadhamen, who had heard 
about my study via word-of-mouth, popularly known as “telephone-Arabe,” and who persistently asked to 
be part of my research. It turned out later that many were reaching out to me because they thought I could 
potentially be a valuable contact who would help them, via connections or money, secure a trip back to 
Lampedusa.  
 vii. Open-ended Interviews 
Open-ended interviews gave me access to aspects of the migrants’ culture that I was unable to observe 
via participant observation, helping me gather detailed accounts, opinions, and feelings directly from the 
respondent (Ervin, 2000). Weiss (1995) advocates for the use of qualitative interviews since they can 
provide “the fullest, most detailed description possible” in order to understand a phenomenon that “no 
single person [can] observe in its totality” (p. 9). 
Before conducting the interviews, I established initial contact by phone through the applications 
WhatsApp and Viber, setting up a date, time, and location. I used most questions listed in the interview 
guide, but I altered and/or removed some questions, depending on the situation and whether or not the 
informant was comfortable with certain questions, e.g., those dealing with the boat journey. While 
interviewing, however, the question guide was primarily used as an agenda because I wanted to build an 
atmosphere in which an informal conversation could occur, rather than have a question-answer session. 
Throughout the various phases of this study, I kept the interview schedule and location flexible to 
accommodate each participant’s preferences and availabilities. 
In the three main field sites, I conducted 60 open-ended interviews: 18 in Hay Ettadhamen; 22 in 
Palermo; 12 in Trapani; 8 in Agrigento; 6 in Sciacca; and 14 in Lampedusa. All the interviews were 
conducted at venues specified by the study participants, including their workplaces, their homes, my 
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home, car/road trips, and public spaces, such as beaches, parks, and cafés/bars. I also conducted a few 
interviews with mothers and other family members of migrants when I was travelling by boat between 
Palermo and Tunis. Most interviews were conducted in darija, the Tunisian Arabic dialect, with Tunisian 
migrants, in Italian with Italian participants, and in English with NGO personnel, international activists, 
and volunteers. These interviews lasted between 60 to 90 minutes for the study population, while taking 
less time, 15 to 30 minutes, for the rest of the participants. I recorded the interviews, except for those few 
informants who did not want be to be recorded, and took notes, making various observations and 
reflections during the interview sessions. Later, I translated and transcribed both the notes and interviews 
into English.  
In order to ensure the quality of the data collected, I used my iPad to record most of the interviews 
in an MP3 format. Later, I transferred these recordings to my computer and then to an external hard drive 
to avoid any incident or data loss. I also created an interview timetable, in which I included some brief 
socio-demographic information about the interviewee, the interview time and place. For instance, in Hay 
Etadhemen, I conducted face-to-face, unstructured interviews with 18 participants, all of whom were 
deported migrants.  In order to elicit self-narratives of their own experiences, I engaged them in thematic, 
in-depth conversations that focused mainly on their experiences in Italy and Hay Ettadhamen. 
Specifically, my conversations focused on topics such as their experiences with “illegality,” Islamophobic 
attitudes, abuse and oppression, life in the detention centers, and social interactions on the island. I then 
asked participants to discuss their lives and personal experiences as deported individuals in the aftermath 
of the 2011 uprising. I suggested that they further reflect upon their experiences by making the connection 
between their past situation in Italy and their current one in Hay Ettadhamen.  
In order to avoid causing emotional distress, I approached sensitive and personal issues carefully 
and compassionately to ensure that study participants did not feel pressured to reveal anything that made 
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them uncomfortable. I also informed them, from the beginning that they could withdraw from the 
interview at any time. Due to the fact that some interview questions raised issues that were sensitive, 
intimate, and emotionally draining, I gave the participants frequent breaks or, at times, rescheduled the 
interview as a whole. Ervin points out that “this would allow the respondents time to become comfortable 
with the interviewing process” (Ervin 2000). I maintained maximum neutrality toward the specific 
content of certain responses because I did not want to be seen making judgments. I was also careful not to 
annoy the respondents or cause them any psychological harm. After the interview sessions, I would 
generally go back home to write down the content of the interview, additional observations, and thoughts 
about the meeting. While writing my notes, questions and ideas would eventually emerge that would 
require additional meetings with the research participants to bring more clarification to some of the issues 
they had raised earlier. Interviews in public contexts, such as bars and restaurants, were not recorded; 
rather, I recalled and wrote down the context of the event and its data in as much detail as I could in my 
field notes when I was home. 
 viii. Data Management Strategies 
After the completion of each phase of fieldwork, data gathered from participant observation was typed 
and then organized, using colored fonts, into various themes. The recorded interviews were translated and 
transcribed during the summers of 2013 and 2014 and the fall of 2014 and 2015. After the transcription of 
all the interviews, I reviewed the material and organized it into retrievable sessions by assigning numbers 
identified by dates, themes, sub-themes, categories, as well as places and times of the interviews. To 
ensure a high level of confidentiality, real names were substituted by pseudonyms. In my thematic 
analysis of each interview transcription, as well as during the analysis of my field notes, I remained 
continuously reflexive with my findings, trying to compare my notes with what the study participants had 
to say. 
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For my data analysis, I began to establish a list of themes, such as “examples of vulnerabilities,” 
“social marginalization,” “neighborly networks,” “acts of resistance,” “Islamophobia,” “distress,” 
“exploitation,” “criminalization,” and “bodily inflicted harm.” These were then divided into categories 
and codes.  For example, the theme of “distress” was delineated into four sub-themes: 1) the boat journey, 
2) the detention center, 3) the overall migration experience in Italy, and 4) the deportation. I was able to 
analyze all moments when the study participants discussed their feelings of distress according to those 
four different, but inter-related, experiences. A careful thematic analysis was then conducted to pull out 
units of data that could be given a particular code, which could then be extracted and examined in depth 
to answer the research questions. From this final coding, my aim was to pull out the contexts, such as 
which human rights violations took place, and to understand the various political, economic, and 
legislative conditions that were responsible for creating those situations of extreme vulnerabilities and 
abuse. 
 ix. Data Analysis Techniques 
The data I collected during my extended fieldwork were rich and diverse, and I realized that I had 
more than I could handle for the analysis and then the writing of this dissertation. My strategy to avoid 
being overwhelmed was to continuously check the reliability and validity of my analyses to see if the 
interpretations I had made from the field notes reflected the reality of the participants’ accounts and 
perspectives. I also carefully scrutinized the data gathered from archival research, participant observation, 
and in-depth interviews to gain a greater perspective on the main themes and to check whether the 
research questions had been answered. Participant observation notes were triangulated with the interviews 
to reach a maximum validity of the emerging themes and to understand the appropriate patterns. The 
following steps were necessary for the analysis of the collected data: 
• Familiarization with the emerging data through an in-depth examination; 
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• Transcription of the taped material, including gestures and non-verbal cues; 
• Organization and indexing of data; 
• Coding of categories; and 
• Detection of specific themes. 
The migrants told me narratives that helped them reconstruct their lives through the recollection of 
the past, present and hopes for the future. These memories are, as Hopkins says “central to the 
development of social and personal identity” (Hopkins 1994:127). The data, provided by the narratives, is 
distinctive and cannot be obtained from simple questionnaires or other interviewing techniques. Because 
the main goal of mapping out the life histories of the irregular migrants is to identify their vulnerabilities 
and resistance strategies, grounded theory was used to illuminate the actions and involvement of migrants 
in local and transnational activities. Narrative accounts and life histories have been used by a number of 
social scientists (Abu-Lughod 1991; Gmelch 1992; Hopkins 1994; Ochs and Capps 1996), who have 
employed them as conceptual tools through which they analyze their research data.  This micro-approach 
was used by other scholars such as Abu-Lughod (1991), who points out that the macro-processes are 
often manifested locally and are “produced in the actions of individuals living their particular lives, 
inscribed in their bodies and their words” (Abu-Lughod 1991:150).  Ochs and Capps (1996) argue that 
narratives create an opportunity to construct a lineal sequence between “past, present and imagined 
worlds” (Ochs and Capps 1996).  Also, they add that 
the inseparability of narrative and self-grounded [noun missing here?] in the 
phenomenological assumption that entities are given meaning through being experienced and 
the notion that narrative is an essential resource in the struggle to bring experiences to 
conscious awareness.  Narratives are versions of reality. They are embodiments of one or 
more points of view rather than objective accounts” (Ochs and Capps 1996:21-22). 
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Drawing on Polkinghorne (1991), researchers can consider narratives as stories about the self.  They are 
“the basis of personal identity and self-understanding and they provide answers to the question, Who am 
I?” (Polkinghorne 1991:136).  
For this dissertation, narrative functioned as a conceptual tool that I employed to analyze the 
research data and to answer the hypothesis questions. I quote most participants directly in order to both 
identify the issues affecting their lives and to voice their concerns with their own accounts. I chose to 
quote them because they contain rich data that tell us how the population of this study incorporates 
various cultural meanings when they engage in the construction and presentation of their “selves.” The 
emotional mood of these narratives, as reflected in this dissertation, gives the migration issue its 
subjective and human aspects and helps readers to examine them from the insiders’ standpoints. Gmelch 
(1992) argues that using this genre makes us “get beneath the abstractions of migration theory.”  He 
further admits that migration is hard to observe; therefore, narratives help us “get sense of the degree to 
which migrants are free actors shaping their own destinies” (Gmelch 1992:311-324). The stories these 
potential migrants tell about themselves, my theoretical analysis, and the story I tell are transformations of 
each other; they are, as Foucault argues, “retellings of a sequence of events derived from the discursive 
practice of our historical era” (Foucault 1973).  
III. Ethics and Confidentiality 
Ervin states, “What is most important in maintaining confidentiality is the protection of individuals 
and potentially vulnerable subgroups” (Ervin, 2000). From the beginning of this research, all participants 
were assured that their involvement in the study was anonymous and were asked to sign a form attesting 
that they understood the subject of the study and that their participation was voluntary. Informed consent 
“entails making the subject fully aware of the purpose of the study, its possible dangers and the 
credentials of the researcher” (Bailey, 1994). Throughout the research, I was careful to ask questions and 
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not to cause any harm to participants by ensuring that the interview data would be handled with 
confidentiality and that the recorded material would only be accessible to me. I explained to each 
participant that I would protect his identity, which was a relief to them and made them more comfortable 
when sharing their life histories, experiences, emotions, and thoughts. Being Tunisian myself and a native 
speaker of the Tunisian dialect, I did not have communication or etiquette problems while doing 
fieldwork in Hay Ettadhamen or Sicily. My fluency in Italian and English has also helped me gain 
credibility and easy access to a variety of Italians, such as local and international NGO personnel, 
journalists, filmmakers, and local inhabitants.  
IV. Issues of Positionality: Personal Reflections 
Despite the challenges of conducting multi-sited fieldwork, I tried to provide an ethical, detailed, 
holistic picture of the lives of the migrants under study on their grounds and on their own terms. In this 
section, I share my reflections on the challenges I faced in the process of doing fieldwork, particularly the 
issues of reflexivity and positionality, as well as the tensions, and conflicts that they represent, explicitly 
and implicitly. In most ethnographic research, reflexivity is a useful strategy that can help the 
ethnographer address the social, cultural, political, and personal aspects of their positionality in relation to 
the participants and contexts under study (Ellis & Bochner, 1996; Marcus, 1998; Okely, 1996). Despite 
the mutual trust and intimate relationship, I developed with most of the study participants, there were 
many times throughout the fieldwork where I felt I was being positioned as an “outsider.” That I live in 
the U.S. and am identified as a scholar/researcher, created distance, and I was sometimes referred to as 
“different” or “too smart.” As Imed, a 32-year-old migrant said,  
You are an anthropologist from the U.S., and that is why you will never understand us or 
relate to what we are going through. We are vulnerable migrants with no rights. You will 
never understand our difficult lives or the amount of dommar (ordeal) and mizirya (misery) 
that we encounter on a daily basis (Interview 06/2014). 
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As my research evolved, comments like this amplified my self-awareness and sensitivity 
about being an educated and privileged Tunisian man; in turn, this affected the way I sometimes 
positioned myself and behaved at certain episodes of the study. For example, I decided to share 
with the study participants my own personal experiences of cultural displacement, as well as my 
concerns and uncertainties as a Tunisian or “foreigner” in Italy.  I told them how hard it was for 
me to obtain my visa for Italy and that I had been subject to a racial profiling experience by the 
Italian police when I landed in Palermo.  In addition, I shared incidents of racial profiling that I 
encountered in Los Angeles simply as a result of being a Muslim and Arab man. Sharing my 
similarities in terms of cultural/religious heritage and personal migration experiences alleviated 
the distance that I had been experiencing, especially at the beginning of my fieldwork. Being a 
Tunisian studying abroad was a valuable position that allowed me to make close connections 
with my study participants over time and allowed them to readily share their migration stories. 
As Geertz (1995:94) eloquently points out, “Field research in such times, in such places, is not a 
matter of working free from the cultural baggage you brought with you so as to enter, without 
shape and without attachment, into a foreign mode of life. It is a matter of living out your 
existence in two stories at once.” 
Hence, I became much closer to some informants, turning into a friend who was accepted and 
trusted. It was touching when my key informants grew concerned about my safety, especially when I 
would be riding my bike or walking home alone late at night in Palermo. They would insist that I call or 
text them as soon as I made it home.  Sometimes, they would accompany me until I reached the main gate 
of my apartment building to ensure I did not get mugged or harmed, especially after hanging out late at 
night in shady neighborhoods, such as La Kalsa or the Vucheria. During my stay in Palermo, I invited a 
couple of informants, with whom I had closely bonded, for a small Ramadan Tunisian iftar (post-sunset 
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evening meal) as a way to show appreciation and gratitude, to reinforce their trust in me, and to ensure 
that the fieldwork would proceed smoothly. This invitation was reciprocated when Mondher invited 
Housine, Monji, and me and his Palermitan girlfriend to their tiny apartment near Al Borgo for another 
iftar, during which we shared our life stories, told jokes, and played cards (Field notes 07/2014).  
Throughout my research, I was extremely aware of my role as an ethnographer and the importance 
of doing ethical research, in which the study population is fully protected and respected. I maintained a 
high degree of reflexivity and was very careful not to engage in any delicate political or personal issues, 
i.e., trying to avoid things that could hinder my relationship with the informants and that could lead to any 
potential conflict. As Foley (2002) writes “to make ethnography at least quasi-objective, one has to 
become much more reflexive about all ethnographic practices—from field relations and interpretative 
practices to producing texts” (p. 473).  Due to a number of sensitive issues encountered during fieldwork, 
such as criminal activities, physical abuse, and male prostitution, I also did my best to preserve the 
anonymity of my participants by limiting the amount of identifying information and only providing basic, 
socio-demographic characteristics. At times, I had to change other forms of identifying information, such 
as occupation or hometown in Tunisia, which I felt might expose the identity of a study participant.  
V. Conclusion 
In this chapter, I provided a meticulous overview of the data collection methodology used to answer 
the research questions of this study and to gain a deeper understanding of the daily life experiences of the 
study population. I explained my choice of a qualitative, multi-sited design, arguing that it was the most 
appropriate way to gain a deeper understanding of the issues and the participants’ social worlds. To give a 
clear context and familiarize the readers with my six locations, I provided a “thick” description of Hay 
Ettadhamen, Sicily, Palermo, Agrigento, Siacca, Trapani, and Lampedusa. After this rich description, I 
laid down the multiple techniques that I used to facilitate my immersion in these different sites and the 
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way I built rapport, recruited the study participants, and got access to their lives. I gathered my data using 
three qualitative research techniques: 1) archival research, 2) open-ended interviews, and 3) participant 
observation. I then discussed my data analysis and management techniques. Finally, I elaborated on the 
importance of conducting ethical research and reviewed the procedures I followed to protect the privacy 
and confidentiality of the study participants.  
The chapter ended with a discussion of the issues of positionality and the challenges and 
opportunities of being an “insider” doing research in a foreign country. Throughout my analysis, I 
reflected on my own cultural identity and my position as a researcher from a well-known U.S. university, 
as an “insider” conducting research on my own ethnic group, i.e., the Tunisian migrant population.  Due 
to the asymmetrical power relations between my study population, and me as a researcher, it was 
important to remain mindful of the ethics of conducting fieldwork and research with marginalized groups. 
Given the sensitivities of the issue that I am studying and the vulnerability of my study population, 
several key issues had to be addressed and taken into consideration, i.e., my role and positionality as the 
main researcher and the ways in which I can responsibly, ethically, and academically represent my 
participants’ views with the least distortion possible.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 80 
 
CHAPTER FOUR 
REVIEW OF THE MIGRATION LITERATURE  
I.  Introduction 
According to Jordan and Duvell irregular migration is the “crossing of borders without proper 
authority, or violating conditions for entering another country” (2002: 15). This type of 
migration is not new, as irregular migrants have always contributed to filling the gap in the 
economy of core countries whose nationals are often reluctant to take certain jobs in fields such 
as agriculture, domestic services, and industry (Terray et al. 2000).  Irregular migration is so 
common today that it is almost impossible to discuss current migration without referring to the 
phenomenon, which dominates the headlines and is used in public debates, mainstream media, 
and academia. Although its context, processes, and theoretical challenges are not deeply 
interrogated in academic research, irregular migration still grounds diverse arguments in the field 
of anthropology and the larger social science arena.  However, the existing scholarship does not 
constitute a distinct stream from the broad migration literature that covers human mobility, its 
diversity, and complexity across the globe.  
Most of the migration literature demonstrates that nation-states, which claim to protect and provide 
for their citizens and to have control over their national borders are, in fact, becoming less and less 
capable of supporting this claim.  The 2011 Tunisian popular uprising has demonstrated the porosity of 
national borders and the weakness of the nation-state concept.  This border permeability is further 
substantiated by the intense economic, socio-cultural, and transnational political exchanges (“legal” and 
“illegal”) taking place across many national borders.  Those transnational exchanges continue to 
problematize binaries that have long characterized social analysis concerning issues such as the “nation 
state,” “national identity,” and “sovereignty.”  There is no doubt that the so-called “Arab Spring” and the 
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flow of human mobility that it has engendered has further dramatically and qualitatively metamorphosed 
and complicated the character of these transnational movements.  As such, the long upheld image of the 
“uprooted” migrant, which characterized earlier migration research, has vanished in light of the multiple, 
varied, regular, and irregular transnational border movements taking place in today’s world.  A plethora 
of phenomena, usually subsumed under the label “transnationalism,” are currently being studied and are 
often regarded as having transformed the way we study borders and trans-border flows of individuals and 
migrant communities. 
New transnational research thus demonstrates how ethnographic studies can capture the dichotomy 
of local-global by rethinking human mobility with respect to its myriad forms, volume, and pace.  This 
has, in turn, demonstrated that local happenings are inevitably shaped by events taking place thousands of 
miles away and vice versa.  Through the increased global mobility of people and labor, a number of 
scholars started to reframe the question of “borders” as both confining locations and shifting political 
spaces that defy any clear-cut definition, thereby removing them from their seeming geographic and 
sovereign primacy.  
In this chapter, I provide a detailed, four-part discussion of migration by 1) reviewing the migration 
key literature and development of transnational research, outlining its paradoxical nature and discussing 
its relevance to anthropology and other social sciences; 2) examining the ways in which anthropology, 
with its conceptual tools, has shaped studies of migration empirically and normatively; 3) discussing 
multi-sited research design and assessing its utility in addressing postmodern constructs such as 
“mobility” and the “spatial turn”; and 4) analyzing the phenomenon of irregular migration as a product of 
the transnational condition.  I particularly examine irregular migration through the lens of social network 
theory and demonstrate through theoretical and ethnographic evidence that social networks play a crucial 
role in the lives of irregular migrants such as the Tunisian migrants of this study, by creating a form of 
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social capital13 operating across borders and acting like a dynamic engine that fuels “chain migration,” 
thereby stimulating and accelerating the process of irregular migration.  
II. Key Migration Theories: Conceptual Issues 
In recent decades, a number of anthropologists (Anderson 1991, 2007; Appadurai 1991; Brettell 2000; 
Foner et al 2000; Massey et al. 1998; Robinson 2004; Urry 2003) have examined the factors that 
engender transnational migration by looking at global capitalism as the main catalyst facilitating human 
mobility.  Many have used ethnographic research to capture the “permeability” of national boundaries and 
the possibilities of re-forming networks of political organizing among different migrant populations 
(Schiller and Blanc 1993).  They argue that the boundaries between nation-states are blurred lines and 
claim that nations are not natural or unchanging communities; rather, nations are entities that are 
imagined and negotiated (Anderson 1991; Appadurai 1991; Anthias and Yuval-Davis 1994; Gilroy 1993).  
Consequently, new theories of identity, ethnicity, economics, and politics have compelled a number of 
scholars to re-consider some of the prevalent migration classical theories such as the “push-pull” theory 
that was traditionally used by social scientists to explain human mobility such as irregular movements 
(Brettell 2000). 
The push-pull theory centers on macro-level factors, i.e., factors in the migration-producing 
countries, such as poverty and unemployment, that push people out while, in the receiving countries, 
attractive features, such as consumption patterns, higher living standards, and job opportunities, pull them 
in.  According to push-pull theory, any migratory movement is a result of push forces in sending countries 
and pull forces in receiving ones.  This theory, despite still being relevant, accounts neither for the 
intervening impediments to migration nor the personal factors involved in the migration decision and the 
                                                          
13 This paper uses Bourdieu’s definition of social capital: “The aggregate of the actual or potential resources which are linked 
to the possession of a durable network of more or less institutionalised relationships of mutual acquaintance or recognition” 
(Bourdieu, 1985:248). 
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overall mobility process.  Indeed, in classical migration theories such as the push-pull theory (Lee 1966), 
concepts, e.g., core-periphery (Wallerstein 1979), are too simplistic because they fail to explain the 
diversity and intricacy of people’s movements across the globe and contribute relatively little to the 
understanding of the complexity of the irregular migration phenomenon (Anderson 1991; Appadurai 
1991; Gilroy 1993).  Further, those theories were developed in the 1960s and 1970s, two decades when 
human mobility and border crossings were relatively simple compared to current complex migration 
patterns.  
Other social scientists advance the idea that transnational migration is a natural result of 
globalization and transnational capitalism (Anderson 1991; Appadurai 1991; Brettell 2000; Gilroy 1993; 
Robinson 2004; Urry 2003).  The global market has generated an exceptional increase in human mobility 
as millions of migration candidates are lured by a global demand for labor. As such, globalization studies 
place an emphasis on migration as a phenomenon resulting from the large-scale transformations of non-
industrial societies, as well as the uneven geographical distribution of global capital and labor (Brettell 
2000:102).  Anthropological research has the capacity to scrutinize these globalization forces and 
examine their relationships by focusing on actual migrants and studying their different experiences from 
emic and holistic perspectives.  Many anthropologists have studied these relationships and attempted to 
explain the process through which they operate (Anderson 1991; Appadurai 1991; Brettell 2000; Gilroy 
1993).  According to Brettell,  
Typologies formulated by some anthropologists have directed research to the diverse nature 
of the process and to the fundamental relationship between sending and receiving societies, 
whether conceived in the macro terms of a global economy or in the micro terms of social 
networks and emotional relationships (Brettell 2000:102). 
 
 These typologies can be helpful in decrypting the broader context in which people’s movements take 
place, including irregular border crossings. Yet today, all this happens in a context of increasing 
instability at the political, economic, social, and cultural levels. The relationships among the various 
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countries of the Mediterranean are now based on several paradoxical interests where both the economy 
and national security are top priorities.  Ironically, while an increasing number of people have the desire 
and means to travel more than ever before for purposes of migration or routine tourist travel, enhanced 
border controls are making it ever more difficult for them to do so (Oucho 1996). The phenomenon of 
irregular migration is tightly linked to the expansive nature of the global market with its commodities, 
ideologies, technology, and culture. This happens, in part, because globalization creates infrastructures of 
transportation, communication, and social networks that make the rich global North “virtually” accessible 
and within deceptive reach to the rest of the impoverished global South. 
Structural Marxists like Immanuel Wallerstein (1979) have examined migration from the 
perspective of world system theory, arguing that the relationship between core and periphery nations 
provides the most viable explanation of today’s various migratory movements.  In the same vein, Brettell 
(2000) argues that “the unit of analysis according to the political economy of world system is not the 
individual migrant, but rather the global market and the way that national and international economic and 
political policies, and particularly, capitalist development, have disrupted, displaced, or even attracted 
local populations, thereby generating particular migration streams” (Brettell 2000:104).  Within this new 
international division of labor, populations in nations of the periphery, whose economic conditions are 
deteriorating because of globalization, have an added incentive to leave their countries and move to the 
core for better economic opportunities (Froebel et al. 1980).  The global market is generating a separate 
division of labor by stimulating labor mobility such that core countries can exploit the advantages of 
lower labor costs and open the doors for people in the periphery to become potential migrants (Terray et 
al. 2000).  
Irregular migration then cannot be discussed outside the context of the global labor market 
because its existence is highly dependent on the availability of a very cheap, disposable, and often 
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irregular workforce.  Irregular migrant workers have become vital for many Western economies that rely 
on cheap and flexible labor.  It is this cheap “illegal” labor that supplies European and American 
consumerism with fruits, vegetables, and clothes at incredibly low prices (Terray et al. 2000).  The image 
of states as simply reactive, responding to the growth of irregular transnational flows, is misleading 
because “it understates the degree to which states actually structure, condition, produce, and enable 
clandestine border crossings” (De Genova 2002:64).  Terray et al. (2000) describe the importance of 
cheap labor to Western economies, arguing that western economies based on irregular migrants’ labor 
represent a form of delocalisation sur place, a French colloquialism which symbolically means 
“delocalization on the spot” (Terray et al. 2000: 82).  This implies that these factories and various 
industries, not outsourced to countries of the global South where labor costs are low, simply exploit the 
cheap labor available by way of irregular migration.  As these authors aptly put it, 
What do the neo-liberals want?  They want a workforce which is as flexible and docile as 
possible and which is deprived of any protection.  Undocumented foreigners represent a 
totally flexible workforce, because you can recruit or dismiss them as you wish, as work 
orders arrive.  The best way to have products at very low prices is to generalize slavery. The 
fundamental question is whether we accept sectors in which slavery is common practice, or if 
we are not prepared to accept this (Terray et al. 2000: 82). 
   
III. New Debates on Transnationalism  
In the last few years, the concept of transnationalism has been developed and employed by 
anthropologists, sociologists, political scientists, geographers, and many others in the study of migration 
movements.  Ong highlights the significance of migrants’ transnational activities, arguing that the concept 
of transnationalism is best suited to explain the condition of increasing cultural interconnectedness and 
other kinds of human mobility across borders.  This definition, she contends, should not be an attempt to 
reify a conception of the world as “composed of sovereign, spatially discontinuous units,” but rather to 
problematize the very notion that cultures and societies are bound and, indeed, defined by the nation-state 
(Ong 1997).  Glick Schiller (2003: 99) defines transnationals as “those persons who having migrated from 
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one nation-state to another live their lives across borders, participating simultaneously in social relations 
that embed them in more than one nation-state.”  She also argues that the various activities and identity 
claims in the political domain are a particular form of transnational migration that is best understood as a 
form of loyalty and a long-distance nationalism.  This could be well evidenced by the various kinds of 
resistance movements as well as the ties and different relationships that trans-migrants maintain with their 
homelands through remittances, technology transfer, political activism, and so forth.  
Another approach to transnationalism deals with political transnational activism, which argues that 
the nation-state system has already weakened, leaving space for international governance bodies and 
global rights regimes to protect individual migrants regardless of their national citizenship (Soysal 1994, 
Beck 2000).  In her studies of the Chinese diaspora in North America, Ong (1996) has demonstrated that 
liminal sites of transnational practices and discourses can be used for entrepreneurial purposes quite as 
efficiently as for the purpose of disputing “hegemonic narratives” of race, ethnicity, class, and 
sovereignty.  Further, anthropologists use the concept, “transnationalism,” as an analytical tool to describe 
the “process by which migrants, through their daily activities, forge and sustain various social, economic, 
and political relations that link together their societies of origin and settlement, and through which they 
create transnational social fields that cross national borders” (Bach, Glick-Schiller, and Szanton-Blanc 
1994: 6).  This kind of transnational research, largely ethnographic and multi-sited in nature, has 
generally been carried out by anthropologists and sociologists (Guarnizo, Portes and Haller 2003; 
Schiller, Basch and Blanc 1995; Smith and Guarnizo 1998, Ong 1997, Kearney 1995).  Much of the 
existing literature, mostly with regards to Mexican migration, is concerned with transnational 
communities that span international boundaries through various types of socio-cultural and political 
activities.  Chavez (1991), for instance, writes about how irregular Mexican migrants, in order to subsist 
in the U.S., vary their adjustment strategies and their social mobilization according to their needs. He 
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describes these arrangements as a form of resistance towards the exploitation and abuses they encounter, 
i.e., “weapons of the weak,” (Scott 1985: 29). In their definition of transnational interactions and 
organizations, Nye et al. state that  
in the most general sense one can speak of “global interactions” as movements of information, 
money, physical objects, people, or other tangible or intangible items across state boundaries. 
We can distinguish four major types of global interaction: 1) communication, the movement 
of information, including the transmission of beliefs, ideas, and doctrines; 2) transportation, 
the movement of physical objects, including war materiel and personal property as well as 
merchandise; 3) finance, the movement of money and instruments of credit; 4) travel, the 
movement of persons. It is important to note that many international activities involve all four 
types of interaction simultaneously (in Levitt et al. 2008: 24). 
 
However, while the term transnational migration proposes a more or less perpetual condition of 
being between two or more locations, the access and the amount of time spent in this state varies 
dramatically among different categories of people based on their regular/irregular status, access to 
resources, gender, race, religion, class, and so forth.  All the people living a transnational experience are 
exposed in some shared way, but at different levels, to a set of social norms and cultural values fashioned 
by circumstances and one, two, or multiple social, economic, and political systems. It is clear that 
accessibility to transnational flows is often reserved for those social actors who have the economic means, 
the political space, or the cultural capital to benefit from them.  In this context, then, what level of 
transnationalism exists, if any, among the Tunisian post-uprising irregular migrant community? And does 
this transnationalism have any positive, transformative impacts on migrants’ level of resistance to the 
various abuses that they face in Italy? 
Levitt and Schiller propose a social-field approach to the study of present day migration by 
exploring the numerous divisions between the local, national, transnational, and global.  In so doing, they 
engage in differentiating between “ways of being” and “ways of belonging” (Levitt and Schiller 2008: 
286). According to them, approaching migration in this way can help demonstrate that assimilation and 
persistent transnational links are neither incompatible nor opposites because both can help scholars delve 
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into issues of citizenship, political identity, and social change as they unfold in transnational arenas 
(Levitt et al. 2008). Levitt & Schiller (2008:286) state, “migrant networks are viewed as constituting a 
single social field created by a network of networks,” which could be used as a conceptual tool in social 
analysis that goes beyond the study of the individual.  According to Basch, Schiller, and Blanc (1994), 
social fields could be defined as sets of manifold, intertwined networks of social relationships through 
which ideas, practices, and resources are unevenly exchanged, processed, and transmuted within and 
across borders.  Many Tunisian migrants in this study, as will be demonstrated, do engage in some kinds 
of transnational activities, but not all are operating within transnational social fields.   
Under the above definition, social fields are multiple and diverse resources composed of various 
interactions of different forms and intensities.  This construct of social fields can be used as a conceptual 
tool to fathom the multi-sited lives of the trans-border migrants.  It can also be employed to capture all 
kinds of local, national, global, and transnational experiences lived concurrently by contemporary 
migrants in various locations.  As such, social fields encapsulating cultural, economic, and political 
exchanges have the capacity to reinforce the migrant sense of community while, at times, challenging the 
host society’s national sovereignty and its ability to control its borders. On the other hand, Faist (2000: 
189) argues that whether scholars talk of transnational social spaces, transnational social fields, 
transnationalism, or transnational social formations in international migration systems, they usually refer 
to sustained ties of persons, networks, and organizations across the borders and across multiple nation 
states.  These ties range from minimally to highly institutionalized forms. 
Considering the many challenges that the concept of transnationalism has engendered, a number of 
migration scholars have attempted to expand the concept to incorporate certain categories of migrants, 
such as those engaged in sporadic transnational activities.  Others (Guarnizo 1998) introduce the concepts 
of “core” transnationalism to refer to activities that are regular, organized, and sustained through time and 
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“expanded” transnationalism to designate activities and exchanges of a more sporadic character.  
Similarly, Levitt (2001: 199) argues, “the concepts of core and expanded transnationalism must also be 
extended to include the transnational practices of those who stay behind.” 
Treatments of various forms of transnationalism can denote the presence of certain disparities in 
terms of their access to these networks or “social fields” as well as their ability to maintain these intense 
transnational flows in the first place. Smith and Guarnizo (1998), for instance, advocate for a delineation 
of the term by distinguishing the “transnationalism from above” of corporations and states, and the 
“transnationalism from below” of international migrants. Use of this distinction demonstrates that, in each 
case, transnational spaces as embedded in particular geopolitical structures determine the circumstances 
under which transnational communities develop under those multiple, uneven, and complex webs. These 
webs act like the engine that generates, sustains, and reproduces those transnational networks through the 
constant, albeit uneven, material, ideological, and symbolic exchanges that take place. 
Transnational migration is not uniform and is formed by a heterogeneous, rather than a unitary, 
group of people, possessing distinct personal and social endowments, i.e., human capital and social 
capital.  Because people are migrating under different circumstances, they exhibit significant, if subtle, 
regional and socio-cultural differences.  Heterogeneity also continues to mark the degree to which 
migrants can access opportunities in the host society, which in part explains why not all migrants are able 
to afford the sustenance of active and sometimes lucrative transnational ties.  However, this being said, 
one needs to be careful when it comes to the decontextualized treatment of transnational migrants as 
“timeless” cultural wholes or neutral categories detached from the often disputed historical and 
geographical backgrounds of their emergence.  Similarly, the easy depiction of transnational subjects as 
“hybrid” obscures the fact that no matter how much spatial mobility or border-crossing experiences 
migrants have; it must always be contextualized within those spatial and geopolitical boundaries. 
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Due to this major shift in the migration phenomenon, “transnational migration” as a new paradigm 
emerged and proliferated especially quickly during the last two decades.  A broad literature with studies 
of various transnational activities has been on the rise, with a number of them carried out on various 
migrant communities in the U.S., Europe, and other parts of the world.  The bulk of this literature 
conveyed the sense that transnationalism, in opposition to assimilation, is becoming the “normative 
pattern” of adaptation and performance for a large number of contemporary migrants.  These studies are 
highly ethnographic in nature and, notably, most of this literature adopts a qualitative approach and is 
exclusively based on multi-sited research techniques such as those I used for this dissertation. 
Transnational migration is the process by which migrants forge and sustain simultaneous relations 
across borders; on the other hand, transnational community is used to describe very different units of 
analysis.  Some scholars perceive this community narrowly as a specific locality in which local 
relationships expand across borders (Goldring 1996; Levitt 2001; Smith 1998; Georges 1992).  The local, 
then, no longer refers to where the migrants come from as much as the current space in which they live 
and interact, which might span various places in two or more countries (Ossman 2004, 2007).  Some 
researchers perceive this community in a broader way, i.e., as reference to a specific region with which 
migrants identify in transnational contexts, such as Mixteca in Mexico, which has become an important 
point of reference and identity for a number of transnational migrants in the U.S. (Kearney 1990). 
Furthermore, some researchers perceive this community in its broadest sense when talking of groups of 
people originating from the same nation-state and engaging in similar transnational activities, such as 
Mexican migrant communities in the U.S. (Roberts et al. 1999) and the Tunisian irregular migrant 
community in Sicily.  To a large extent, most of these migration scholars are interested in what Smith and 
Guarnizo (1998) have labeled “transnationalism from below,” which examines people’s mundane 
activities and everyday forms of agency within and across nation-state borders.  This model enables trans-
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migrants across the globe to nurture economic, social, and political activities that span borders and 
sustain, produce, and reproduce their dual or multiple transnational lives.  
Transnational migrants, such as the Tunisian migrant population of this study, are transforming 
their lives and the lives of others, by creatively engaging in various cultural, socio-economic, and political 
conversations and activities.  Tunisian migrants use transnational networks, communication technologies, 
and social media to reject their label as “passive victims” by re-enacting their resistance against the Italian 
state through its hegemonic practices and oppressive migration policies.  This being said, they do not all 
play the same role or are equally involved in transnational activities within and across the Italian borders. 
Migration policies, i.e., visa rules, border security, police interventions, and asylum policies play a crucial 
role in shaping both regular and irregular migration movements (Brochmann and Hammar, 1999; Castles, 
De Haas, and Miller, 2014). 
However, in spite of the popularity of the transnational paradigm in the field of social sciences, 
several critiques have emerged regarding its rigor, efficacy, clarity, and empirical usage.  Pries (2007), on 
the other hand, makes a distinction between various units of analysis and advocates for the importance of 
clarifying  
the specific relation between the (transnational) units of analysis, the (local, national, regional 
or global) units of reference and the (micro, meso or macro) units of research. These 
components characterize the transnational perspective and differentiate it from a global or 
simply comparative point of view (Pries 2007: 3). 
 
Moreover, one of the main debates prevailing in the field of transnational migration studies, revolves 
around the question of the intergenerational continuity of the transnational experiences of those currently 
living transnational lives and creating transnational networks of social capital.  These debates center on 
whether households or sending communities are appropriate units of analysis for gauging the levels of 
social reproduction of trans-local ties (Guarnizo and Smith 1998: 16-17; Levitt and Waters 2002). 
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According to a number of scholars, the transnational framework can be used as a positive tool for the 
maximization of migrants’ vulnerable human and social capital.  Using the increased global mobilization 
of people and labor, these scholars reframe the question of “borders” as both confining locations as well 
as shifting political spaces that defy any clear-cut definition that removes them from their seemingly 
geographical and sovereign primacy. 
Friedman (1995) argues that the “world investigated by anthropologists is a world already 
transformed structurally by its integration into the global system” (Friedman 1995:74).  Nations are 
structurally transformed by their incorporation into global markets, with people being forced to leave their 
traditional livelihoods and to suddenly become international migrants (de Has 2001; Massey et al. 1998).  
As such, the study of people’s movements across national boundaries has very recently become one of the 
main research areas for many anthropologists, especially those working with urban and transnational 
communities. Anthropology scholars are now disengaging with the prevailing, essentializing binaries 
such as the push-pull and core-periphery theories that have shaped studies of migration empirically and 
normatively.  
I argue that the former concerns of anthropology, pigeonholed by dichotomies such as the global-
local, the urban-rural, the male-female, the domestic-public, the regular-irregular, and so forth are no 
longer valid in explaining the contemporary human movements of the postmodern world.  For 
anthropology to capture current transnational experiences, it has to adopt an analytical shift from old 
master narratives that support binary frameworks to an accommodation with the new challenges facing 
our mobile world.  A strategic methodology would take account of geopolitical configurations, the 
plurality of personal identities, and diverse migrants’ social roles across nation-state borders. 
The recent theoretical perspectives in the anthropology of migration have started to reconsider some 
of the traditional methodological frameworks of the discipline, such as “doing ethnography.” 
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Anthropologists have argued that this method is no longer appropriate or feasible with regards to research 
on transnational processes because the field must now reckon with flows of transcultural motion 
including social uprisings, religious fundamentalism, cyberspace, fashion, transportation, airports, ports, 
and other new phenomena.  Today, this transcultural motion is being studied from diverse, theoretical 
perspectives and sometimes with distinctly different units and levels of analysis: the individual, the 
household, the state; the micro, the meso, the macro (Faist 1997).  Anthropologists listen to the voices of 
migrants and analyze the rich content of their stories by paying attention to the various meanings they 
assign to their own actions and behavior. 
After reviewing the multiplicity of theories, it is clear that there is no “grand” migration theory. 
Migration movements are too complex and resist any particular theoretical model or any specific, ready-
made, conceptual framework.  The reason is that globalization, which creates those movements, is itself 
very complex and multi-dimensional.  As Pieterse puts it, “globalization invites more controversy than 
consensus” (Pieterse 2003:8).  Therefore, it becomes necessary to scrutinize the various theoretical 
models in order to accommodate the broad facets, forms, types, players, motivations, and cultural and 
socio-economic realities of the phenomenon of migration (Davis, 1988).  As Massey points out, we are 
now dealing with a “largely fragmented set of theories that have developed largely in isolation from one 
another” (Massey et al. 1993:432).  Theoretical constructs of migration would become more coherent 
through the application of a multidisciplinary and inclusive paradigm that employs a holistic view in 
order to envelop its contemporaneous, complex, and paradoxical nature.  Thus recent shifts in the 
anthropological enterprise cannot be considered a mere response to perceived empirical changes on the 
ground imposed by transnational phenomena, but rather a drastic revision of its major epistemological 
and foundational principles.  Undoubtedly, most classical anthropologists largely failed to identify the 
category of the trans-local by only examining the larger context in which the societies and cultures being 
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studied were entangled or simultaneously being created.  Within the prevalent ethnographic, monographic 
and unilateral models of the time, cultures were examined as bounded entities, which produced biased and 
limited research that created a number of controversies in the arena of anthropology.  
Gupta and Ferguson (1992:7) argue that classical “ethnographic maps” have tried to explain the 
spatial distribution of peoples, tribes, and cultures as transcending nation-statesAs Gupta and Ferguson 
aptly state, 
In a world of diaspora, transnational culture flows, and mass movements of populations, 
old-fashioned attempts to map the globe as a set of culture regions or homelands are 
bewildered by a dazzling array of postcolonial simulacra, doublings and re-doublings, as 
India and Pakistan apparently reappear in postcolonial simulation in London, pre-
revolution Tehran rises from the ashes in Los Angeles, and a thousand similar cultural 
dreams are played out in urban and rural settings all across the globe. In this culture-play 
diaspora, familiar lines between “here” and “there,” center and periphery, colony and 
metropole become blurred (Gupta and Ferguson 1992:10). 
 
After scholars in anthropology reconfigured the culture concept, major changes started to take 
place in the field when they began to examine those connections and trajectories that tie the local to the 
global, addressing new phenomena under the umbrella of transnationalism.  The problematization of the 
idea of the “field” as being fluid, multiple, and changing allows anthropologists to detach themselves 
from the traditional, exoticized and, at times, romanticized classical anthropological field.  It is a break 
away, a form of liberation from the old ways in which anthropologists are historically, socially, 
personally, and intimately attached to the areas they study. Ossman (2007) considers this experience a 
path to freedom that opens up spaces for self-reflexivity and a deeper appraisal of the anthropological 
encounter with transnational issues.  However, she reminds scholars of the need to be ethical because, 
only then, can they pave the way for a solid foundation for an anthropology of motion (Ossman 2007: 
216).  Moreover, anthropologists working on issues of migrant communities and diaspora have become 
increasingly uncomfortable with the conservative idea that the local was a suitable and sufficient form of 
ethnographic space (Falzon 2005).  Transnationalism, migration studies, diasporas, cosmopolitanism, and 
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so on—all necessitate new methodologies and investigation tools that invite supra-local understanding 
and a suited research methodology.  As Mintz (1998: 117) properly puts it, “(t)he new anthropology is 
many things, among them the study of human groups in motion.  That motion is thought to be more than 
international; it is transnational.”  Ossman discusses “pathways” and argues that transnational research 
dealing with “serial migration” should encompass the various scopes of global processes while 
scrutinizing local practices to better adapt to and understand our mobile world.  Ossman (P. 3) contests 
the classical anthropological claims about scientific grounding and questions archaic methods of data 
analysis that fail to address most of the paradoxical aspects of transnational migration.  She seems to 
advocate for a multi-locational research approach that crisscrosses national, cultural, and institutional 
borders and resonates with the nature of “serial migration” (Ossman 2007).  
IV. Multi-sited Ethnography: New Challenges in the Field(s)  
By virtue of its complexity and paradoxical nature, transnational research requires a specific 
methodology in which data is gathered in multiple localities, units, scales, and scopes of analysis.  This 
type of research is being adopted by a number of anthropologists who work on transnational phenomena 
by moving away from classical geographies, methodologies, and scopes of investigation toward queries 
about a more tangible structure of social life.  Transnational scholarship entails the utilization of 
approaches that are able “to capture the complex temporalities in which particular dynamics or relations 
occur” (Levitt et al. 2008:6).  Marcus (1998) argues that single-sited ethnography fails to grapple with 
complex situations of fieldwork, namely those dealing with human mobility and requiring plural 
localities.  According to him, multi-sited ethnography arose as a more convenient and sophisticated 
research design for ethnographers because “it moves out of the single sites and local situations of 
conventional ethnographic research designs to examine the circulations of cultural meanings, objects and 
identities in diffuse time-space” (Marcus 1998: 86).  Marcus defines the concept as follows:  
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Multi-sited research is designed around chains, paths, threads, conjunctions, or juxtapositions 
of locations in which the ethnographer establishes some form of literal, physical presence 
with an explicit, posited logic of association or connection among sites that in fact defines the 
argument of the ethnography (Marcus 1998: 90). 
 
The fields of multi-sited ethnography are diverse and encompass migration, communication, 
transportation, tourism, medicine, trafficking, business, development, fashion, media, and so forth. 
Multiple research projects get carried out in various localities, sometimes cross-globally, connecting the 
multiple geographical sites that bridge the distances between them.  A famous example of multi-sited 
ethnography is Scheper-Hughes’ controversial work on the international underground market for the trade 
of human organs.  The utilization of multi-sited research emerged as a response to the complex issues 
dealing with socio-spatiality as discussed by Pries (1999, 2008).  This form of data collection allows the 
design of transnational units of inquiry as analytical items whose references are located in more than one 
site.  Under this innovative type of research, ethnography moves from its conventional single-site 
location, contextualized by macro-constructions of a larger social order, e.g., the capitalist world system, 
to multiple sites of observation and participation that cross-cut binary constructs such as the “local,” the 
“global,”’ the “lifeworld,” and the “system” (Marcus 1998: 95).  This type of ethnography greatly alters 
the relationship between anthropologists and their subjects and field sites, offering new insights on how 
mobility can be conceived, interpreted, and contextualized.  The power of this method is that it delves 
into socio-cultural formations and practices that span cultural and geographical boundaries, linking local 
with trans-local social actors and institutions.  Multi-sited research is also valuable in its dealing with 
transnational practices and social fields that transcend boundaries on theoretical and conceptual grounds. 
This design allows researchers to escape old nationalistic and master narratives by envisaging the 
relativistic quality of transnational settings and the resulting design of transnational research techniques. 
As Amelina and Faist write,  
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The research based on this methodology does not regard transnational practices as a result of 
cross-border circulations of people, commodities and ideas. Instead, it analyzes social 
trajectories and dynamics of cross-border circulations of people, commodities and ideas as a 
consequence of actors’ dealings with the interferences of knowledge orders. (Amelina and 
Faist 2008: 18) 
 
Moreover, in exploring the multiple experiences of migrants who have moved across plural 
localities and spaces, a multi-sited design offers background data pertinent to the topics under research. 
As such, different “trajectories” of action undertaken by transnational families, communities, 
organizations, and diasporas can be revealed through the study of social practices in multiple localities 
(Mazzucato 2008).  Another superb example of multi-sited research is the work conducted by Kearney in 
his examination of the Yucatan (Kearney1996).  This ethnography does a brilliant job in situating 
transnational migration dynamics within the larger political and economic factors on both sides of the 
U.S.-Mexican border and in analyzing their change over time and their impacts on the migrants.  The 
NAFTA agreements, the commercialization of Mexican agriculture, the reduction in tariffs on agricultural 
imports, and declining wages are only one tip of the iceberg that Kearney was successful in exploring.  
Kearney used multiple theoretical and methodological paradigms to study indigenous migrant 
communities across different parts of Mexico and the U.S.  His informants are exclusively transnational 
because they live across various cultural and territorial borders and because they have always been 
situated in spaces of symbolic and political boundaries, e.g., as subaltern citizens of Mexico.  They are 
neither global nor national nor local.  Kearney soon realized that the discourses and practices he 
discovered could not be fathomed without taking into account the trans-regional, economic dynamics and 
the political relations between local, state, and federal actors in two countries (Kearney 1996). 
A critique of multi-sited ethnography has been put forth by a few scholars such as Candea in his 
article, “Arbitrary Locations: In Defense of the Bounded Field-Site” (Candea 2009: 25-46), which 
informed a number of theoretical debates on the efficacy of this design commenting on what he sees as a 
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‘latter-day implicit holism.’ He is uncomfortable with the idea of delimited field-sites and advocates for 
an ethnography that sets up “arbitrary locations” and “self-imposed restrictions.”  He also advocates for 
an ethnographic endeavor based on a scheme of “self-limitation,” in which the researcher becomes 
reflexive and self-critical of his/her methodological choices and research techniques.  Candea’s critique of 
this which method is motivated by his concern about methodological reflexivity which absence might 
skew the research findings.  
In her article, “In the Right Place at the Right Time: Reflections on Multi-Sited Ethnography in 
the Age of Migration,” Gallo discusses the question of holism (Gallo: 2009: 87-102).  She uses her 
research experience among the Malayali migrants in Rome, Italy and in Ernakulam, India as an example 
of her own retrospective assessment of her multi-sited ethnographic fieldwork. She argues that scholars 
need to pay careful attention to the “meanings of movement” involved in the processes of following 
people.  Movements and mobilities must become themselves “objects of study rather than its premises” 
(Gallo 2009). Her approach to multi-sited ethnography is also based on tracking the subject under study 
across spatial and temporal boundaries while paying attention to any potential conflicts that might 
transcend those boundaries.  She concludes that “it is the possibility it offers to interrogate the ‘site’ of 
research, not as a pre-constituted dimension of social inquiry, but as a relational process and 
methodological device” (Gallo 2009: 99). 
This particular focus on people’s mobility has become a preferable research avenue in 
transnational studies (Gupta and Ferguson, 1999).  In studying mobility, the multi-sited research 
technique widens social science methodology by considering complex, transnational linkages.  Different 
“trajectories” of action, for instance, of transnational families, communities, organizations, and diasporas 
can be better explained by the study of social practices in different localities (Mazzucato 2008). 
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V. Space and (im)mobility as Social Constructs  
When an important area of contemporary, anthropological research takes a different approach to 
people’s movements, place, time, mobility, media, science, and technology, it necessitates a radical shift 
from the conventional formulae of doing fieldwork.  Contemporary discourse occurs in an environment of 
extreme mobility and within spatial and temporal frameworks that have been transformed by modern 
life’s accelerated pace.  “National” cultures are constantly decentered, invaded, and penetrated by global 
forces encapsulated in media, transnational capital, international NGOs, multinationals, supranational 
political institutions, and so forth.  Thus notions of mobility and space are no longer geographical since 
they are now being conflated with the concept of time.  In fact, one blurs with the other until both merge 
into a unified entity that can act as a full-fledged conceptual tool of action and analysis.  Lefebvre writes: 
“(Social) space is a (social) product…the space thus produced also serves as a tool of thought and of 
action; that in addition to being a means of production it is also a means of control, and hence of 
domination, of power; yet that, as such, it escapes in part from those who would make use of it” 
(Lefebvre 1991: 26).  This non-geographical notion of space has been coined the “spatial turn” and is a 
conceptual model in the social sciences that was introduced by Lefebvre and geographers such as Soja 
(1989).  The spatial turn refers to the fact that “space” is a social construction just like many other 
categories in the field of social sciences to explain or examine socio-cultural phenomena.  According to 
the spatial turn, physical location can symbolically indicate a number of social meanings that are 
culturally constructed and socially produced. 
Massey (2005: 9) posits that our modern conceptualization of issues pertaining to space rests on 
three propositions: 1) space is recognized as the product of interrelations, as constituted through 
interactions, from the immensity of the global to the intimately tiny; 2) space is known as the sphere of 
the possible for the existence of multiplicity in the sense of contemporaneous plurality, i.e., as the sphere 
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in which distinct trajectories coexist, and the sphere, therefore, of coexisting heterogeneity; and 3)  space 
is understood as always under construction. 
The study of movement and mobility has become an integral part of social and anthropological research.  
Thus, politics, social life, and, increasingly, social theory have become a matter of contested “mobilities” 
and contested metaphors of the “mobile life.”  According to Castells, mobility is central to the way in 
which people live in an increasingly “networked society” (Castells 1996). Thomsen (2005: 5) investigates 
three, wide-ranging themes pertaining to mobility: 1) mobility as a constructed social reality, i.e., how 
individuals construct notions of mobility in their everyday life and practice; 2) mobility as spatial 
coordination and transgression; and 3) mobility as a policy theme, i.e., developments in transport policy. 
Urry examines mobile spaces and technology, analyzing their effects on human subjects and the way they 
potentially are transformed, stating that 
In our problematization of issues of movement, today we are witnessing a ‘mobility turn,’ 
a different way of thinking through the character of economic, social and political 
relationships. Such turn is spreading in and through social sciences, mobilizing analyses 
that have been historically static, fixed and concerned with predominantly aspacial ‘social 
structures.’ Contributions from cultural studies, feminism, geography, migration studies, 
politics, science studies, sociology, transport and tourism studies and so on are 
hesitatingly transforming social science and especially invigorating the connections, 
overlaps and borrowings with both physical science and with literary and historical 
studies. The mobility is post-disciplinary” (Urry 2007:6). 
 
According to this debate on (im)mobility, I argue that the mobility of a certain category of 
migrants, i.e., the irregular ones, is of a problematic nature due to all of the spatial constraints that makes 
it hard for them to choose freely between mobility and immobility.  Indeed, as much of the 
anthropological research of the last decades has appropriately confirmed, mobility and immobility are the 
result of complex choices, policies, negotiations, and practices carried out by different actors in different 
settings under different circumstances.  Mobility and other forms of transnational movements and 
 101 
 
practices, as Bhabha argues, do not take place in an imaginary “third space” (Bhabha 1990) that is 
hypothetically positioned “in-between” national zones. 
Transnational practices span the three categories of place, space, and time; yet, this does not imply 
that transmigrants, as unbounded and “floating” social actors, are totally disconnected from local 
constraints and other social and political configurations and contingencies.  One needs to clearly define 
who qualifies as transmigrant.  In other words, what are the boundaries to transnationalism?  This is an 
important question because the social construction of place and mobility and the notion of the “spatial 
turn” are not processes emanating from a vacuum.  Rather, they obey norms of meaning-making based on 
the complex transnational economic, political, and cultural flows, as well as other complex configurations 
in place.  In this case, politics, class, gender, regional origin, and religious faith emerge as critical 
determinants of migrants’ (im)mobility, destination, fulfillment, and transnationality.  Thus it becomes 
clear that not all spaces, mobilities, and social relations can be regarded equally and uniformly because 
the very processes that produce trans-border movements also result in geographical immobility and social 
exclusion.  Social relations are not fixed or located in place, but are constituted through various 
“circulating entities” (Latour 2014: 17). 
Today, national boundaries are being constantly traversed by virtual processes of communication 
and exchange that do not involve human mobility, but instead involve money routing, internet, digital 
technologies, and other systems of satellite communications.  The other forms of human mobility or 
migration, such as tourism, international consulting, and global business, do not entail migration.  These 
mobilities, it appears, produce complex and paradoxical movements of people, objects both symbolic and 
non-symbolic, values both monetary and non-monetary, images, and ideas demonstrating the various 
contradictions of the concept of (im)mobility.  Cohen (1996:516) draws from Hall’s [date] idea with the 
observation that “transnational bonds no longer have to be cemented by migration or by exclusive 
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territorial claims. In the age of cyberspace, a diaspora can, to some degree, be held together or re-created 
through the mind, through cultural artifacts and through a shared imagination.” 
VI. The Role Social Networks 
 
In this section, I demonstrate that, despite the restrictive policies of states to limit these mobilities, 
transnationalism through its various resources, i.e., human, financial, ideological, and symbolic, will 
somehow succeed in “lubricating” the mobility “engine.”  I also examine the network-driven aspect of 
transnational migration and the role it plays in generating various flows of migrants from impoverished 
countries to wealthy ones.  While addressing this issue, I look at the various mechanisms and tools that 
Western states, both Northern European and North American, use to control their borders and determine 
whether they have had any substantial effect in preventing or deterring potential flows of migrants.  I 
show that the border-control policies contain numerous gaps and often act as a vehicle for increasing 
irregular migration and fueling the “migration industry,” including human trafficking and migrant 
smuggling.  In doing so, I demonstrate that “(im)mobility,” similarly to irregular migration, is a 
transnationally produced condition, shaped by the global market’s demand for cheap, flexible, docile 
labor. 
Massey defines a “migration network” as a composite of interpersonal relations in which migrants 
interact with their families and friends across borders (Massey et al. 1998).  His approach focuses on 
those factors that are embedded in the broad and strong linkages that unite potential migrants with their 
friends and/or relatives who have been successful in their migration experience.  According to Massey, 
these linkages are likely to fuel the desire to migrate, thereby constituting the main incentive towards 
migration and thus initiating new migratory movements, which, in turn, generate other movements 
creating the phenomenon of chain migration (Massey et al. 1998).  Tilly puts it beautifully: “it is not 
people who migrate but networks” (1990: 79). Social networks, I argue, help newly established migrants 
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find jobs, shelter, and even wives.  Notably, many Tunisian migrants have a variety of social networks 
and kinship ties in Italy, France, Germany, and Holland and spoke about them as the bridge that will link 
them with “Paradise Europe” (Khedher 2007:91).  Most participants in this study as well as those in my 
previous research referred to Italy or Lorop (the word they use for Europe) as “paradise.”  The concept of 
al Janna (paradise) is often used by Tunisian youth and fed by “inflated” and “aesthetic” images 
transferred through their family members or friends abroad, creating a strong quest for the West with its 
seemingly attractive consumer culture and lifestyle (Khedher 2008: 14-24). 
In their chapter, “Return to Aztlan,” Massey et al. map out this social-networks trend by 
examining the various means through which Mexican migration to the U.S. is sustained and perpetuated.  
Using case studies of four different communities of Mexican migrants, the authors note that social ties are 
more likely to develop when migrants share common backgrounds, kinship, paisanaje (being from the 
same place), and friendship (Massey et al. 1987:140-145).  Their main argument is that the formation of 
social bonds helps most migrants alleviate the difficulties of the migration experience, increasing the 
desire for others to migrate and reinforcing the migrants’ network in return. Moreover, they say that 
social networks, interpersonal ties, and webs of kinship are not solely based on material exchanges but 
can take various forms such as favors, services, moral support, and so forth (Massey et al. 1987).  Social 
networks thus create a form of social capital operating across borders, lubricating people’s movements, 
and also providing a set of information that could lower the costs and risks of migration (Massey et al. 
1998: 42-43).  These social networks provide migrants with a strong feeling of identity as well as a sense 
of belonging and membership that is necessary for strengthening the network.  Moreover, Massey et al. 
emphasize the importance of voluntary and non-lucrative institutions and sports clubs, such as soccer 
clubs, that serve as a space where information about job opportunities and access to healthcare and/or 
social benefits get exchanged regularly, reinforcing migrants’ social ties (Massey et al. 1987).  These 
 104 
 
social networks strengthen over time because of the amount and variety of exchanges, i.e., information, 
goods, and so on, between the sending country, i.e. Mexico, and the U.S.  In addition, Massey et al. 
discuss the formation of “daughter communities,” which means the emergence of new communities in the 
U.S. that are a continuity of the same community in a particular site in Mexico (Massey et al. 1987:153).  
The formation of these communities is a good example of how far the process can go as the network 
becomes “self-perpetuating.”  This migration network pattern creates specific groupings of specific 
communities that end up living together in particular locations of the receiving society.  Accordingly, 
these communities start to form settlements that reinforce the migration process, increasing economic and 
social ties while engendering more and more settlements that act like “magnets for further migration” 
(Massey et al. 1990- 1987:157-163). 
In the context of this social network scheme, migration continues not only because it is physically 
difficult to stop, but mainly because of the strength of the networks which make it very unlikely to be 
stopped (Arango 2004; Bloch 2013; Lancee 2010; Massey et al. 1987; Ryan 2011; Bloch et al 2011, 
Zontini 2010; de Haas 2008).  As Arango puts it, “The importance of networks for migration can hardly 
be overstated… [they] rank amongst the most important explanatory factors for migration” (2004: 28).   
In this section, I analyzed the impact of social networks on the lubrication of the migration 
process; however, there are networks that weaken or could have existed, but do not.  In this respect, the 
social network model is not always a steady and self-perpetuating process because it is shaped by 
multiple, macro-geopolitical, and economic forces, as well as international and national migration policies 
over which individuals have little or no control.   
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VII. Conclusion 
In this chapter, I argued that a comprehensive discussion about transnational people’s movements is 
necessary in order to understand the mechanisms under which contemporary irregular migration, as a 
multifaceted phenomenon, operates.  I reviewed most of the literature pertaining to transnational 
scholarship and demonstrated that there is no complete theory for transnational migration.  Yet, 
anthropology with its multi-sited ethnographic design can help scholars move away from simplistic 
theorization to capture and problematize the various dichotomies surrounding trans-border movements 
such as local-global, rural-urban, time-space, mobility-immobility, mono-sited/multi-sited, and so on.  I 
have demonstrated how the intensity, velocity, and fluidity of the transnational flows of people, objects, 
ideas, symbols, pictures, and so on not only contributes to a new understanding of borders and people 
movements, but also blurs the very foundation that allows these dichotomies to emerge, i.e., the nation-
state and its boundaries. 
I looked at different types of transnational movements and pulled out a number of disparities with 
regards to the operation of their flows, such as their different levels of embeddedness in the socio-
economic and geopolitical structures in place.  In analyzing these disparities, I also tried to show that 
people involved in transnational border crossings are heterogeneous actors possessing different socio-
demographic, economic, and political endowments.  I gave a definition of multi-sited research and 
demonstrated its appropriateness in dealing with trans-border ethnographies as well as its efficacy in 
unpacking complex issues pertaining to transnational socio-spatiality and mobility. 
In doing so, I also reviewed some of the critiques of this type of research, showing that most of it 
is based on concerns about methodological reflexivity, and I gave examples of how ethnographers could 
address them. The concept of spatial turn is an effective tool that anthropologists could use to explain and 
examine a set of social meanings as they relate to various aspects of our mobile, postmodern lives. I 
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elaborated on the idea that “space” is no longer a frozen and stable entity, but rather a social construction 
and a process that is constantly invented, contested, negotiated, and reproduced.  I presented cases where 
the spatial turn is not just a nuanced and metaphoric construct employed theoretically, but a real and 
concrete entity that is endowed with a territorial specificity and could also be historically and 
geographically contextualized.  I also argued that in addition to space, the concept of mobility should also 
be carefully examined because not all spaces, movements, and mobilities are equal and uniform.  I noted 
that spaces and social boundaries are increasingly detached from territorial and national boundaries, 
taking on distinct identities and affiliations. I concluded by arguing that migrant mobility has usually been 
related to voluntary migrants or others who freely move in and out of national borders.  By analyzing 
social network theory through some ethnographic examples, I demonstrated that, despite the restrictive 
policies of states to limit these mobilities, transnationalism through its various resources, i.e., human, 
financial, ideological, and symbolic, will constantly ease the processes of mobility.  Conversely, despite 
the massive border control operations around it, the Mediterranean Sea remains the most open and 
dangerous transit separating Europe from its southern neighbors.  As stated by De Haas (2014) “increased 
border controls do not stop migration.” Transnationalism is a complex, peculiar process that, if used 
adequately, can yield numerous and broader assessments of the most complex trans-border practices and 
discourses pertaining to power relations, mobilities, identities, social organization, and many other human 
arrangements and manifestations.  
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CHAPTER FIVE 
FROM TUNISIA TO LAMPEDUSA: SELECTED PERSONAL NARRATIVES 
I.  Introduction  
Since the popular uprising that shook Tunisia in December 2010-2011, some 35,000 Tunisian 
irregular migrants have arrived by sea on the southern Italian island of Lampedusa creating what Cuttita 
calls “the Tunisian turn” (Cuttitta 2014:203).  Regarding what he referred to as a “human emergency,” 
Cuttita writes that 
On 12 February there were 4000 migrants sleeping on the streets; 1,500 were eventually 
“hosted” in the local football ground.  The day after, the Italian government declared a state of 
humanitarian emergency on the entire national territory.  Only then was the Lampedusa center 
re-opened, and still there were thousands of migrants who did not find accommodation there, its 
capacity being of only 804 persons (Cuttitta 2014: 210).  
 
Fig 7. Migrants arriving by sea to Europe 
 
What experientially happens to the migrants before and when they land on Lampedusa rarely reaches 
the public and, if it does, it is often via exaggerated, mainstream-media narratives that confuse public 
opinion and inflame the overall migration debate.  What is known is that the sea passage to, and the landing 
on, Lampedusa are dangerous experiences in which migrants are vulnerable to the vicissitudes of nature 
and to human mistreatment and abuse throughout all stages of the journey.  Several thousands of Tunisian 
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men attempting to cross the Mediterranean have died or suffered various ordeals and injury.  According to 
the Tunisian Consul General in Palermo, Italy, more than 850 Tunisian irregular migrants drowned while 
heading to Lampedusa at the end of March, 2011 only (Interview 07/23/2014).  
 
Fig 8. Dead and Missing Migrants in the Mediterranean 
 
From the start of their trip, Tunisian migrants suffer human rights abuses as they interact with the 
various parties involved, e.g., smugglers, Tunisian and European navies and coast guards, and police.  
When get caught in Italy, they are arrested and then locked up in detention centers for months, where they 
undergo lengthy administrative procedures and face imminent deportation.  Between April 28 and 
November 14, 2011, a total of 3,380 Tunisians were deported from Lampedusa or Italy while only 13,000 
were granted residency permits (Interview 07/23/2014).  Unfortunately, the data regarding Tunisian 
irregular migration are scarce because of the migration’s clandestine nature and its rapidity, as well as the 
high mobility of the migrants.  Figuring out the exact numbers of irregular migrants is like trying to “count 
the uncountable” (Triandafyllidou, 2010).  Also, since irregular migrants live in the shadows and almost 
never get reported, their total numbers in Italy are often “guesstimates,” based on reports provided by 
Ministry of the Interior or Frontex.  The apprehension records provided by Frontex are considered to be the 
most reliable data on irregular migrant flows (Triandafyllidou, 2010). 
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In this chapter, I examine the testimonies of Tunisian irregular migrants living in Lampedusa, Sicily, 
and Hay Ettadhamen, which I obtained through interviews with them. I use these diverse narratives in order 
to illustrate and analyze their experiences of “Otherization” and “dehumanization.” I also explore their 
hardships, dangers, violence, and suffering from their departure point to their landing in Lampedusa, 
focusing on four specific stages of the voyage: pre-departure, the sea crossing, detention, and life outside in 
Italian society.  Each step of the migrant’s journey is scrutinized to depict the reality of this experience. As 
well, I highlight the emotional toll and the psychological impact on these migrants—aspects of the journey 
that is often overlooked or unexplored in the migration literature.  
II. Figurative Use of the Word Harqa 
The phenomenon of crossing borders without going through official, legal, and administrative 
procedures is described by the use of different terminologies and figurative expressions: illegal migration, 
undocumented migration, invisible migration, migration sauvage (wild migration), unauthorized migration, 
clandestine migration, and irregular migration. The Tunisian term for this type of migration is harqa.  From 
the 1960s to early 1980s, different words in the Tunisian vernacular were used to describe the action of 
illegally crossing national borders, i.e., irregular migration.  During this time, the most common illegal 
passage for many Tunisians was via land with Libya as a main destination.  Back then, the common terms, 
mezigri and fallega, were used to refer to Tunisian illegal migrants.  Mezigri is transformed from the 
French word, immigrés (migrants), while fallega was originally used by French colonial authorities in the 
1940s and 1950s, especially in reference to Algerian dissidence and to enemy combatants during the 
Algerian war of independence.  Thus it invokes the reckless, the disobedient, and the transgressor of legal 
authority (Mabrouk 2003:13). However, harqa (burning), a metaphor for irregular migration, is a new 
terminology without any known historical roots or social use in the daily Tunisian vernacular.  However, 
other uses of harqa and its derivate in Tunisian vernacular have various meanings: 1) to tell someone about 
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what another did in order to get the latter in trouble, e.g., harqu maa arfou (He burned him to his 
boss/employer); 2) to describe an action, such as driving through a red traffic light, that will get a person 
into trouble, e.g., hraq ethaw (She burned the traffic red light); and 3) to describe the feeling of pain over 
the loss of a dear one to the point of suffering, e.g., Foolen mahrouk ala flen aziiz aaliih (A person is 
burned by the loss of someone dear to him).  Further, harqa is used by Tunisian mothers when they lose a 
son or a daughter whom they consider their “qibda” (liver), for example, qbdti tharqet or qibdti mahrouqa 
(My liver was burned). Thus, the mother of Ridha who was lost after a shipwreck said, “Ever since the 
shipwreck, I have been unable to eat, sleep, or even to function normally. Ridha hraq w’ hraqli qibdti 
maah” (Ridha burned and burned my liver in turn)” (Interview 08/15/2013). 
The word harqa comes from the Arabic trilateral root (ha-ra-qa), in reference to the pre-voyage 
incineration of all forms of documentation that could help authorities identify individual migrants.  The 
term, ﺔﻗﺮﺣ harqa (irregular migration), began to be used during early 1990s primarily by people involved 
with this particular type of migration.  However, قﺮﺣ harqa does not, in any way, refer to something that 
evokes irregular migration.  Moreover, this expression also exists in neighboring Algeria and Morocco 
where it is pronounced and transcribed as harga or hriq and is similarly employed to refer to the 
phenomenon of irregular migration in both countries.  A common consensus is that yahraq (to burn) is a 
term that invokes the deliberate actions of irregular migrants, i.e., burning documents and destroying all 
evidence about who they are so that the police will not be able to reconstruct their identities or successfully 
determine where they come from.  Some informants said that with this act the “burners” would have the 
potential to lie about who they are in order to avoid any imminent repatriation (Field notes 03/05/14).  This 
tactic was especially used during the late 1980s and early 1990s by some irregular migrants who were 
successfully granted refugee status and remained in Italy (Mabrouk 2003). 
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In addition, the figurative word harqa, according to some informants, is used to refer to the act of a 
migrant burning his fingertips so to more easily conceal their identity and successfully apply for political 
asylum.14  This act could also mean that the person was symbolically burning his macabre past in order to 
start a new life in his imagined “Paradise Europe” (Khedher 2007, 2008).  Moreover, this rapid 
metamorphosis from identifiable to non-identifiable would allow him to be a new, successful human being 
once he penetrated Lorop (Europe). The hariq (burner) would also deliberately use the term “harqa” in a 
symbolic way to think of himself as a newly born and a pure, unpolluted person free of guilt and remorse. 
Since most migrants feel culpable because of their unemployment, poverty, and destitution, they 
experience themselves as dirty, heavy social burdens; therefore, the fire implied in this “burning” cleans 
and purifies them. (Khedher 2007).  For the purpose of this study and for the sake of uniformity, I have 
deliberately opted to alternately use the two expressions, “irregular migration,” and the term used by the 
study population, harqa, in order to describe this particular type of migration.  
III. Pre-departure  
Harraqa (human smugglers) have been operating in Tunisia since the early 1990s; however, their 
business really began to exponentially flourish during and after the 2011 uprising due to the unstable 
political situation and lawlessness that characterized the country.  The harqa phenomenon became a very 
profitable business for smuggling networks turning thousands of young Tunisian migrants into very 
valuable commodities.  As noted by Massey et al., the strong demand for global cheap labor creates “a 
lucrative economic niche for entrepreneurs and institutions dedicated to promoting international movement 
for profit, yielding a black market in migration” (1993:450).  In this section of the chapter, I describe the 
way the harqa phenomenon is structured and operated as a successful business practice.  
  
                                                          
14 I discuss the issue of self-inflicted harm in Chapter 7. 
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i. Recruitment  
The news of harqa is spread via word-of-mouth by a laggat or wasiit (middleman), who tracks down 
young men in Hay Ettadhamen interested in migrating to Italy.  Advance payments for al harqa (the 
irregular sea passage) are sometimes collected to pay the various parties involved before the clandestine 
embarkation.  The wasiit is often assisted by several young men who receive all kinds of privileges from 
him such as money, cigarettes, alcohol, and food.  As a reward, these young men, who are often 
unemployed, even receive large discounts on the price they would pay for their own sea crossing.  The 
luckiest ones manage to secure a guaranteed large number of potential migrants, i.e., usually eight to ten, 
and as a reward, the middleman might give them a free trip.  This is relatively rare in general but was 
common in the post-uprising period.  The middlemen and their assistants frequent particular cafés where 
they receive information about any potential candidates planning to leave.  They establish a primary list of 
people, take down their cellphone numbers, and remain in close contact with them in order to negotiate the 
price of the passage and to discuss departure time and location.  
The factors that determine the harqa price are weighed by the middleman, the captain, and the owner 
of the chqaf (boat).  Like most of the prices for goods and services in Tunisia, the harqa fee is not fixed, 
and bargaining is very common and also expected.  The middleman collects the price of harqa, which is 
flexible; it is not strictly the same fee for all migration candidates, nor is it the same fee one pays for a 
summer, spring, fall, or winter sea crossing.  Thus the harqa cost varies according to all these factors and 
many more such as the socio-economic status, etc since it gets modified like the prices of most 
merchandise, depending on the laws of supply-and-demand and overall market movements.  For the same 
passage, one migration candidate might pay 500 to 1,000 dinars while another could pay 1,200 or 1,400 
dinars.  Non-Tunisians and especially il brayniyya (literally foreigners, but referring primarily to Tunisians 
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who are not locals of the departure-point location) might even pay 2,500 dinars.15   I was recently told that 
the price of a “secured” harqa, such as harqat Al Jarbouaa,16 currently ranges between 3,500 to 5,000 
dinars.  This dramatic increase in the cost of harqa could be explained by the tighter, border-control 
measures deployed by Tunisia and the EU in deterring human flows across the Mediterranean.  Harqa fees 
also depend on whether the migrant is alone or among family.  Two brothers or two cousins could travel 
together with one paying full price while the second enjoys a deep discount.  Some potential migrants 
might even have a free passage without paying one millime (equivalent to a penny), especially if he is one 
of three brothers or cousins.  It is very common for brothers, male cousins, and other relatives to decide to 
take the trip together to take advantage of the price reduction as well as to feel protected and secure during 
the dangerous sea crossing as well as when they land in Lampedusa.  
This research showed that the majority of migrants got financial assistance from family and friends as 
well as from close relatives abroad who would occasionally agree to finance the whole cost of the harqa.  
Some young men resorted to stealing or selling various items, such as electronics, brand-name clothes, 
expensive watches, and so on, which they looted from supermarkets and stores during the uprising in order 
to finance their trip.  For example, Boubaker told me that two of his friends, Amer and Sidqi, rented a pick-
up truck and headed to Géant, a large supermarket in Al Mnihla, to grab whatever they could after its 
famous mall had been broken into by thugs a couple of days after the uprising.  Amer and Sidqi came back 
with two refrigerators, four plasma TVs, microwaves, and various other products that they sold quickly for 
the amount of 8,000 dinars, which was way below the actual price.  On the dawn of that same night, Amer 
and Sidqi burned from Raf Raf, a coastal village, near the city of Bizerte (field notes 20/18/14).  Others 
used a variety of strategies to get money.  Some relied on their mothers, such as Elyes, who told me that his 
                                                          
15 The current average monthly wage for Tunisians is between 500-600 TND (the equivalent of 250-300 $US). 
 
16 Al Jarbouaa is literally a “rat” in Tunisian vernacular; also, Al Jarbouaa is a famous smuggler known for securing 
successful sea crossings to Lampedusa. 
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mother had to sell all her jewelry at a very low price in order to get him the right amount of money to pay 
the smuggler (Field notes 06/15/14).  Another was Souheil who had to wait for a transfer of 1,500 dinars 
from his cousin Chehir via Western Union from Milan. This cousin had been living in Italy since 2002 and 
managed to quickly find Souheil a job at a chicken factory in Ancona.  Although Souheil tried to pay him 
back, Chehir refused to take the money (Field notes 05/12/14).  
Even though migrants prefer to pay on shore before the boat leaves, i.e., pay-as-you-go, to avoid 
scams, wasiits want advance payments one week before the sailing takes place because they claim that they 
have to pay the captain.  When migrants entrust the advance to them, they can run away with the money. In 
this case, the migrants would have no recourse to the authorities as they simply have no proof of payment 
and also resist contacting the police for fear of arrest.  Fraj, a middle-aged man, described one such scam to 
me.  He had decided to leave, not because he wanted to escape Tunisia, but because he had had no job for 
the last six years.  He started to engage in contraband activities by smuggling gas from Libya through the 
southeastern Tunisian border town of Ben Guerdane to resell in Tunisia.  Fraj spent so much money bribing 
the Tunisian police at the border that he had to spend the next two years smuggling more oil to earn money 
for his journey to Lampedusa.  He managed to pay 500 dinars to the wasiit who ran off with the money. Of 
this middleman, Fraj said,  
The wasiit named Faycal was a sailor and local man from Zarzis who was deported from 
France a few years ago.  Faycal started the business of harqa right after the uprising.  He is 
known for charging much less than the others since the passage with him would cost you barely 
500 dinars and you could still bargain.  Yet, he is also infamous for being fraudulent and 
dishonest because many migrants were deceived and ripped off on various occasions when they 
had to deal with him. I am one of his many victims (Interview 08/25/2013). 
 
Many wasiits are known to be sheer opportunists who have no interest in getting boats safely to 
Lampedusa and, in fact, would rather have boats capsize in the Mediterranean so there would be no 
survivors who could report to authorities and police. The Tunisian authorities have arrested a number of 
wasiits because they lack any kind of structure except for a loose organization or simply cannot pay a 
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generous bribe.  However, many succeed, thanks to corrupt, law enforcement officials who were thriving 
on the lavish bribes they were getting out of this “business” (Field notes, 10/15/2014).  In the post-uprising 
context, bribery flourished and touched most domains.  Traffic police and border police are famous for 
taking bribes.  
The middleman demands cash payment in dinars, the Tunisian currency, for fear of being paid in 
false, foreign currencies, especially U.S. dollars.  If the payment is on shore, the wasiit prefers large notes 
in denominations of 50, 30, or 20 dinars in order to not waste time counting out the money and to minimize 
the risk of police intervention and potential arrest.  Some informants told me that a number of migrants 
avoided the middleman altogether by organizing themselves and collecting money to buy their own boat 
(Interview 03/04/2014).  The middleman also makes sure that the burners pay the complete, negotiated 
amount of money and that they do not carry items such as drugs, weapons, political documents, religious 
books, and announcements.  He also checks them on board to make sure the passage takes place under 
good and safe conditions.  One man, who acted as both wasiit and captain, boasted that since the uprising, 
he had helped over 2,000 men get to Italy without being caught by the police.  He claims that he is helping 
desperate young people get a better life and Tunisia a better economy.  He even stated that he has helped 
save more than 50 irregular migrants on various occasions while at sea.  He added that it is his duty to 
come to the rescue whenever he can, especially since rescue organizations and coast guards are often 
absent or sometimes deliberately refuse to provide help (20/06/2014).  
 ii. At the Gouna  
The wasiit is responsible for hosting potential migrants for a short period of time before the actual 
passage takes place.  Once migrants pay their harqa fees, they are immediately transported to clandestine 
shelters (gouna in Tunisian vernacular), which are often located on abandoned farms or deserted beaches at 
the fringes of remote coastal villages.  The waiting period ranges between a few days to one week or a few 
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weeks, depending on the weather conditions and also on how fast the wasiit can gather sufficient clients to 
make the passage financially worthwhile.  While waiting for the harqa departure, the migrants lose total 
contact with the outside world.  Abidi, a Tunisian journalist, describes these gounas:  
To avoid a potential arrest by the Tunisian police, the smugglers have premises known as 
gouna where would-be migrants are kept for several days prior to departure.  These facilities, 
which are usually dwellings, shacks, or abandoned garages, are heavily concentrated all along 
the coast and in the rural areas and villages immediately inland.  Gounas have been found in 
Zarzis in the southeast of the country and even in the petroleum port of Skhira, to the south of 
Sfax (the second largest city after Tunis) which acts as a gathering point (My translation; Abidi, 
2003). 
 
The gouna hosts are responsible for accommodation and food and are paid about 500 to 1,000 dinars 
per night, depending on the number of people and/or how many days they are being hosted.  The host 
prepares beds that are often worn-out mattresses, kelims (Tunisian hand-woven rugs), blankets, or flattened 
cardboard boxes on the floor.  The host also prepares light meals, which are often harrissa (chili sauce) 
sandwiches with olive oil, olives, and sardines or canned tuna.  If the waiting time becomes long, some 
hosts even make other forms of profit from the potential migrants by selling them newspapers, cigarettes, 
medication, alcohol, and zatla (hashish) at prices higher than those of the market.  The host often uses a 
guard/assistant who watches the gouna and is in charge of doing the daily shopping for items such as bread, 
milk, coffee, and cigarettes.   
I interviewed Selim, a tattooed, well-built young man in his mid-twenties, in a local café in 
Lampedusa in July 2014.  He recounted his gouna experience: 
We were about 40 people.  Some were from Libya and Egypt.  I could tell from the dialects 
they were using.  But most were Tunisian men from the ages of 16 to 50.  There were two 
young women with their husbands who seemed to be related to the wasiit as they received 
special treatment.  We spent 16 days and recited the Quran the whole time because the wasiit 
told us that the place has been spotted and that the police could come at any time.  
 
We finally left the gouna after spending three weeks there, which seemed like an eternity.  
Stress became very intense because the planned departure dates were often cancelled or 
postponed due to rough waters or sea storms.  We were crushed against one another, and the 
oxygen became scarce inside the small, dusty, unventilated room.  We were like sardines in a 
small tin.  One evening, we were all attacked by a group of thugs who took all our money, food, 
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and cell phones.  We could not react because the host and the wasiit ordered us to obey and not 
to resist.  We felt that we had been cheated but had no means to react or do anything (Interview 
07/10/2013). 
 
Stories like this about the gouna experience are frequent; however, many migrants are reluctant to report 
their experiences out of fear of reprisals by the wasiits and by local authorities who might arrest them, 
thereby thwarting the entire journey to Lampedusa.  
 Once out of the gouna, migrants are then taken to the coast during a preferably moonless night with 
pick-up trucks carrying 20 to 50 persons at a time.  Ports on the east coast, i.e., Al Hawariyya, Sfax, 
Monastir, Mahdia, and Zarzis, are the primary departure points for most of these clandestine crossings.  
Drivers usually received about 500 dinars for each trip and drive a estafette (van) or a camion semi-
remorque (delivery truck) with a covered roof so that the passengers are concealed.  Some drivers employ 
clever tactics to mislead the police, such as wetting the truck with water so that the police would think their 
cargo was fish or vegetables.  These trips are always conducted late at night to avoid confrontations with 
police authorities and the possibility of being arrested.  
IV.  The Sea Crossing 
For the majority of the study population, the sea crossing is a bittersweet experience because it represents 
the beginning of the realization of their dream.  However, it is also a game of life and death and is referred 
to as a qmaar (gamble).    
 
 118 
 
 
Fig 9. Sea Crossings on Rise 
i. The Boat and Ferryman 
The sea passage often takes place in a chqaf 17(wooden fishing vessel) or inflatable boats, both with a 
capacity of 20 to 40 people.  Frequently, the migrants are shown a sample boat, which is in better shape 
than the actual boat on which they will be transported.  “They lied to us,” says Chokri, a 33-year-old young 
man from Zarzis.  “They told us the boat would be brand-new and well-equipped, but it wasn’t.”  He 
continues,  
Once you make your decision to get on these boats, you have to be convinced that there is no 
way to go back, even if you know that it is a 50/50 chance and that the risk of death is high.  As 
a matter of fact, death for us is not an issue; we are never afraid to die and whatever Allah 
decides for us, we accept it with an open heart.  Il mout qatha w’ qadar (Death is everyone’s 
destiny) (Interview 07/28/2013). 
 
The trip to Lampedusa might take from seven to ten hours or a full day under optimal 
conditions; however, bad weather may mean a few days or even weeks.  Karim, a 27-year-old 
migrant from the coastal village of Chebba, said,  
There were 124 of us on the boat. They told us the trip would only take eight hours, but it was 
not true.  We spent three days at sea [sigh!].  It was a terrifying journey.  We took things for 
granted and thought we were unsinkable.  It was a big mistake!  But due to what I went 
through, I will never do it again (Interview 09/08/2013). 
 
                                                          
17 Chqaf is the word Tunisians employ to refer to the boat being used for Al harqa 
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 The risk of being in a shipwreck is extremely high because most of the sea crossings in the post-uprising 
period were conducted by amateurs unfamiliar with the waters of the Sicilian Channel, resulting in 
hundreds of migrant boats capsized off the coastal shores of Tunisia and Libya.  The following account was 
given to me by Si Saied, a 60-year-old man and the father of Wissem, a 28-year-old Tunisian who perished 
in a shipwreck on his way to Lampedusa.  Si Saied explained the escalating number of deaths at sea during 
and after the uprising:  
My son was 28, in the spring of his life! [in tears…]  Wissem was a carpenter in Sayyada.  I 
didn’t know about his plans to flee to Lampedusa and intentions to migrate…Had I known, I 
would have prevented him…I got the news of his death from his best friend Ali who burned 
with him and was lucky to survive…Before the revolution the organizers of these trips were 
professional sailors accustomed to the sea and its unpredictability; they also respected the 
capacity of their vessels and never took a risk.  After the revolution, anyone could claim to sail 
to Lampedusa and many amateurs who know nothing about the sea and who had never sailed 
before did it for the sole aim of making money.  You can see how many victims got drowned 
just like Wissem.  It is a “qartha” (tragedy) [sigh] (Interview, 09/15/2013).  
 
The majority of these boats, like the one boarded by Wissem and others, are old fishing vessels, ill-
equipped for sailing and lacking basic safety equipment and navigation systems.  These boats are also 
designed to be unidentified, with no names and flying no flags, in order to avoid detection by official 
authorities and coast guards.  During the post-uprising period, many sea-faring men, who had been 
primarily engaged in fishing activities, had debts they could no longer repay and were forced to either sell 
or rent their boats or become ferrymen.  Thus, these former fishermen now greatly benefit from the harqa 
industry. Chawki, a local fisherman from the Il Mwansa district in Zarzis, told me that 
Clandestine migration has now become a major source of income for many fishermen here in 
Zarzis.  It is a huge business that generates a lot of money: 1,000 times more than what we 
make from fishing.  Hundreds of families “taaqol min al harqa” (live off this phenomenon) 
(Interview 09/03/2013). 
 
According to informants, ferrymen also make money by duping naïve migrants with “false” 
disembarkations.  They would land the boats in places like Querquennah, a Tunisian island near Sfax, and 
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tell passengers they had arrived in Lampedusa.  Other migrants were abandoned in deserted Tunisian 
beaches, such as those near the northern coastal towns of Bizerte and Hawariyya.  
  ii. Dangers at Sea 
Many migrants, especially those from the western parts of Tunisia, have barely been on the sea 
before and have no idea what to do in case the boat capsizes; nor do they know how to swim. Makram, a 
frail-looking young man in his early thirties, knows first-hand the risks young Tunisians take when they 
embark on the perilous journey to Lampedusa:  
“You literally give yourself over to death.  Once we were in the harbor, we were put in line in 
twos to start boarding the boat.  It was a chaotic situation when everyone started to shout and 
yell, trying to get a place on that old boat…As I was about to embark, I was shocked at the 
number of people who were crammed against each other on this little, timeworn boat. There 
were probably over 100 people between the ages of 15 and 45.  As we all got on board and the 
boat started to sail, the sea grew very rough with waves exceeding two meters high, filling up 
the boat with water and creating a situation of panic.  
The captain told everyone that the boat will not make it to Italy due to bad weather conditions 
and added that he would be sailing back to Zarzis because he was afraid that the boat would 
capsize.  This situation happens a lot because we migrants often get duped and return to Tunisia 
with empty hands…The money and the dream evaporated, but I will try again. (08/14/2013) 
Of his sea-crossing experience, Bassem, a 20-year-old, former carpenter from Medenine had this to 
say:  
The water was like glass when we sailed off the coast of Al Hawariyya.  Everyone started to 
shout Allahou Akbar, clapping hands and chanting.  Soon, the waves got rough, and the boat 
started to shake, almost flipping over and filling with water. Everyone was busy emptying the 
vessel and praying, and I saw myself dead already.  At around 3:00 in the morning, the sea got 
even rougher, and the boat started to swirl as we were sailing far away from the coast.  We all 
got terribly seasick and started to vomit.  I truly wanted to die.  This shows how foolish I was to 
take such a boat ride and go for such a deadly adventure.  As we were screaming, the captain 
didn’t listen to us and shouted that we all had to keep quiet.  It was such a horrifying 
experience.  It was one of the days you would rather forget.  
As the boat was sailing, we nearly crashed on what looked like a small island, not Lampedusa 
though.  The boat almost flipped over, but we tried to keep calm and get the boat to stabilize a 
little bit by moving around on both sides in order to create balance. The Tunisian coast guard 
sailed over to us and asked us to return to Tunisia.  When we refused, they told us to be careful, 
wished us good luck, and waved good-by.  
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We continued the trip, and suddenly everyone started vomiting again because the waves were 
churning with greater intensity until the view became obstructed.  The boat began to shake, 
being tossed around by the high, crashing waves, and water started to rapidly fill the boat again.  
Many fell into the sea; others were clinging to the edge of the boat, shouting and screaming.  
Many started praying and reciting the shahada18 out loud.  Again, the captain was trying to 
calm everyone down, but to no avail.  The state of panic was extreme and the situation was 
totally out of control (Interview 08/22/2013).  
Mahdi, a man in his thirties, sighed as he described the horrible scenes from a shipwreck he was in 
during a sea journey from Sfax to Lampedusa:   
I jumped out of the boat; the crashing high waves totally covered me.  There was total panic as 
people started fighting for lifejackets.  Everyone moved towards one side of the boat until the 
vessel completely lost balance.  Within a few minutes, the rotten old boat capsized. Many 
passengers were already floating in the water, being pushed away by the strong waves.  Some 
were screaming and shouting Allahou Akbar! … 
I found myself under the boat when my hand caught a piece of wood to which I clung until the 
fishing boat nearby came to the rescue.  Bodies, slippers, hats, plastic bags, and packs of 
cigarettes were floating in the water…I was trying to float and could feel a body underneath.  I 
dragged it by force to the surface.  It was my friend Omar.  He was dead.  I do not even want to 
remember this scene as it was very disturbing and horrific.  It was a big “qabous” (nightmare)!  
That is all I can remember (Interview 06/14/2013). 
 
Fig 10. Shipwreck in Lampedusa 
Photo taken by Rayed Khedher on August 08, 2014 
 
  
                                                          
18 The shahada is the Muslim vow that is uttered before death. 
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Mustapha, a 22-year-old young man from Mahdia, also recalled falling into the sea: 
We suddenly found ourselves in the sea with water reaching our necks.  There was a fishing boat 
nearby.  As I was swimming towards it, the waves were pushing me backwards making it harder 
for me to move forward any longer.  Finally, a balansi (small fishing boat) approached us.  The 
Tunisian fishermen aboard started throwing lifejackets and ropes and helped us get on their boat, 
but quickly for fear of being spotted by the Italian coast guard.  As I looked back, our 
unfortunate boat completely sank and disappeared from view (06/02/2013). 
 
Another man who went overboard was Mohammed, a 27 year-old, black Tunisian from Gabes, who 
was sitting with me next to the gate of Caltanissetta’s Contrada Pian del Lago Detention Center. He gave a 
bitter smile and said, 
We sailed for 15 hours, but then the boat engine broke.  I was exhausted and seasick, but 
managed to swim a distance of one mile until I got back to shore.  Only five survived. Everyone 
else was swallowed by the high waves of the Mediterranean.  I swallowed gallons of water!  
But al hamdulillah (Praise to God), I survived… (Interview 09/16/2014). 
As these narratives illustrate, the risk of death seems to outweigh the risk of staying in Tunisia.  Most 
migrants are fully aware that they may perish in the Mediterranean Sea; yet, they are willing to take the trip 
and try their luck.  Many consider it as their last option for survival, and the likelihood of dying does not 
seem to bother them or make them change their minds.  The argument of maqtoub, qatha w’ qadar (destiny 
and calling) was frequently emphasized in my conversations with them.  It seems that only God decides 
whether they will die or successfully make it to Lorop (Europe), and death is something they try not to 
think about.  For many of them, il mout (death) seems to be something beyond them because as someone 
told me, one can die anytime, anywhere, even in bed. It is entirely b’yidd rabbi (in the hands of God). 
V.  The Detention Center 
The migrants’ ordeal does not end with the sea crossing; rather, they are distressed again by the 
dehumanizing policy of detention, which negatively impacts their psychological well-being.  As I 
demonstrate in this section of this chapter, most informants who stayed at these detention facilities 
complained about the ill-treatment received from the carabinieri (Italian police), the non-hygienic 
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conditions of their confinement, and the conditions of overcrowding, the prevalence of disease, and a poor 
diet. Cuttitta describes this situation: 
Italian detention centers operate as inwardly flexibilized, fixed and punctiform 
manifestations of the Italian border.  Their official purpose is to enforce expulsion orders, 
to help authorities push back foreigners beyond the borderline: since the linear border has 
proved too weak and unstable, detention centers have been established in order to support 
and strengthen it.  They can be regarded to as waiting rooms of the border, or as the 
points of extreme tension of a stretched rubber band that, when released, is supposed to 
project the detainees beyond the official demarcation line of the state border (Cuttitta 
2014: 124). 
  
Of his detention conditions, Rached, a 28-year old man and former Student Union activist from 
Sousse, had this to say:  
For seven weeks, I slept on the cold floor with no mattress or covers.  I contracted severe 
bronchitis and was denied any medical intervention simply because I was supposedly 
rebellious and often complained about everything.  I was treated badly despite my illness 
and was insulted and humiliated on various occasions by the officers at the center.  The 
Italians are very racist towards Tunisians.  There is a lot of hogra (humiliation) in the 
center.  They treat you like an animal.  It is totally unhuman and degrading to see that 
migrants at the reception center are sprayed and disinfected while naked, like rats, 
without any respect to their human dignity [Big sigh…] (Interview 05/18/2014). 
 
 The above-mentioned interview excerpt offer evidence that the Tunisian migrants had appalling living 
conditions while in the Contrada Imbriacola Detention Center in Lampedusa, which had been built in 2007 
for a total capacity of 800 migrants, but was now hosting up to 2,800 migrants.  Most migrants like Rached, 
suffered humiliation and dehumanization while being detained.  Many complained about being treated like 
dogs or being called “animals.”  This dehumanization tactic, i.e., associating migrants with animals, causes 
victims psychological harm and, for some, a desire to take revenge and resort to violence.  
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Fig 11. Migrants in Lampedusa Center 
 
Rached was not the only participant in the study to complain about the poor facilities and lack of 
access to medical services due to a rebellious nature and non-obedience.  As one detainee told me, it was a 
way for the detention staff to punish migrants and teach them a lesson.  Moreover, migrants are often 
victims of verbal and physical abuse by the carabinieri.  Violence had been perpetrated against some 
detainees, leading to broken bones and other serious injuries.  
Ahmed, 34, from Bouhajla, Kairouan, described the situation in this way: 
“Since I arrived, I’ve spent two weeks without a single shower.  The food they give us is 
inedible...I cannot even understand what it is and how it was prepared...White pasta every day!  
We are not sleeping properly and many of us have no place in the Center and are roaming the 
streets of Lampedusa in the cold weather...My friends, Salah and Ahmed, are sleeping in an 
abandoned building near the Center...Others sleep in the open fields near mountains of smelly 
garbage worse than Tunisia...Lampedusa is a big habs (prison). 
 
We do not have access to any lawyer or anyone that can help...We have no status here...We are 
literally nothing. When they first came, they approached us with huge dogs like 
criminals...They even confiscated a number of cellphones in the possession of some fellow 
harraga (translation)...We have nowhere to go...They even prevented us from attending the 
funeral of our friends!  Where are the human rights that they always talk about? This is not 
acceptable!  If the situation does not change, we will follow Mohamed Bouazizi and immolate 
ourselves (07/10/2014). 
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Ahmed’s testimony and those of other Tunisian refugees and migrants reveal the extreme mental and 
physical hardships they had to endure.  In addition to physical violence, verbal abuse, and racial profiling 
by the Center’s guards and staff, they also suffered from lack of hygiene, poor diet, overcrowding, and lack 
of access to lawyers or translators.  As evidenced by the narratives, discipline and security at the Center 
seemed to be fully embodied and achieved through the arbitrary decisions and actions of the carabinieri, 
who abused the power they have to control and intimidate migrants.  As such, detention emerges as a 
“normalized” technique of control (Bloch and Schuster 2005), in which detention centers become not only 
sites of punishment and discipline, but also of humiliation and dehumanization.  To fight this, most 
Tunisian detainees threatened the use of “self-immolation.”  Many erroneously believe that this threat will 
ensure that their claims are taken seriously and Center staff and police will start to treat them with dignity 
and respect.  
 Not surprisingly, many of the study population were saddened and disappointed to realize that Italy 
was not the “paradise” they had expected.  For example, Ahmed has decided to escape to France where his 
cousin will help him find a good job.  He believes that France will grant him the chance to build a 
successful life and that he will regain the dignity and humanity taken from him by the Italians.  Another 
migrant, Fethi, a 38-years-old Tunisian, was eloquent about his unhappiness with Italy: 
I am very disappointed with Italy!  I truly thought I would find a place where I could regain my 
lost dignity and realize a dream, but it is a mere illusion.  The Italians are racist, insulting, 
arrogant, and unwelcoming to foreigners, especially to Muslims.  They treat us like an enemy, 
like terrorists.  Some have even thrown stones and rotten prickly pears at us while on the beach 
the other day.  But we are harmless human beings who deserve respect and whose only 
obsession in life is to make a living and improve our situation.  I took part in the Tunisian 
Revolution, and I decided to escape to Italy to be human, but I was mistaken because I feel less 
than an animal now.  It is true that some people here in Lampedusa were nice to us and gave us 
biscuits, bread, water, cigarettes, telephone cards and shampoo.  It is so kind of them, but we do 
not want their charity, we want freedom, karama (dignity), good jobs, and lawraq (papers) so 
that we can live here like true human beings (Interview 07/18/2014).  
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Fethi, like the majority of the Tunisian population of this study, aspired to values of karama, 
freedom, and enjoyment of human rights, which were lacking in Tunisia and for which a “revolution” 
broke out.  The treatment migrants receiving in the Center robbed them of their dignity by putting them 
through humiliating experiences that further deepened their sense of alienation and dehumanization—all 
accentuated by the ill-treatment they received from the Italian police. 
  In addition to the psychological distress they suffer, migrants continue to face a number of physical 
risks such as injury, adverse health issues, and even death.  For example, Bettino, a staff member at the 
Center, told me that tensions between Tunisians and Libyans were very frequent and violent, resulting in 
physical injuries for most detainees.  An eyewitness described a serious fight to me that was provoked over 
a pack of cigarettes, which had been stolen from a Libyan detainee.  The accused Tunisian migrant was 
badly beaten and fell on the hard floor, injuring his head, all the while under the watch of the Center’s staff 
who failed to offer any protection or help.  Theft was a recurrent pattern and major source of tension among 
detainees.  According to Bettino, Tunisians were always the ones who stole and were the most turbulent, 
ruthless, and merciless. They often insulted and provoked other detainees, creating many problems and 
engaging in violent behavior (Field notes 08/03/2014).  
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Fig 12. Reception Center in Lampedusa 
 
The ordeal of the sea crossing as well as the dehumanizing experience in the detention centers 
follows Tunisian migrants throughout their life in Sicily and haunts them for a long time. For example, 
Raouf, a 20-year-old young man who worked at a bakery, described his exhaustion to me:  
You know, I am always tired and fatigued. This is truly the fate that rabbi (God) had in store 
for me.  I am still haunted by the traumatic experience of my harqa and my experience at the 
Centro.  They both follow me all the time, and no matter what I do to forget them, they manage 
to come to the surface.  The images of the dead, floating bodies, and the smell of death…will 
be in my memory forever.  These scars are deep and will probably follow me through all my 
life.  I often feel down and anxious and lose sleep. I cannot even count my sleepless nights 
anymore. This is still occurring and I really do not know what to do, especially now that I have 
gotten this recent job at the bakery and have to wake up every day at four a.m.  
 
Often, I cannot help it, but I feel sleepy at the bakery.  My boss has noticed it on many 
occasions and threatened to get rid of me if I continue to be sleepy and lethargic.  I drink the 
expresso after the expresso and excuse myself to the restroom to run water over my head so that 
I can keep my eyes open and do the job.  I force myself to be talkative to my chatty co-workers 
at the bakery by responding to their jokes.  I do this by putting on a daily mask to cover up my 
sadness and anxiety and all of those negative emotions and bad memories of the Centro.  They 
are still here.  They are still fresh… [Sigh…] (Interview 06/12/2014). 
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VI. Life Outside  
Although many migrants had been relocated to other reception centers in Sicily, some were still in 
limbo on Lampedusa and moved freely around the island.  When I walked around Lampedusa’s main 
streets, I had the feeling that I was in an open-air prison where distressed migrants are trapped on an 
isolated island, totally detached from mainland Italy, with little or no opportunity to escape, except for 
those few who have money and the right connections.  Mohamed, a 23-year old man, summed up this 
experience: “I wish I were dead.  Lampedusa is a big jail.  One cannot even breathe or think clearly about 
any prospects of escape.”  
 i. Idleness: Repercussions  
During the day, migrants could be seen wandering around, sipping coffee, smoking at local cafés, 
playing soccer on the beach, or sitting on public benches watching people.  Some had even cynically 
created a banner with words Grazie Lampedusa (Thank you, Lampedusa), marching with it 
throughout the island.  Under these circumstances, the local population in Lampedusa started 
complaining about the chaotic and violent situation on the island, and many Lampedusans claimed 
that they were extremely concerned about the state of the tourism industry.  They demanded that local 
authorities lock the migrants in centers and prisons so that they were out of sight and no longer 
visible (Field notes 07/12/2014).  Marisa, a retired teacher from Lampedusa, told me:  
We, Lampedusans, are extremely afraid and stressed even to leave the house to run regular 
errands.  We have been locked in our homes because of these terrible and massive North 
African invasions.  Our government is not doing anything to halt the arrival of these migrants, 
who are only bringing chaos and terrorism to our country (Interview 07/25/2014). 
  
Marisa clearly had a hostile attitude, which was, and is, shared by a number of local Lampedusans, and her 
testimony demonstrates the high level of fear and anxiety that came with the so-called “invasion” of 
Tunisian migrants.  This narrative of invasion contributes to an essentialist representation of this migrant 
population, reinforcing a rhetoric of exclusion and xenophobia that has spread beyond Lampedusa to the 
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rest of Italy.  Moreover, most migrants in this study did not speak Italian, making contact with locals 
difficult if not impossible.  Socializing and acts of friendships were hard to establish because the migrants 
were rejected in the first place and perceived as “potential terrorists” and “invaders” who had come to 
propagate chaos, disorder and crime.  The boundaries were already established, and migrants had no choice 
but to intermingle among themselves, thereby widening the gap that separates them from the local 
population and contributing to further their misrepresentation and miscommunication.  As one participant 
told me, “How can they accept us when we hardly talk to them or even get close to their space. They look 
at us as if we come from a different planet.  Their eyes are full of fear and hostility” (Interview 
06/25/2014).  
This psychological distance between the migrants and the locals was a constant reminder to both 
groups of the migrants’ exclusion, difference, and state of being “Others.” Interestingly, some Italian 
activists started a riots and demonstration of solidarity with Tunisian migrants, denouncing the hostile 
reactions of the government, the media, and the larger Italian public.  The protesters held slogans and 
placards including “Pace,” (peace) “Migrants rights are human rights,” “Respect for refugees,” and 
“FRONTEX is Criminal.”  During the riot, migrants of different nationalities joined the activists, and the 
protests took on an atmosphere of celebration with music and dancing.  Local residents, staff, and 
volunteers offered food and drinks from some local and regional NGOs, such as Askavusa, that worked 
with migrants. A group of young Lampedusans tried to disrupt the demonstration, but the police made sure 
that there was no violence (Field notes 07/10/2014). 
 ii. Job-Hunting  
A number of Tunisians I encountered in Lampedusa and Palermo received expulsion orders after their 
asylum applications were rejected on the basis that they were economic migrants. However, most did not 
leave Italy but remained “illegally” in Italy.  Also, after an agreement with the Tunisian government in 
April 2011, Italy granted some temporary six-month visas. The visa renewal depended on whether these 
 130 
 
migrants could find jobs; otherwise, the terms of the agreement stipulated they would be subject to 
immediate deportation. Some obtained seasonal, agricultural jobs such as in the tomato and watermelon 
fields in parts of Sicily, such as Ragusa and Trapani.  Some migrants engaged in very low-income jobs 
such as car-washer or parking guard while others took up criminal activities such as car theft or mugging.  
A few managed to cross the border and make it successfully to France, a country where they had family 
and social networks. Yet, few were arrested by the French authorities and deported to Tunisia. 
 Empty plastic bottles, packs of cigarettes, and litter surrounded the six migrants who came for an 
interview in a local Palermitan café behind the famous Teatro Massimo (Massimo Theatre). Mohsen, a 23-
year-old man, was the first to speak: 
I escaped the Center, slept on the beach for four days, and went all over Lampedusa, looking 
for a job and a place to stay. Then I managed to get the price of a ticket and took the ferry to 
Palermo.  I stayed there for four days, and then moved to Agrigento, Trapani, even Mazara Del 
Vallo.  I could not find anything.  I came back to Palermo because I can live here rent-free, 
thanks to my friend Aziz. Many people told me Italians do not hire Tunisians anymore.  We 
Tunisians, especially those who came after the revolution, seem to have a very bad reputation 
in Italy.  This does not mean that I will give up.  I will continue looking (Interview 
25/04/2014). 
 
 Many Tunisians in Palermo, like Mohsen, congregated every day early in the morning in front of 
Alfredo Café, hoping to be hired as tomato, watermelon, or grapes pickers—but in vain.  For many 
Tunisians, finding a job became an impossible mission. Hilmi, a very thin man in his thirties, said “You ask 
your friends and the friends of your friends, and all you hear is Inchallah (God’s willing).”  The men told 
me that Italians preferred to hire West-Africans and Bangladeshis.  They had a much better reputation and 
were known to be docile, hard workers who were often satisfied by a few Euros in payment.  As many of 
my respondents, these interviewees commented that the Italians were not interested to hire them and were 
treating them differently than migrants from other countries. Many had concluded that their negative image 
was related to the fact that they were Arabs and Muslim. 
Hilmi’s story served as an exemplar of hit-and-miss job-hunting:  
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Luckily, I got a small job on a farm outside Palermo picking watermelons.  I worked there for 2 
weeks, but the Capo only paid me 150 Euros.  I should have been paid 450 Euros instead.  The 
Capo told me that that is all he could pay me and that I can report him to the police if I wanted.  
I tried nicely to negotiate with him and to get him to pay me the difference, but it did not work.  
I gave up and told myself that only God could help me out.  You know, stories like that happen 
every day (10/02/2014). 
 
 Being jobless, Hilmi joined a group of Tunisians in Mondello, a popular Palermitan resort, and started to 
engage in illicit activities such as selling hashish late at night on the beach.  He said that Italians push you 
to engage in risky activities because they do not want to hire you in regular and clean jobs.  
I had no other option because the legal route is closed, and I have to survive and pay my share 
of rent; otherwise, I will find myself on the street again.  You have to see how I live.  We live 
in a one-bedroom apartment, six of us sleeping together on worn-out mattresses eating pasta 
every day.  Sometimes, when we run out of food, we secretly go to Caritas to get some bread, 
milk, and cans of tuna for free.  We are so grateful that those places exist and thank Allah for 
all the help they provide, especially food and clothing.  But we do not want to go there often 
because we prefer not to be seen by other Tunisians, because it is disgraceful, you know.  What 
I am talking about?  This is not a life.  I wish to be back home.  I miss the comfort of my bed 
and the food of my mom.  I am always thinking about leaving Palermo and going back to 
Tunisia, but it is a hard decision.  I do not want to return empty-handed.  That would be a big 
shame (10/02/2014). 
 
 Old Palermo, to which I moved during the second part of my stay in August 2014, hosts a large number 
of irregular migrant communities, including Roma, Bangladeshi, Tunisians, Moroccans, Egyptians, 
Ghanians, Nigerians, Malians, and Eritreans.  Being irregulars and confronted with almost non-existent 
income options to make ends meet, many were engaged in illicit activities such as selling hash and other 
drugs at street corners in the open market and narrow streets of Ballaro.  I met Aladdine, a 28-year old man 
in Centro Astralli Palermo, a charity organization that supports undocumented migrants.  He frequented the 
Centro to play baby foot and video games, take a hot shower and grab food donations such as used clothes, 
milk, crackers and canned-tuna.  Despite his various hardships, Aladdine managed to get some money by 
selling hash to locals.  He admitted that he used to do it while in Hay Hlel in Tunisia and that was why he 
was good at it.  Yet, because of the competition with the West African migrants, Aladdine did not make 
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enough money.  However, he was comfortable with his hard life as he felt a sense of belonging in this 
Sicilian city. “We feel at home here.  It is like a small piece of Tunisia,” Aladdine commented.  
It is important to mention that not all migrants remained jobless and idle, roaming the streets of Sicily 
engaging in illicit employment activities.  A few migrants were more entrepreneurial and managed to get 
small jobs without a permesso di soggiorno and seemed to be successfully integrating into the Sicilian 
society.  Chaker was one of these; he had come to Palermo two years earlier and was still waiting for his 
permesso:  
When you have been here for almost two years and have no papers, it becomes a real burden 
and a source of frustration.  To fully function in Italy, everyone needs a permesso.   When I 
arrived to Palermo, there were only a few Tunisians here.  Now, they are everywhere.  It truly 
feels like I am back home again.  Wherever you go, they are in your face. 
 
Palermo is zaboura19 (very beautiful).  The good thing about being in Palermo is that one can 
easily get a lavoro in nero (job in the black market) without documents.  I now work at a car 
wash and barely make enough money to make ends meet. But, when you do your job properly 
and smile and be nice to clients, they often give you generous tips.  The Palermitans have big 
hearts, unlike Napolitans, who exploit you and never pay you enough. Sometimes, I secretly get 
clients’ phone numbers and do home service over the weekend for much less money than what 
they normally pay at the wash station.  I actually do not want to overdo this because I don’t 
want to get caught by my boss and lose my job.  I only do it for certain clients who are 
trustworthy and discreet.   
 
Also, in Palermo, if you are short on money and need basic food, you can go to Caritas, and 
they will feed you and even give you used clothes and shoes to wear.  In Palermo, one can also 
have access to cheap rent and small jobs. Unlike the rest of Italy where living costs are much 
higher and papers are often required for any type of job (Field notes 09/05/2014).  
 
 iii. Male-male Prostitution 
When I was conducting interviews in Ballaro, Mohamed, a 24-year-old man, insisted that I stop by his 
studio for a beer.  The studio was large and smelled of stale tobacco.  Mohamed said that four people 
shared the studio and each paid 50 Euros a month.  The large room was divided into small sleeping areas, 
cleverly separated by pieces of wood, mattresses, and blankets, thereby creating an atmosphere of 
privacy.  On the walls, pictures of Italian soccer players and semi-naked women, probably Italian movie 
                                                          
19 An obscene word used in the Tunisian vernacular to refer to something as very beautiful. 
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stars, were carefully taped.  Some frameless pictures, most likely of family and loves-ones, had been put on 
what looked like a dining table.  On the same table, various objects were scattered around, such as food 
packaging, a small Quran, empty cigarettes’ packs with cigarette butts, old dirty kitchen cloths, empty 
water bottles, used phone-cards, and an over-used toothbrush.  Mohamed apologized for the messiness of 
the place, lit a cigarette, and offered me a bottle of chilled Peroni (local beer).  We started chatting about 
various things and suddenly touched on the topic of sex.  As we were talking, Mohamed told me that a few 
Tunisians he knew well engaged in sexual activities with Italian men for money.  He said that these 
Tunisians—he never mentioned the names—frequented the park near the port or strolled on the beach after 
sunset to engage in male prostitution with local gay men and tourists.  Although I tried to get in touch with 
some of these men through Mohamed and his friend Majdi, all my attempts failed.  This did not surprise 
me because homosexuality is a very delicate subject for Tunisians, especially those coming from a lower 
socio-economic class such as the study population.  Hence, the stories I heard about male prostitution were 
not told to me by actual prostitutes; rather, they were cautiously reported by friends, such as Mohamed, 
who approached the topic with a lot of stress, discomfort, and fear and asked me to keep the information 
secret.  Majdi, a 24-year-old fruit vendor at Ballaro, joined my conversation with Mohamed, saying,  
We all know what is going on and who exactly is doing it.  You know Palermo is small, and 
people talk a lot and gossip about one another especially ahna ettwansa (We the Tunisians).  
But, you know, this is haram (a sin), very bad and totally unacceptable in our religion or by our 
society.  As they say in Tunisia, “thkar maa thkar thrab rabbi bil hjar” (Men doing it with men 
is like throwing stones at Allah).  No matter how poor you are, you cannot resort to ettfara 
(active homosexuality).  It always remains haram and ya wiilou il wahid nhar akhor and rabbi 
(one would be severely punished by God on judgment day).  And by the way, one can always 
catch AIDS and return to Tunisia in a coffin, like a couple Tunisians that we know about 
(interview 10/23/2014). 
 
This prolonged narrative about male-male prostitution revealed the complex situation in which a 
number of migrants found themselves: having no resources or options for survival except to sell their 
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bodies. Thus, they secretly engaged in and haram activities, as described by Majdi, in order to survive their 
migration experience.  
VII. Conclusion 
In this chapter, I used ethnographic and interview data to describe the experiences of most Tunisian 
migrants who managed to land in Lampedusa.  I captured the multitude of human rights abuses that they 
underwent as they went through four specific stages in their journey: pre-departure, sea crossing, detention, 
and life in the Italian society.  I demonstrated that smuggling migrants from Tunisia to Lampedusa is a full-
fledged industry that is highly manipulative and dangerous. The majority of individuals taking this journey 
are prime candidates for exploitation, ill-treatment, and abuse from the start of their journey to its end on 
Lampedusa and later in Sicily.  Nor does the cruelty stop when the migrants land in “paradise.”  Instead, it 
starts when they are rescued and transferred to detention centers or let loose on the streets where they face 
racial discrimination, humiliation, and “Otherization.”  I used migrants’ narratives to depict the types of 
hardships, dangers, violence, and suffering that they are exposed to in Lampedusa and Sicily.  These 
narratives show that the migrants’ lives are filled with pain, suffering, and hardship; some even regret 
leaving Tunisia.  Detention, in particular, negatively affects their physical and mental well-being, and 
detention personnel erode their sense of being human until they feel more like “animals” without self-
respect and “karama” (dignity).  Those who live on the margins of the Italian society are in a state of 
liminality, leading “shadowed lives” (Chavez 1991) that makes their access to resources extremely 
difficult.  While a few migrants are able to surmount these dehumanizing experiences, others feel that they 
have been totally destroyed. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
 
THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF THE MIGRANT:  
“ILLEGAL” AND “CRIMINAL”  
 
I.  Introduction 
The current European debate about migration is characterized by constructing the irregular migrant, 
such as the Tunisian migrant of this study, as a subject of risk, i.e., the new “security threat” to 
Europe.  Under this social construction, the migrant’s social image is no longer simply that of 
“otherness,” but that of being in an ongoing and/or potential state of “illegality” and “criminality.”  
The more the debate goes on, the more this social construction of the migrant is strengthened, 
resulting in higher levels of anti-migrant, discriminatory, and xenophobic sentiments.  Italy, in 
particular, has had an eruption of anti-migration sentiment that has normalized deeply negative 
stereotypes about the clandestini (irregulars), thus making their “demonization” a mainstream 
practice.  The fear of the Muslim “Other” has become so ingrained in the Italian public imaginary 
that the socio-economic fabric and overall political landscape, particularly in the southern part of 
Italy, is increasingly hostile to all Muslim migrants, whether regular or irregular.  Territorial 
exclusion of these unwanted migrants has become the rationale for the deportation of thousands of 
refugees and irregular migrants in the aftermath of the North African popular uprisings.  New 
restrictive migration policies are continuously being implemented in Italy and Europe as well to 
deter migration and to control the northern Mediterranean border in a more effective way for the 
purpose of “securitization.” 
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Fig 13. Total Number of Detected Irregular Border Crossings 
 
As well, a number of procedures have been implemented to criminalize irregular migrants 
which include, but are not limited to, the enactment of laws that sanction migrants in an “illegal” 
situation and the people who provide them with any form of assistance.  These laws include 
unlawful detention and deportations without procedural guarantees.  Indeed, criminalization has 
now become the strategy for dealing with irregular migration.  Italy, along with many other 
European states, is now exercising its alleged right to close and control its maritime borders not 
only by establishing restrictions to legal entrance, but also by enacting and enforcing anti-criminal 
norms against anyone violating these restrictions.  
The following chapter is organized into two halves. In the first half, I examine the context in 
which the “criminalizing” content of the Italian deportation policies and reactions towards the 
“illegal” human flows take place.  I provide a critical analysis of the social construction of the 
Tunisian migrant as the “Other” or potential “criminal” by exploring the effects of migration 
policies implemented by Italian authorities.  In doing so, I attempt to tease out the ambivalent and 
arbitrary bureaucratic procedures that identify the political asylum seeker, regular or irregular, as he 
or she transits among different juridical statuses.  In other words, I center my attention on the 
contentious and dynamic nature of migrant categories, i.e. “asylum seeker” or “irregular migrant,” 
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to demonstrate how these categories are blurred by laws and policies, how they have socially 
constructed the Tunisian migrant into a “criminal,” and how they impact the everyday life of the 
migrants in this study.  In the second half of the chapter, I focus on the contentious concept of 
Islamophobia.  I first provide a short overview of this phenomenon by contextualizing it within the 
literature of anthropological theory and migration.  I then examine the “racialization” of Muslim 
migrants and how this process has been used in Italy to normalize xenophobic attitudes and 
exacerbate anti-Muslim rhetoric.  Throughout my analysis, I use narratives of the study 
participants to capture the way they give meanings to their experiences of “Otherization,” 
“criminalization,” and Islamophobia. 
  
II. Deportation and the Process of Criminalization 
 
In Chapter 2, I demonstrated how the Italian government sanctioned deportation, which 
contravened international law.  In this chapter, I describe how the “criminalization” of migrants 
made deportation more palatable and thus more justifiable to the Italian government and 
populace. 
 i. The Irregular Migrant 
I live near the central station of Via Roma, which is a pick-up point for Italians looking 
for day laborers. The area is often patrolled by the Palermitan police and known to be a 
drug-dealing spot for some locals.  Every day, before leaving the house, I recite a sura 
(verse) from the Quran, as I have no idea what will happen to me.  I live in permanent 
fear of being arrested or deported.  The police here are wild.  They are worse than 
Tunisian police and can arrest you and deport you for no reason. You always feel like a 
mujrim (criminal). This is not a life. Ya rabbi nakhou il permesso (God, I get my 
permesso) and all this will become history [sigh…] (06/02/2014). 
 
This testimony by Wael, a 22-year-old young man who had been living in Palermo for three 
months, not only demonstrates the existential issues of living as “illegal,” but also shows how the 
Bossi-Fini law complicates the lives of irregular migrants by making their clandestine status a 
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criminal offence.  This status also applies to migrants who were not “illegal,” but have failed to renew 
their permits of residence or can no longer find regular jobs or accommodation.  Many of these 
migrants, like Wael, live in a state of permanent fear and anxiety while they wait for an unlikely 
amnesty in order to get themselves regularized and obtain their permessos.  Naim, a 25-year old 
man, stated: 
“You know, the presence of clandestini in this country is essential.  Italy needs us and 
that is why they often do those amnesties – mouch ala swad iniina20 (not because they 
like us).  Inchallah, they will be doing a new amnesty soon. This is what I heard from 
good sources” (Interview 08/16/2014).  
 
Before the Tunisian migrants were constructed as “criminals,” they were viewed as 
“problems” that needed fixing.  This perception began soon after the massive landings of Tunisians 
on Lampedusa.  Prime Minister Berlusconi visited the island and announced, “The evacuation has 
begun. It will take two, two-and-a-half days. From then on, Lampedusa will return to Lampedusans” 
(Poggioli: 2011).  On February 20, 2011, Frontex reinforced its monitoring of the Sicilian channel.   
In March 2011, Roberto Maroni, Minister of the Interior, said that the flows of migrants from Tunisia 
and Libya would bring Italy “to its knees.”   In March 2011, Franco Frattini, Minister of Foreign 
Affairs, talked of 200,000 to 300,000 arrivals, creating a future that was “impossible to imagine” 
(Fargues 2012:26). 
Italy then started a collective detention and expulsion of most of these migrants, 
implementing border-control measures to facilitate sending boatloads and charter flights of 
“irregular” migrants back to Tunisia and Libya.  These measures are strategies of exclusion that 
become entrenched within national and international policy frameworks aiming at more effective 
management of migrants’ mobility (Fekete 2005).  One such mechanism is not to screen migrants 
first for potential asylum claims; another is deportation.  This latter practice has “achieved an 
                                                          
20 This expression literally means “not for the blackness of our eyes.” 
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unprecedented prominence [...and] seems to have become a virtually global regime” (De Genova 
2002: 34).  Gibney states, “deportation not only constitutes the most explicit form of exclusion, 
but also ‘the state’s ultimate and most naked form of immigration control’” (Gibney 2003: 1). 
 ii. The Asylum Seeker 
Many migrants in this study applied for an asylum status after arriving on Lampedusa, claiming 
that they were fleeing dangers in Tunisia where armed gangs and snipers filled the streets and telling 
Italian authorities that they would return to Tunisia as soon as the country gets stable.  For the 
majority, however, their ultimate goal is to move on to France, where they can speak the language and 
have extended social networks of family and friends.   
The legal concept of asylum seeker is different from that of the irregular migrant.  The 
asylum seeker claims to be fleeing from persecution and, therefore, eligible for international 
protection, according to the principles stated by the 1951 Geneva Convention.  The local 
bureaucratic practices in Italy are remarkably lengthy and arbitrary so it can take several months for 
an asylum application to enter the system and hence be registered by the police authorities.  In the 
meantime, the asylum applicant is entitled to hold a temporary residency permit, which gives the 
holder the right to work, while his or her claim is being examined—a process that can take more 
than a year.   
Thus the asylum seeker, just like the irregular migrant, is in a state of limbo under a 
“formally” irregular condition.  Cabot writes, “limbo is implied in the juridical formulation of 
asylum seeking itself.  Asylum applicants occupy a position precariously in-between undocumented, 
paperless illegality and “refugee status” (Cabot 2012: 16).  The arbitrariness and indeterminacies of 
the bureaucratic procedures for asylum seekers demonstrate that Italian immigration laws construct 
illegality and criminalization producing new forms of “illegitimate illegality” (Calavita 2005, De 
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Genova 2002).  This “illegality,” into which migrants constantly risk being submerged, is not only 
actively produced, but also patterned by the historical specificity of immigration laws (De Genova 
2002). 
 The current border controls and surveillance mechanisms in Italy and Europe are so exclusionary 
that they leave little or no chance for those seeking asylum to enter through regular and legal 
channels.  Also, the huge number of migrants, barriers of logistics, and language and bureaucratic 
arbitrariness make it hard for many to even consider pursuing their asylum claims.  As a result, 
manydecide that the only path that remains is to venture an “illegal” entry, often with the help of 
professional smugglers and thus often facing the dangers and violence that this type of voyage 
entails.  Like irregular migrants, asylum seekers are also referred to as clandestini.  They are believed 
to be trying to strategically infiltrate the country to take advantage of a collapsing welfare state and 
are similarly objects of the processes of dehumanization and criminalization of migrants in general 
(Pellizzari 2013). 
Mounir, a 21-year-old young man, whom I interviewed in Agrigento in July 2014, is an 
irregular migrant and described what it was like to have one’s asylum application denied, be a 
clandestino and navigate the “spaces of nonexistence” (Coutin 2003): 
Life as a clandestino is like living underground.  You are on your own avoiding people 
and hiding most of the time. Lazimni n’warrq (I must have papers) …You have no name, 
no identity, no home…You are afraid of everybody because they can report you to the 
carabineri any time and any moment.  The result is that you can be deported in a wink of 
an eye…Even though; you know that you have done nothing wrong, but you still feel 
guilty and shameful… It is as if you have killed a whole bunch of people. (Interview 
07/10/2014). 
 
For asylum seekers, the bureaucratic procedures that they must go through deeply affect their 
integrity as they are stripped of their identities, and their individuality is reduced to the abstraction of 
simple file numbers/references.  For example, Nadhem, a 33-year old man who seemed to be much 
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older than his age, told me that he was forced to sign papers that he could not even read or understand, as 
there was neither translation available nor any kind of assistance or explanation.   After the interview, the 
only thing he had was a reference number.  Many, like Nadhem, find themselves exposed to 
complicated procedures and classifications without adequate knowledge—an experience that 
reinforces their feelings of confusion, disorientation, uncertainty, and anxiety.  Nadhem was also 
concerned that he had given wrong answers that could compromise his application and make his 
asylum project impossible to realize.   
As I noted above, the two statuses, irregular and asylum seeker, are also conflated and 
blurred because most Tunisians landing in Lampedusa applied for asylum, but the majority were 
rejected.  They were classified as “irregulars” because authorities had given them the designation of 
“economic migrants” as opposed to “political refugees.”  For example, Saber, a 30-year old man, 
applied for political asylum and found himself caught in an ambiguous process with an interminable 
process of waiting:  
We did not have access to any lawyer or anyone that could help…We have no status 
here…we do not speak the language and we do not know what to do…We are literally 
nothing...When they first came; they approached us with huge dogs like criminals… 
They even confiscated a number of cellphones in the possession of some fellow harraga 
(translation)…All we do is wait…wait and wait…We are mentally and physically 
exhausted.  This is unfair and it cannot continue (Interview 06/15/2014).  
 
 Saber’s words vividly highlight the conditions under which a number of migrants find 
themselves. Many feel that they are being penalized for a crime that they have never committed; 
many condemn the humiliating and dehumanizing behavior of the carabineri (police).  They are 
subject to exploitative treatment that takes place during migration control operations, within the 
reception centers, and/or during the asylum procedures.  Ahmed concluded that this inhumane 
treatment should stop not only because he felt like a criminal, but also because it came on top of a 
disturbing sea crossing experience, and he and his fellow travelers were exhausted.  This 
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dehumanization experience depicts the construction of migrants’ subjectivities into what Dal 
Lago (2009) calls “non-persons” i.e., immigrants seen as having no social or personal history 
who are reduced to administrative categories and to being sub-human.   
III. Local Media: Populist Rhetoric 
The “migration crisis” of 2015 inundated world media with shocking images of desperate 
migrants and refugees fleeing the turmoil in the MENA region.  The Italian media discourse on this 
crisis contained discriminatory and extremely pejorative labels such as “invasion,” “attack,” 
“terrorist threat,” and “moral panic.”  This rhetoric has contributed to a large-scale phobia of 
Muslims migrants in the Italian population—a condition that has severely damaged the image of 
most Muslim diasporic communities in Italy, including the population of this study.  This is 
evidenced by the current explosion of media-saturated talks, television programs, social media, 
documentaries, and blogs about Islam in Italy, which have, in many cases, produced and reinforced 
a neo-Orientalist perspective on the “Muslim world.”  This perspective has reduced the rich 
histories of the Middle East and the Arab-Muslim world, in particular, to a limited discourse that 
foregrounds gender oppression, religious fundamentalism, and violence.  This discourse is 
sensationalist in character, appealing to the masses and establishing certain “truth” about the so-
called “threat” of Muslim migration through political speeches, expert opinions, security analyses, 
and media reports (Tsoukala 2005).  Although these over-mediatized and reiterated expressions and 
images are seemingly designed to inform the public, what they have done, and continue to do, is instill 
a tremendous public fear of the Tunisian “Other,” the extracomunitario (foreign national), the 
musulmano (Muslim) who comes to bring “panic,” “crisis,” “disorder,” “disease,” and “crime” into 
Italy.  Sciortino and Colombo claim that there has been a reduced use of the term extracomunitario 
since the beginning of the 1990s, as it became increasingly less necessary to specify these 
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immigrants as such, and “nationality became rather the focus of these alternative nomenclatures” 
(2004:107).  Therefore, a number of more stigmatizing ethno-national terms albanese, islamico, 
marocchino, musulmano, rumeno (Albanian, Islamic, Moroccan, Muslim, Romanian) are now used 
more commonly in the Italian media and everyday vernacular. 
Moreover, social media such as Facebook, Twitter, and Instagram, are other spaces where 
Islamophobic information can be found.  Najah, a 27-year old mansaid: 
When I browse Facebook pages, especially the Italian ones, all I see is that they are 
sharing horrible and disgusting videos about ISIS and Al Qaida.  This, of course, will 
spread confusion and make everyone believe that Islam is a satanic, bloody, and 
terrorist religion.  The result will be widespread hatred and an inclination to remove all 
Muslim migrants from Italy and Europe including the Tunisians” (Interview 
06/24/2014). 
Thus social media present Tunisian migrants as an imminent Muslim threat to the safety, as well 
as the cultural and national identity, of the Italian state.  Therefore, protecting the border from this 
external threat is seen as the primary concern of the state, which employs a number of measures and 
administrative regulations putting various criminal sanctions on irregular entry and presence. 
 Commonly watched Italian TV channels, such as TG4 and RAI, do not hesitate to use sensational 
and derogatory metaphors about MENA migration, such as airing the following infamous expression 
used by Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi who told a TV news reporter that a “human tsunami of a 
total of 25,867 irregular migrants and asylum seekers landed in Lampedusa.”  This type of 
discriminatory expression as well as the over-emphasizing and/or inflating the numbers of migrants 
can only heighten further anti-migration feelings.  As Koser says, “the presentation of undeniably 
significant numbers runs the risk of fueling further public and media overreactions to the 
phenomenon” (Koser, 2005: 8).  Media coverage thus centers on “visibility” and “illegality” labels, 
which are constantly over-dramatized by a number of Italian national TV channels and newspapers 
highlighting the “border spectacle” (De Genova 2002).  De Haas states that the “increasing visibility of 
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global migration for the resident populations of Western societies might partly explain the popular 
perception that current migration is at unprecedented levels and the concomitant ‘flooding’ images 
associated with migration” (De Haas, 2005:  1270).  These stigmatizing images and derogatory 
expressions feed into the popular perception of irregular migration as a “territorial invasion,” 
engendering more widespread stereotypes vis-à-vis post-uprising Tunisian migrants. Indeed, “it is 
precisely ‘the Border’ that provides the perfect theatre for staging the spectacle of the ‘illegal alien’ 
that the law produces” (De Genova 2002: 436). 
 Since mid-February 2011, the official reaction in Italy to this migration crisis has been pejorative 
and ruthless. The words and images used by Berlusconi and a number of Italian ministers have been 
highly charged and derogatory, creating a xenophobia that has been enthusiastically taken over by 
the media.  According to D’Emilio (2011), a newspaper reported that “Italy ferried hundreds of 
Tunisians off the Sicilian island, Lampedusa, Saturday to detention centers amid government fears 
that terrorists could mix in among the boatloads of people fleeing turmoil in North Africa.”  Louay, 
a frustrated 29-year-old Tunisian man, told me:  
The images and words used to describe Muslim migrants in Italy are extremely 
derogatory.  Whenever there is a debate or a program on migration in this country, it is 
often framed around our criminal tendencies, savage and criminal behavior, terrorist 
actions, and abuse of the system.  There was once a program on RAI Uno where we 
were literally referred to as the “sons of Bin Laden” (Interview 05/09/2014). 
 
The Italian media’s willingness to put migrants at the forefront of the news and over-
emphasize their committed crimes demonstrates that the criminalization of migrants has clearly 
been drawn from a fascist and nationalist ideology. 
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IV. The Migration Security Debate: The Populist Agenda 
Current migration policies are increasingly framed as a security issue in Italy, within the EU, and 
in the entire Schengen area. The concept of “security” is socially constructed and thus has multiple 
definitions and manifold ways of application.  Terms such as “national security,” “human security,” 
and “public security” are highly contested and blurred by prevailing ideological discourses that link 
the political control of borders with migration policies, terrorism, and national sovereignty.  The 
widespread xenophobic agenda put forth by growing populist forces and right-wing parties has 
reinforced the connection between “insecurity” and migration, especially that of the Tunisian 
individuals entering Italy after 2011.  Sigona states that “security seems to be a ‘nebula concept’ 
with mobile borders, a crucible of meanings, expression of priorities, interests and expectations in a 
continuous interaction, which is, at the end, oriented by the dominating political discourse” (Sigona 
2007).  Moreover, what scholars and policy makers view as “national security” issues vary over 
time, according to the socio-economic and the political climate in place (Stivachtis 2008:1). 
According to Altheide, “resourceful leaders use the propaganda of fear to connect one problem 
with another, as in numerous news reports that join the ‘war on terrorism’ with ‘protecting our 
borders’ and stopping the ‘invasion.’  Under this fear propaganda, the process becomes one of 
moral panic as emotions run high and people assert that a ‘way of life’ is in jeopardy” (Altheide 
2006:28).  The following narrative told to me by Marisa, a retired, Lampedusan, elementary 
school teacher in her 50s, validates this: 
They were two bearded Tunisian men who were very agitated, running in the street very 
late at night, chanting Allahu Akbar and other incomprehensible phrases in Arabic.  
Both men jumped over the fence of my garden, stole the water hose, picked some 
grapes, and ran away.  I am panicking, and I hardly leave the house unless there is 
something urgent, and I prefer to do that in the company of someone and not by myself.  
It is a shame that you do not feel safe in your own home and that the government is not 
doing anything to deport these terrorists and criminals back to their countries.  Also, I 
cannot understand why we have to shelter these people, feed them, give them clothes, 
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and even allow them to permanently live in Italy simply because they claim to be 
political refugees.  This is very ironic; yet it is the reality.  I really do not get it 
(Interview 07/14). 
 
A moral panic such as the one experienced by Marisa occurs, according to Cohen, when “a 
condition, episode, person or group of persons emerges to become defined as a threat to societal 
values and interests; its nature is presented in a stylized and stereotypical fashion by the mass media 
and politicians” (Cohen 1972:9).  The construction of migrants as a “dangerous threat” not only 
contributes to their further “demonization,” but also to the undermining of their humanity and sense 
of self and paving the way for the implementation of more severe, exclusionary policies towards 
them.  These policies reinforce the boundaries between the host society and the migrant community 
by placing “physical fences” around their movements, while emphasizing various images of 
criminality and disorder.  Due to the fact that he does not belong, the “illegal” migrant is therefore 
constructed not only symbolically, but also juridically.  This criminalized condition paves the way 
for a state of delinquency that “authorizes the perpetual surveillance and control of the immigrant 
population” (Behdad 1998:105). 
To reconcile “national security” with “human security” in relationship to migration is far 
from being an easy task.  As Koser states, “irregular migration poses very real dilemmas for states 
exposing migrants themselves to insecurity and vulnerability (Koser 2005:13).  These security 
measures and practices reflect a global logic called the “externalization” of migratory control 
(Guiraudon and Joppke 2001).  A trend that can be traced back to the 1990s as Western countries 
began developing new strategies for the containment of migratory flows (Guiraudon and Joppke 
2001:13).  Technologically sophisticated surveillance apparatus are continuously being added, along 
with fences and walls, as a means to guard this divide (Cornelius et al. 2004). These new forms of 
policing, i.e., at a distance, as Bigo and Guild (2005:1) have noted, “moves the locus of the controls 
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and delocalizes them from the borders of the states [...].”  Most states have, nevertheless, failed to 
manage or control irregular migration effectively or efficiently.  These security measures do not hold 
back illegal migration attempts; instead, they only move the flow of migrants away from popular 
crossing points to more rough and dangerous terrains (Massey, Durand, & Malone 2002, Cornelius 
et al. 2004). 
 Notably, the populist discourse uses the “security card” to “criminalize” irregular migration, 
presenting it as a national security problem that can only be resolved through the tightening and 
policing of the borders.  This link between migration and criminality remains a very complex issue 
as it often gets politicized and mediatized according to periods, phases, geographical locations, 
ethnic groups, criminal networks, and so on.  Only a comprehensive anthropological and multi-
dimensional approach that takes this complexity into account can offer suitable social and political 
analyses—an approach that is beyond the scope of this dissertation 
From a conservative political point of view, defining foreigners as a source of multiple social 
problems would ultimately provide a plausible justification for strict migration policies.  It follows 
that fearing a loss of sovereignty due to Europeanization and globalization, political elites seek to 
reassure their electorate by placing the protection of borders and other issues related to national 
security high on their political agendas.  According to Brinkley, 
The history of civil liberties in times of emergency suggests that governments 
seldom react to crises carefully or judiciously.  They acquiesce to the most alarmist 
proponents of repression.  They pursue preexisting agendas in the name of national 
security.  They target unpopular or vulnerable groups in the population less because 
there is clear evidence of danger than because there is little political cost” (Brinkley 
2003: 45- 46). 
 
A UNHCR staff member, whom I met in a bar in Agrigento, provided insights into the 
issue:  
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One has to also be aware of the fact that these migrants, like any other irregular migrants, 
have no access to jobs and have to eat in order to survive.  The only way for them to do 
so is by stealing.  It seems that the car theft incidents have increased exponentially in 
Agrigento and, according to the local police, the main culprits are Tunisians.  Also, it 
seems that there are many instances of shoplifting happening in various grocery stores 
and supermarkets, mainly for food items.  These migrants have to eat and that is 
somehow understandable. As a UNHCR person, I always try to direct them to Caritas 
and other NGOs where food is freely distributed to migrants so that no one remains 
hungry or resort to stealing.   
 
It is sad that a large number of these migrants are now filling up Sicilian prisons and 
some have even been illegally deported, even for crimes that they have never committed. 
Unfortunately, the news about crime and theft travel extremely fast and spread amongst 
the locals, sometimes with many exaggerations and twistedness.  The problem is when 
they get used by politicians to serve their political agenda and win elections” (Interview 
07/13/2014). 
  
As the narrative demonstrates, when social anxiety propagates, host societies generally do not 
criticize their own policies, but put the blame, if they can, on the “Others,” i.e., those who visibly 
contribute to a decline in the overall quality of life as shown by factors such as increased 
unemployment, crime, disorder, and their engendered socio-economic problems.  In an 
interesting discussion of the importance of “human security” in the context of contemporary 
irregular migration, a 1994 United Nations Development Program (UNDP) report stated: 
For too long, the concept of security has been shaped by the potential for conflict 
between states.  For too long, security has been equated with the threats to a country’s 
borders.  For too long, nations have sought arms to protect their security.  For most 
people today, a feeling of insecurity arises more from worries about daily life than from 
the dread of a cataclysmic world event.  The world can never be at peace unless people 
have security in their daily lives.  Future conflicts may often be within nations rather 
than between them.  Human security is not a concern with weapons—it is a concern 
with human lives and dignity (UNDP 1994). 
 
 With the “securitization” of the migration debate, existing borders are tightening in an 
unprecedented way and new discriminatory borders are being created for certain groups of 
immigrants and refugees, especially those coming from Muslim countries.  Silverstein contends that 
the perception of Muslim migrants as a “threatening existence” still persists in a number of 
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European societies feeding in “national fantasies” depicting the Muslim migrant population as 
“nationally suspect and potentially disloyal” (Silverstein 2005).  The recent influx of migrants with 
highly differentiated cultural and religious traits, such as those of Muslims, have become popular 
and dominant themes in the representation of migration both in public and political discourse. 
The prevailing discourse in Europe today has taken a new turn by linking Islam with 
violence and anti-Western values (Triandafyllidou; Modood and Zapata-Barrero, 2006).  The Italian 
migration agenda, for instance, became exclusively framed within the recent terrorist attacks taking 
place in a number of European cities such as Paris, Brussels, and Nice.  Racist outbreaks, both 
verbal and physical, from Italian authorities, the larger public, and media have become mainstream, 
targeting a number of Muslim migrants including Tunisians.  Moreover, the increasing violence in 
the MENA region, primarily propagated by ISIS terrorist groups, has engendered unprecedented 
waves of anxiety and Islamophobia in Italy and across Europe.  Due to this climate of fear and 
increasing suspicion of Muslims, the participants in this study have become subject to an increasing 
“racialization,” experiencing various incidences of Islamophobia.  In Italy, for example, xenophobic 
debates about migration refer to Muslim migrants by using derogatory religious terminology rather 
than an ethno-cultural jargon.  One local resident in Agrigento explicitly expressed her anxiety and 
fear of Marrochini (Tunisian migrants) stating, “these Muslims are parasites who invade our land to 
literally suck our blood.” When describing the Muslim migrant community in Palermo, Roberto, a 
local 48-year-old man, referred to them as “evil,” “parasites,” and “camels.”  He said “those 
parasites use our system, steal our jobs, or get welfare money.” This xenophobia extends into the 
elite.  For example, the Italian political scientist Satori claims that Muslim migrants are a separate 
category, an “invasive” presence that will bring “disorder and desegregation” (Sartori, G. 2002).  
The term “invasive” suggests that Italy has been over-run by Muslims.  However, this perception is 
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belied by recent statistics from the Italian Ministry of Interior, which estimated that the Muslim 
population in Italy increased to 1,613,000 million, representing only 2.7 per cent (my italics) of 
Italy’s 61 million population (Nadeau 2015).  The majority are migrants who entered Italy within 
the last two decades, mainly from Morocco, Albania, Tunisia, Egypt, Senegal, Pakistan, Turkey, 
Algeria, Somalia, Nigeria, Syria and Ethiopia (Allievi 2003).  
In this half of the chapter, I have shown how the arrival of an increasing number of 
Muslim migrant groups into Italy engendered a number of anti-Muslim attitudes among citizens 
that normalized deeply negative stereotypes about these migrants, thus making the vilification of 
Islam a mainstream practice.  As such, Islamophobia appears to be the “new racism”; it is overt, 
normalized, politicized, ideologized, and yet highly contested. In the next half of the chapter, I 
argue that the current debate on migration in Italy is one that is based on the fear of the Muslim 
“Other,” legitimizing a new form of racism leading to the construction and the propagation of a 
fully-fledged Islamophobic discourse. 
V. Problematizing Islamophobia 
In this half of the chapter, I start by providing a short overview of the contentious concept of 
Islamophobia, contextualizing it within the literature of anthropological theory and migration.  I 
then examine the “racialization” of Muslim migrants and the way this process is used to implement 
an increasing number of restrictive migration policies and programs that normalize new forms of 
xenophobia and exacerbate anti-Muslim rhetoric.  My aim is to demonstrate that under newly 
implemented migration policies, the growing climate of suspicion and intolerance conceals Italy’s 
real socio-economic and political issues.  I use personal narratives to demonstrate the impacts of 
Islamophobia on the identity construction and everyday life of migrants.  For example, Soufiane’s 
testimony who tells the following story describes a troubling incident of Islamophobia in Palermo: 
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One afternoon as Farhat was walking down Via Maqueda (the Muslim district in 
Palermo) with his veiled Bangladeshi wife and two children, two young, tattooed 
Sicilian men drove close to them with their Vespa and threw a plastic bottle of liquid on 
his wife’s face. The bottle turned out to be filled with urine. The two men cheered, took 
off on their Vespa, and disappeared.  That happened in front of many people on busy 
Via Maqueda and nobody dared to react—not even Farhat (Interview 04/29/2014). 
 
Another testimony recounted to me by Nidhal, a 29-year old young man who landed in 
Lampedusa on March 22, 2014.  Of his rescue experience, Nidhal said: 
We miraculously arrived to Lampedusa on March 22, 2014 at 6:00 in the morning. All 
the people on the boat were safe, yet extremely tired, hungry, and thirsty.  As we 
disembarked at the military harbor of Lampedusa, a number of people from 
humanitarian NGOs and charitable organizations rushed to hand us tiny packets of 
biscuits and small bottles of water.  When one Tunisian migrant started complaining 
about the biscuits, asking for a proper sandwich, a carabineri gave him a look of disgust 
and said, “You should be lucky we did not throw you and the other terrorists in the sea.” 
This is my first encounter with Italian hogra21 (racism) (Interview 07/21/2014). 
 
When I arrived to Lampedusa on the morning July 15, 2014, I could not wait, but rushed outside 
and made my first exploration of the island and its physicality.  As soon as I got close to the Centro 
Loran, I immediately broke out into “goose bumps.”  It had militaristic aspect; it looked like a huge 
prison.  Although the Centro was deserted, its walls were still covered with anti-Muslim, anti-
migrant, and pro-migrant slogans.  Its graffiti were inscribed in Arabic, Italian, and the Tunisian 
vernacular.  Some writings were also blacked out with white spray paint.  I could read expressions 
such as “Musulmani nel forno (Muslims in the oven); Arabi terrositi (Arabs are terrorists); and 
l’Italia all Italiani (Italy for the Italians).  Other slogans were in Arabic such as ‘hourriya 
(freedom), karama (dignity), tahya Lampedusa (viva Lampedusa), Allahu Akbar (Allah is great), 
and even the famous slogan in French of the Tunisian uprising: Dégage (translation), which was 
chanted on January 13, 2011, on Habib Bourguiba Avenue in Tunis.  As I was reading those 
slogans, I started to develop a feeling of disgust, especially when my eyes came across the 
following set of very racist and derogatory slogans: Tornasse in Africa (Return to Africa); fiero di 
                                                          
21 This is a literal translation. There is no word for Islamophobia in the Tunisian vernacular. 
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essere facista (proud to be fascist); Terroristi islamici di merda (shitty Islamic terrorists); bruciate 
alvivi e tutti i clandestini (burn them alive those clandestines); via gli immigranti (migrants out); 
viva la lega” (Viva the Lega Nord); musulmani fuori (Muslims out); tutti in mare (All in the sea); 
and Tunisini al forno (Tunisians in the oven). 
As I started my daily conversations with the locals, I was shocked that many 
Lampedusans such as students, bar men, shopkeepers, teachers, and fishermen were still 
complaining and condemning what they referred to as the “Islamic invasion” of Tunisians in the 
aftermath of the 2011 uprising.  They claimed that their main concern was the collapsing tourism 
industry in the island.  Many Lampedusans I spoke to had taken part in various riots to push the 
local authorities and Italian government to lock up “Muslim invaders” and “dangerous terrorists” 
in centers and prisons or, even better, send them back so that they are no longer visible to them 
nor to the small tourist community.  This hostility demonstrates the escalation of xenophobic and 
Islamophobic attitudes among the local population.  
 i. What is Islamophobia?  
No analysis of Muslim migration in Western Europe today is complete without a consideration 
of the significant rise in Islamophobia, the polemic and emotional repercussions engendered in this 
concept, and why it is so deeply disputed semantically as well as politically. 
To begin: the word Islamophobia, even though transliterated as such in Modern Standard 
Arabic   ﺎﯿﺑﻮﻓﻮﻣﻼﺳا does not have any equivalent in the Tunisian vernacular. The only word Tunisians 
use to refer to this phenomenon is either ﺔﯾﺮﺼﻨﻋ, onsuriyya or hogra ةﺮﻘﺣ, which literally means 
racism or humiliation.  In the Oxford English dictionary, Islamophobia is defined as “a hatred or 
fear of Islam or Muslims, especially when feared as a political force.” For the purpose of my 
analysis, I alter the term to the plural, Islamophobias, because the plural can more adequately 
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capture its highly contextualized nature.  Interestingly, despite its frequent occurrence, there is a 
distinctive absence of clarity about what Islamophobia is and is not, what it means linguistically, 
and how to track its development.   
Islamophobia seems to encompass a variety of forms of discourse, acts, and praxis—all 
based on an identical ideological premise: a fear or phobia of Islam as a backward and/or violent 
religion.  Within this Islamophobic discourse, Islam is perceived as “a single monolithic bloc where 
Muslims’ diversity is overlooked both in terms of the difference between Muslims and also between 
Muslims and non-Muslims” (Allen 2013:69).  Consequently, a number of negative stereotypes 
become projected onto all Muslims and “any episode in which an individual Muslim is judged to 
have behaved badly is used as an illustrative example to condemn all Muslims without exception,” a 
strategy that leads to a generalized and deliberate racialization and criminalization of all Muslims 
(Allen 2013: 69).  Thus, Muslims become categorized as a homogenous and fixed population in 
some way responsible and accountable for the wrongs perpetrated by those Muslims whose practice 
of Islam denotes violence and terror.  Stefano, a 52-year-old, UNHCR staff member, described the 
problem: 
Unfortunately, we are dealing with Tunisians who happen to be Muslims and who 
quickly get labelled as criminals, wrongly turning Islam into a religion of crime and 
violence.  It is so easy to put many people in one box, you know.  Why would you make 
any effort to understand and attempt to know the real story and circumstances of the 
person behind the label or even listen to his hidden predicament?  Unfortunately, I do 
not see any solution to the stereotyping and escalating Islamophobia towards the 
Tunisians and the larger Muslim migrant community in Agrigento and Sicily, or Italy at 
large (Interview 07/12/2014). 
 
In Covering Islam: How the Media and the Experts Determine How We See the Rest of the 
World, Said writes that “Islam has been historically seen as a challenge to Christianity, as a 
blasphemous religion, Muhammad as a false prophet, as containing the latent power to threaten and 
dominate the West as it had done in the Ottoman Empire” (Said: 1997:5).  As Said observed, this 
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“orientalist” position marginalizes Islam and Muslims in a world where Western modernity is the 
norm and where there is little room for Islam because it remains subjected to the historical 
specificities of the West’s Christian and secular experiences. In this situation, Muslims, in general, 
and Muslim migrants, in particular, with their distinct, religio-cultural traits have been constructed 
as the new “Others” or the new “threat.”  This “Otherization” became more politicized in the 
context of the “war against terror,” justifying a new racism based on a constructed discourse of 
cultural difference (Esposito and Kalin 2011).  These negative portrayals of Muslims, exacerbated 
by the recent terrorist acts claimed by ISIS, are becoming widespread, essentializing Muslim 
migrants, inflaming more anti-Muslim sentiment, and engendering new discourses on racialization, 
ethnicity, difference, religion, migration, globalization, and human rights.  
Mario, a 35-year-old restaurant owner, who I met while having dinner at his restaurant in old 
Palermo, sat down at my table and started telling me how the entire island of Sicily was now full of 
Muslims.  In his view, this is a jihad against the Italian people.  He added that all Italians must wake 
up and start fighting for the safety of their nation.  He said, 
“The situation is fucked up, and I do not think that it will change anytime soon.  I have 
been living in Palermo all my life, and I have never witnessed this huge number of 
Muslim migrants in my city.  There are way too many of them.  Because of their 
presence, Palermo has become congested, polluted, and extremely dirty.  They have no 
manners or any form of civil behavior.  They talk loudly, throw trash in the streets, and 
engage in all kinds of violent and criminal activities.  You know that historic Palermo is 
fully inhabited by them.  Walk down Via Maqueda, Via Roma, and even Via Liberta 
now, and you will not see a single Palermitan.  They pushed us out and occupied our 
city.  I am not only talking about Tunisians and North Africans, but also the newly 
established community of Bangladeshi.  It is sad for me to say that Palermo has become 
a third-world city.  Who would have expected that?  This is truly unbelievable.  Che 
scchifo (How disgusting). Basta adesso (Enough now).  Things have to change 
(Interview 08/16/2014). 
 
Mario’s testimony demonstrates the intense, widespread, anti-Muslim sentiments prevailing 
in Palermo.  These beliefs and feelings contribute to essentialist representations and racialization of 
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the Muslim “Other” as a major threat to the stability of Sicily and a source of anxiety for its entire 
population.  This intrusion of Muslims into Palermo’s public spaces has been viewed as a threat to 
the national identity, cultural values, morality, and tradition.  Palermo, as Mario described, has been 
converted into a third-world space because of the Muslim migrants’ “invasion.”  
 ii. Islamophobia: A New Form of Racism 
Although racism in modern Europe generally has a biological and scientific aspect, what is 
critical to the racialization of Muslims today does not involve biology but a radical “Otherness,” 
requiring a different “Othering” treatment of individuals, not in terms of their physical appearance 
and phenotype, but in terms of their cultural and religious differences.  From an anthropological 
perspective, race is a social construct, divorced from biology, which categorizes and classifies 
people based on socially fabricated distinctions.  These distinctions could be the larger, cultural 
differences that set apart “minority groups” from the dominant group, leading to their exclusion and 
unequal treatment—a process of categorization and stereotyping.  To discriminate against those 
perceived to be culturally different is a new form of racial discrimination in which cultural 
essentialism and inferiorization intermingle to efface the “Other.”   Some argue that this “may still 
be regarded as a cultural prejudice or cultural exclusionism rather than racism per se, so that if 
persons are targeted only on the basis of their behavior and not on the basis of their ancestry, then 
might we not have something we should call culturalism rather than racism?” (Sayyid and Vakil 
2010). I contend that, although the biological phrase, “racially inferior,” is here substituted with the 
phrase, “religiously inferior” or “culturally inferior,” the underlying ideology marginalizes and 
vilifies the “Other.”   Such an ideology or dogma pathologically reinforces the stereotypical traits 
“glued” to Islam and Muslims, such as “other,” “monolithic,” “sexist,” “oppressive,” “dirty,” 
“uncivilized,” “third world,” “irrational,” and “violent.”  This is Islamophobia at its best, 
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functioning just as scientific or biological racism does.  This happens in a climate where these 
cultural, Muslim differences are reified to the point of being considered “destabilizing,” a security 
threat to the national identity and cultural homogeneity of Italian society.  In fact, especially in the 
context of the 2011 Tunisian uprising, the dominant Italian perception of the Tunisian presence in 
Sicily was framed as a security issue: Tunisians were labelled as Muslim radicals and potential 
terrorists. 
Many Italians, like Mario, claim that their country, security, values, and resources are 
threatened by the presence of disruptive Muslims, who are dangerous invaders contributing to the 
cultural destruction of the Italian society.  Based on Mario’s account, the “securitization” of 
migration takes its legitimacy not only from cultural difference, but also from the security-threat 
discourse that lays the ground for a “new racism,” or, as Ibrahim phrases it, “racism’s most modern 
form” (Ibrahim 2005).   This racism is new or modern in the sense that it transcends classical 
definitions such that it neither operates by reference to superiority/inferiority dichotomies nor 
through the physical removal of racialized populations (Meer and Modood, 2009; Sayyid and Vakil 
2010, Schiffer and Wagner 2011).  Today’s new racism is much more veiled and respectable.  It has 
been built upon more “innocent” and “subtle” configurations, such as preservation of one’s identity, 
own way of life, and values in the face of the “destabilizing” and damaging effects of other cultures 
(Ibrahim 2005).  This “new racism” or the new “anti-Muslim racism,” as it has been referred to by 
Kundnani (2007), does not, however, entail the exclusion of previous forms of racist practice; 
rather, “new racism” implies that current racist discourses used against Muslim migrants are being 
dominated by the so-called “insurmountability” of cultural differences.  Although there is no 
reference to “race” or “phenotypes” in the classical sense, “new racism,” as Spears puts it, “is still 
racism in that it functions to maintain racial hierarchies of oppression” (Spears 1999).   Balibar 
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posits that, despite the changes in the “doctrines” or “discourses” of justification, this new racism 
still sustains the “same old acts” (Balibar 1991:18).  In the same vein, Sivanandan (2001:87) argues 
that today’s racism is not only concerned with color or phenotypes; rather: 
It is a racism that is not just directed at those with darker skins, from the former colonial 
territories, but at the newer categories of the displaced, the dispossessed and the 
uprooted, who are beating at Western Europe’s doors, the Europe that helped to displace 
them in the first place.  It is a racism, that is, that cannot be color-coded, directed as it is 
at poor whites as well, and is therefore passed off as xenophobia, a natural fear of 
strangers.  But in the way it denigrates and reifies people before segregating and/or 
expelling them, it is a xenophobia that bears all the marks of the old racism.  It is racism 
in substance, but ‘xeno’ in form.  It is a racism that is meted out to impoverished 
strangers even if they are white (Sivanandan 2001:87). 
 
Some scholars (Negri 2000, Deleuze and Guattari 2004) even argue that within the terms of 
this kind of racism, representations of the “moderate Muslim” do not necessarily signal its 
suspension; rather, they are often signs of its efficacious re-emergence.  Deleuze writes that “there 
are only people who should be like us and whose crime it is not to be...Racism never detects the 
particles of the other; it propagates waves of sameness until those who resist identification have 
been wiped out” (Deleuze et al. 2004:197-198).  This type of racism operates within, and outside, 
the good/bad binary as it sets the “threshold for distinguishing ‘genuine’ Islam from ‘extremist’ 
Islam” (Mamdani 2002: 767).  This, in turn, depicts the political discourse recently adopted by 
Western governments differentiating between “true Islam” and “Jihadi Islam.”  The distinction 
augments the racialization of “Islamophobic” discourse by reinforcing the relationship between 
Islam as a religion and terrorism, demonstrating again that the real problem lies in Islam, as an 
ideology, and not in its representation.  
This hatred of Islam as an ideology is well illustrated by Jamal, a 34-year-old man. Jamal 
has been deported in May 2012 from Palermo and he now lives in Dawar Hicher, Hay Ettadhamen.  
The Sicilians, when they show you their true colors, are the worst people you could 
encounter in your life.  I am not sure what we did to them, but they have an ingrained 
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hatred towards all Muslim and Arab people.  I see how they behave with the little 
Chinese community in Palermo, and right away, I could tell the difference.  It is 
something that they have against Islam. This is obvious (Interview 08/05/2013).  
 
 The next story of Hamed is illustrative of what can occur when Islamophobia and police brutality 
combine. Hamed, a 27-year-old, bearded man from the town of Kairouan, landed in Lampedusa on 
February 24, 2011, during a very cold dawn.  He was running through the streets of the island when 
he was caught by the police who handcuffed him and drove him to the police station.  He spent an 
entire night there, trying to understand the police’s Italian and why he was arrested.  The police 
used hate terms such as stupido musulmano and terrorista and accused him of stealing a cell phone 
from a German tourist near the port, with one punching him in the head. The whole experience was 
infused with laughter, insults, and foul language.  Hamed only reacted by stating that he was 
innocent of any allegations the police were trying to make.  Hamed told me that this night not only 
felt like an eternity, but was also the most humiliating experience of his life.  He added that even 
under the police state of Ben Ali, no one would be treated in such a manner.  They Italian police 
eventually released him the next day after they had arrested the actual criminal, who turned out to 
be a Ghanian young man who had landed in Lampedusa two weeks before (Interview 05/17/2014). 
Ruba Salih writes, “certain Islamic symbols may be actively chosen or imposed as crucial 
markers of cultural difference” (Salih 2001:1).  Hamed’s beard might have been such a symbol, i.e., 
a visible mark as the Muslim “Other,” “extremist, and/or potential “thief,” and thus the reason for 
his arrest.   A close association between representations of the “extremist” and fear of Islam are 
strengthened by a tendency to focus on visible manifestations of Muslim identity that evoke 
particular modes of Islamophobias, which are, in turn, experienced by only a certain type of 
Muslim.  Under this subjectified representation, the Muslim woman’s “veil,”22 for instance, is a 
                                                          
22 As far as the veil is concerned, it is important to note here that there are no laws in Italy banning the use of the veil 
either in public or in private spaces.   
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“visible statement of separation and difference that acts as an obvious example of how this 
separateness and difference becomes ‘racialized’ and eventually get coded as ‘extremist’” (Allen 
and Nielson 2002, Sheridan 2006).   
In spite of this racial profiling and his feeling of “being different,” Hamed told me that he 
was more determined not to lose focus, falter, or be discouraged.  He challenged his social 
construction as the dangerous “Other” by staying calm at the police station and deciding not to 
overreact.  His strategy for not being provoked by incidents of Islamophobia was to purposefully 
recall his sea crossing.  He claimed that nothing could be worse than that horrible harqa when he 
was close to death and battling for his life: “galbi met” (my heart died).  He also felt more 
empowered and determined to attain his migration goals such as getting a halal job making lots of 
money, and returning to Tunisia.  Hamed’s resilience, determination, and confidence seemed 
extraordinary to me.  His main obsession now is 
to learn Italian so that I can respond back to these racist Sicilians and stop them from 
doing what they are doing.  Only through mastering the Italian language, can one act 
and start to resist.  The problem here is that even the language they use in Palermo is not 
Italian; it is Sicilian, and it is very different from the Italian you hear on TV and on the 
radio.  I only know a few words, but I am determined to learn more and become fluent. 
Only then I can fight efficiently for myself and for my fellow Tunisians (Interview 
05/17/2014). 
 
Nejah, a 32-year old man, was also determined to succeed.  He had shaved his beard and 
stopped wearing his Islamic outfits23 because both beard and clothing made him visible as a Muslim 
migrant and would reduce his access to jobs or other resources.  Also, as he pointed out to me, he 
did not want to attract unnecessary looks, insults, and other derogatory and racist comments from 
members of his host society.  He whispered that Abdel Karim, his new Moroccan friend, told him to 
                                                          
23 An example is the salwar and kameez, a traditional outfit originating in the Indian subcontinent that was 
introduced in Tunisia along with Salafism. In the aftermath of the Tunisian uprising these outfits became very 
popular in townships and neighborhoods such Hay Ettadhamen, Hay Ettahrir, and Hay Ibn Khaldun.  
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keep a low profile as the mafia recently declared that they would wipe all the Muslims out by 
burning them alive. He went on: 
As far as my faith is concerned, I will take care of it personally by praying in my studio 
by myself, ana w’ rabbi (My God and I).  This is better also because I do not want to 
flash my being Muslim in front of everybody, especially now when all Italians think of 
us as terrorists and call us “Bin Ladens and Talibans.”  I sometimes have strong feelings 
of resentment towards this country.  I do not even understand how they can get away 
with these labels and racist attitudes towards us.  Maybe those terrorist acts are good for 
them after all.  I sometimes have no compassion towards them because of the way they 
treated us from the very first day we landed in Lampedusa until today (interview 
04/28/2014). 
 
Mourad, like many of his compatriots in Sicily, also started to avoid going to mosques 
because of his fear of being spotted and perceived as a “potential terrorist”:  
I started to feel anxious and avoided frequenting the mosque as much as possible 
because he was told that the police in Palermo have an eye on everyone who goes there 
and that could raise unnecessary suspicion, which I do not need.  I honestly went to the 
mosque because I was expecting some of the well-off Muslim brothers, mainly 
Bangladeshi traders, to help me with some sadaqa (charity) as well as to assist me in 
finding a job in their custom jewelry, booming business (interview 06/03/2014). 
 
As this passage demonstrates, some Muslims believe, that to avoid social stigma, 
harassment, and provocation, they have to avoid, in public spaces, any visible ties that link them to 
Islam, such as beards, religious clothing, and going to a mosque.  Mourad confessed to being sad 
about his decisions because it restricted his freedom to be himself although he now was much less 
self-conscious, a feeling that in itself had been a heavy burden for him to carry. Like Mourad, a 
number of study participants, especially the religious ones, found themselves leading a double life: 
one that is secular and non-Muslim in appearance when in town, and the one that is religious, pious, 
and traditional in garb at home.  Nejah confessed that when life became difficult, he stayed home, 
opened his Quran, and read a few suras (verses).  Reading the Quran brought peace to his heart and 
not only made him feel better, but also stronger and more able to cope. 
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As I have argued above, Islamophobia in Italy has become an ideology that mutates 
constantly as it becomes more socio-culturally coded and manipulated.  It is also a dangerous 
ideology, and migrants of Muslim background such as the study participants are its principle 
victims.  Members of the Italian extreme right and anti-migration politicians, such as those of the 
Lega Nord, have successfully propagated the image of Muslims as a challenge to Italy’s “cultural 
harmony” and “national security.”  Members of the Northern League applauded Italian Prime 
Minister Berlusconi when he declared, “We are proud bearers of the supremacy of western 
civilization, which has brought us democratic institutions, respect for the human, civil, religious and 
political rights of our citizens, openness to diversity and tolerance of everything… Europe must 
revive on the basis of common Christian roots” (The Guardian, London, 27 September 2001: 15). 
He went on to add, “We don’t want Italy to become a multiethnic, multicultural country. We are 
proud of our traditions.”  For Berlosconi and others of his ilk, “multiculturalism” is a code word for 
attacking the culturally diverse societies that extreme right politicians customarily despise.   
Italian politicians from other conservative political parties have similarly sought to frame 
multiculturalism as an outrage that threatens the cohesiveness of the Italian “national” culture by 
disrupting its core values.  They are not alone in their anger; other European politicians of the far 
right argue repeatedly that many Muslim religious extremists have prospered from multiculturalism 
and contend that an “Islamification” of Europe is underway.  As such, the current Italian and 
European debate on integration and assimilation emphasizes a strong incompatibility between 
Western culture with its democratic values and Muslim culture, which is “neither based on Western 
democratic principles nor […] sensitive to Western standards of human rights” (Banakar 2008:73).  
For many politicians in Italy, multiculturalism has enabled a situation in which Muslim migrants’ 
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religious fundamentalism and acts of terrorism could pose a challenge and a “security threat” to 
Italy’s Catholic identity, its homogeneity, and the principle of “laicità” (laicity).   
 In Italy, there is a growing opposition towards the building of mosques, masajid (prayer spaces), 
and Islamic centers that would allow the Muslim migrant community to enjoy the freedom of 
worship. This opposition finds its roots in discourses of nativism, essentialism, and 
homogenization, which make it possible for conservative and racist groups to defend their values 
and their way of life. Their argument follows the same populist rhetoric that uses culturalist and 
religious discourses to establish and reinforce a dialectical and hostile relationship between Italians 
as “natives” and Muslim migrants as “foreigners.”   
VII. Conclusion 
 This chapter has addressed the research questions that I posed in the Introduction to this 
dissertation, particularly those involving the criminalization and dehumanization of the Tunisian 
migrants: how these processes impacted their daily lives and the ways in which the migrants 
permitted and rationalized, experienced and negotiated or resisted the violence against them and 
their socially constructed “illegality” and “criminality.”  
  In the first half of the chapter, I argued that the prevalent Italian policies, media, and discourse 
about migration constructs the Tunisian migrant as a risk-subject, i.e., as the new “security threat.”  I 
also analyzed the social construction of the Tunisian migrant as the “Other” or the “potential 
criminal” by exploring the effects of the “criminalizing” migration policies implemented by the 
Italian state. What emerges from the ethnographic data is that the lack of a coherent and reasonable 
migration policy ironically generates and produces the same “irregularity” that the state is trying to 
curb.  Throughout this analysis and illustrative narratives, I identified some of the ways in which 
negative images of the Tunisian migrant gets constructed and propagated.  In this process, I 
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demonstrated how the increasing wave of ultra-conservative and far right parties in Italy created an 
ideal scapegoat: The Tunisian migrant. 
In the second half of the chapter, I scrutinized the slippery concept of “Islamophobia.” 
Throughout my analysis of this highly contested term, I was motivated less by the challenge of 
determining its connotations than by the effort to recognize its politicized aspects and its 
variability.  Throughout the analysis, I demonstrated how Islamophobia functioned as a form of 
cultural racism, or to use Balibar’s phrase, “racism without race” (1991), which constructs and 
propagates the image of the Muslim as a “threat.”  I demonstrated that there is almost no culture 
of integration in Italy today; rather, the emphasis is on what I call a “forced assimilation” as 
Muslim migrant groups are expected to almost completely disconnect with their Muslim 
background.  Under this stream of cultural racism or “negation of otherness” (Joppke 2007), 
some have altered their socio-cultural and religious characteristics to integrate and access 
resources.  
Moreover, this chapter is interspersed with selected narratives to gain further insights into 
the everyday worlds of the irregular migrants in this study.  My aim was to see how, on their 
own terms, they faced the challenges of Islamophobia, hostility, and suspicion and both 
experienced and negotiated their lived, essentialized experiences of fear, powerlessness, and 
humiliation on their own terms.  I tried to provide a space where these individuals could become 
actors in crafting their own narrative discourses by rethinking their various positions within the 
current normative migration discourse in Italy. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
SURVIVAL STRATEGIES AND RESISTANCE 
I.  Introduction 
Jameleddine’s story: 
Life here24 is extremely difficult and challenging. We are trapped in this habs (prison), 
and I truly mean habs with all its mizirya (misery) and dommar (angst).  Famma barcha 
hogra w’ barcha qahr (There is a lot of humiliation and a lot of oppression).  Yet, you 
have no choice but to always be sindiid (very strong) and do everything you can to hide 
your weakness.  It is a daily struggle, but no one here should underestimate his ability 
for survival and resistance.  No one must forget that we did a revolution.  Tunisians are 
strong and powerful and nothing can defeat them.   
To survive, Ettwansa houni (Tunisians here) must have a lot of self-confidence, courage, and 
audacity. You have to distrust everyone, don’t talk too much, keep resisting, and never ever 
give up.  At times, it is exhausting [sigh…], but what choice do you have? Yilzmik taaqif ala 
saqiiq (You have to stand on your feet).   Yilzmik tahchihoulhom qbal ma yitahcheliq (You 
have to screw them before they screw you).25  It is a ghaaba (jungle).  Jameliddine sighed. 
[His account continues with how his friend Mohsen Zatla26 being mad at the unbearable living 
conditions at the Center and the cruelty of the Carabinieri, threatened to burn down the facility 
and purposefully drunk bleaching liquid and a whole bottle of shampoo with the intent to be 
transferred to the local hospital and then escape from there, get to the French border and catch 
a train to Paris….] (Interview 08/15/2014).  
 Jamaleddine, who told me this story, was a well-spoken young man who always tried to 
present himself as a “tough guy” although he was small and frail; his hands trembled; and I could 
see the suffering in his eyes.  Toughness was his strategy for surviving the hostility of the 
deportation-center environment where he was treated as if he were less than human: a “body” 
that had to be monitored and sometimes oppressed, humiliated, and abused.  He said that he 
would sometimes get into unnecessary quarrels with no apparent provocation, just to raise his 
                                                          
24 The speaker was in the Trapani Milo Centro di Identificazione (CIE), which is located in the countryside of 
Trapani, and, like other identification centers, is a very difficult place from which to escape.  
 
25 As in English, the Tunisian expression has a sexual connotation. 
 
26 Nicknamed Mohsen Zatla because of his heavy addiction to hashish. Zatla is the popular word for ‘hashish’ in 
Tunisia. 
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voice and show how tough he is.  He described this action as a survival mechanism that seemed 
to be working so far.  In order to stay strong and never weaken, Jamaleddine forged a new 
identity for himself.  This new identity, or “counter-identity,” was a shield to protect himself 
from the daily experiences of oppression, stigmatization, and marginalization.  Berry et al. 
(1989) point out that marginalization is not easily defined, possibly because it is accompanied by 
a good deal of collective and individual disorientation and anxiety.  It is a situation of social 
dislocation where people suffer feelings of alienation, loss of identity, and what has been termed 
“acculturative stress” (Berry et al. 1989:4).  Despite his ordeal, Jameleddine’s strategy of 
survival and resistance was this: “One must have a lot of self-confidence, courage, and audacity.  
One has to distrust everyone, not to talk too much, keep resisting, and never ever give up.” As 
Hammaren states, “Counter-identities emerge as means of coping with segregation and feelings 
of being an outsider” (Hammaren, 2008). 
 The aim of this chapter is to explore one of my research questions: what are these forms of 
violence and oppression and their consequences on the migrants’ identities but, more importantly, 
on their survival and resistance strategies and transborder social engagements?  Hence I scrutinize 
how migrants engage with their migration project by actively moving away from having no status 
and becoming resisting political subjects (Nyers 2010).  I focus on the ways in which study 
participants, through various forms of resistance, claimed their rights and protected themselves from 
potential deportation by subverting sovereign control and destabilizing their enforced invisibility 
and potential deportability, thereby producing new formulae of political belonging (Isin 2009).  I 
argue that their survival and resistance strategies emerged from the 2011 uprising and were 
subsequently exported to Italy.  I examine both individual and collective tactics of survival and 
resistance that Tunisian migrants employed to see how they informed, challenged, or disrupted their 
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constructions as “threats” to Italian sovereignty.  In doing so, I show how their protests, i.e., acts of 
political participation, framed their resistance narrative and then explore the ways in which this 
narrative informs or contests how migrants are constructed and categorized.  I am interested in acts 
of survival and resistance, i.e., local and transnational, individual and collective, and their ability to 
disturb power structures and the oppressive migration story that had developed within Italian 
society.  
The first part of this chapter lays out the theoretical framework in which my argument is 
grounded.  I discuss migrants’ resistance movements in the academic literature to shed light on 
concepts such as acts of resistance, migrants’ daily struggles, and coping strategies.  The second 
part of the chapter focuses on how Tunisian migrants managed to reverse their situation of 
vulnerability and invisibility by actively and collectively affirming their “right to claim a right” 
(Isin, 2009:380).  One of the main questions that I will address is how Tunisian irregular migrants 
can engage effectively in resistance movements and protest against the border-control machinery 
while at the same time being a vulnerable and often silenced population.  Scott’s (Scott 1990) 
concept of “weapons of the weak” provides me with a tool to examine migrants’ everyday 
resistance and how it contributes to both the protection of their rights and the advancement of 
claims that concern the mobility-restriction and potential deportation.  I use vignettes of migrants’ 
lives and actions to illustrate my arguments about survival strategies and resistance. 
II. From “Invisibility” to “Visibility” 
Migration literature has failed to take into account migrants’ agency, subjectivity, and resistance 
strategies (Andrijasevic & Anderson 2009), offering a simplistic framework in which migrants “are 
represented as destitute and frustrated people driven by economic and/or humanitarian needs in an 
increasingly globalized society” (Aradau & Huysmans 2009:586).  This conceptualization of the 
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migrant as a powerless victim no longer holds true in light of their increasing empowerment and 
political participation.  In fact, refugees and irregular migrants have now become significant actors 
in global struggles that involve freedom of mobility, social recognition, worker protections, and the 
right of asylum (McNevin 2006). 
Protests and hunger strikes by migrants are proliferating and have become more organized, 
thereby becoming a new mechanism of political participation and collective condemnation of the 
various forms of power and oppression suffered by migrants on a daily basis.  As Foucault (1996) 
states, the diffuse nature of power always provides a possibility for resistance.  Scott’s important 
study (Scott 1985) on the livelihood of secluded, rural communities in Southeast Asia elucidates 
how weak subalterns develop both active and safe means of resistance that allows them to revolt 
against tough post-totalitarian living conditions and adds meaning and value to their lives. Scott’s 
resistance includes “any act(s) by member(s) of a subordinate class that is or are intended either to 
mitigate or deny claims (for example, rents, taxes, prestige) made on that class by superordinate 
classes (for example, landlords, large farmers, the state) or to advance its own claims (for example, 
work, land, charity, respect) vis-à-vis those superordinate classes” (Scott 1985: 290).  Scott argues 
that, at times, resistance can encapsulate “explosive moments of power,” which he coined a 
“Saturnalia of power,” capable of toppling whole political systems (Scott 1990: 340-350).  He 
further asserts that “most of the political life of subordinate groups is to be found neither in overt 
collective defiance of power holders nor in complete hegemonic compliance, but in the vast 
territory between these two polar opposites” (Scott 1990: 136).  As this chapter demonstrates, the 
Tunisian migrants of this study reject their label as “passive victims” by drawing upon survival 
strategies and modes of resistance that shift them from being invisible to the public and media to 
becoming visible, a state that Ruggiero calls “reappearance” (Ruggiero, 2000:54).  
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 i. Bodily Self-inflicting Harm  
One significant “weapon of the weak” is to self-inflict harm in such a way that it confounds 
those in power and advances goals and projects.  One self-harm tactic used by migrants to get 
public attention and circumvent deportation is the deliberate defacing of their fingertips so that they 
have no fingerprints, a highly symbolic act that cleverly disrupts the techniques of disciplinary 
power by making them dysfunctional and irrelevant.  Nawfel, a 24-year-old man I interviewed in 
Siacca, told me “No Fingerprints” was a strategy only used by brave migrants because  
it requires the burning of your fingertips which only the most courageous, those who 
have a glaib (heart), could do.  We all know that if you refuse to give your hand for 
fingerprinting, the Italian authorities will physically force you to place it on the digital 
fingerprinting machine.  So, you really have no choice, but to burn them.  Everyone 
knows that by law the Italian authorities will never be able to deport you if they cannot 
determine your nationality or your true identity (Interview 06/18/2014). 
 
The annihilation of one’s fingerprints is an extreme act that challenges the validity of the 
migration system.  According to Broeders and Engbersen, acts of bodily self-inflicted harm are 
used by some as a “strategy to protect oneself against the state’s inquisitive eyes is to hide one’s 
personal (legal) identity. Manipulation of personal identity is one of the major strategies adopted 
by illegal aliens who want to prevent detection by the state” (Broeders and Engbersen 2007: 
1598). 
After burning their fingertips, the Tunisian migrants, aware that they were considered 
“economic refugees” with no chance of obtaining asylum, could pretend to be Palestinians, Iraqi, or 
Syrian political asylum seekers whose refugee claims were more acceptable to Italian authorities.  
The destruction of fingerprints allowed migrants to circumvent the refugee system, obtain political 
refugee status, or at the very least, lengthen the administrative process so that they can eventually 
escape from detention centers.  Papadopoulos and Tsianos call this a strategy of “de-identification,” 
which is “not primarily a question of shifting identification ascriptions; it is a material and an 
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embodied way of being. The strategy of de-identification is a voluntary ‘dehumanization’, in the 
sense that it breaks the relation between one’s name and one’s body” (2007:166).  In this way, 
migrants escape sovereign control, which relies on identification in order to create new forms of 
political subjectivities (Papadopoulos et al 2008).  
Migrants used other tactics of bodily self-inflicted harm to protest and gain visibility.  For 
example, a few migrants held at Rome’s Ponte Galeria Detention Center sewed their mouths shut 
as an extreme form of protest against the Center’s dehumanizing regime and the authorities’ total 
ignorance of their asylum claims.  In addition, if their demands were not met, they threatened to 
immolate themselves.  Photographs of these young men with their sewn lips were immediately 
displayed across social media websites such as Facebook and Twitter as well as some migration 
blogs and websites.  Other self-harm activities such as hunger strikes and vein slitting [see Ajmi and 
Farid’s story in the Introduction] have become more frequent in many Italian detention centers.  
  ii. “The Right to Claim Rights” 
Through acts of resistance, Tunisian migrants not only claimed their right against deportation, 
but also affirmed their “right to claim rights” (Isin, 2009: 380).  With this claim, Tunisian migrants 
become what Isin (2008) calls “activist citizens” (Isin, 2009: 38). According to Bojadzijev and 
Karakayali, these acts of political participation and public resistance can be considered as an 
“appropriation of citizenship” (Bojadzijev and Karakayali 2010: 8), which both disrupts the image 
of irregular migrants as “depoliticized objects” and re-interrogates the concept of citizenship as a 
pre-requisite for political belonging (Nyers 2010).  Citizenship itself is a contested concept.  For 
some scholars, citizenship should be conceived of in its legal links “between individual and polity; 
for others, it signifies active engagement in the life of the community. For some, it is largely a 
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matter of individual justice, while for others still; it implicates pressing questions of collective 
identity” (Bosniak 2000: 455).   
In discussing migrants’ acts of resistance, Walters describes them as “those constitutive 
moments, performances, enactments and events when a new identity, substance or relationship of 
citizenship is brought into existence” (Walters 2008: 191).  Isin (2008) uses the expression “acts of 
citizenship,” which is employed to “focus on those moments when, regardless of status and 
substance, subjects constitute themselves as citizens—or, better still, as those to whom the right to 
have rights is due” (p. 18).  It is clear that many migrants now refuse to follow traditional, 
authoritative processes to acquire legal status.  As Broeders and Engbersen state, “The irregular 
immigrant has thus become a direct challenge to the state’s notions on legal mobility and 
territoriality in a globalized world” (2007:1594). 
 iii.  Individual Acts of Survival and Coping Strategies 
In addition to extreme forms of resistance, I argue that, although irregular migrants’ other 
survival strategies and coping mechanisms are less dramatic as “weapons of the weak,” they are no 
less significant as acts of resistance to power structures that have denied them rights and 
opportunities.  For example, irregular migrants do not have access to jobs because of their “illegal” 
status.  However, study participants needed to secure a living and engaged in activities such as in 
the lavoro nero (informal labor market/black market) or paying for awraq mathrouba (fake 
documents).  Stories of purchasing fake permessos were very common and kept reoccurring during 
interviews and informal conversations.  
Study participants also repeatedly used the term nwarraq (to get the papers) to describe the 
process of attaining “legal” resident status.  By forging fake identities via criminal networks, 
migrants could move from an irregular status to a regular one simply by paying a fee/bribe.  This 
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was acknowledged by Tarek, who informed me that his permesso di sogiorno cost him 500 Euros 
which he is paying in installments.  Many of his friends had done the same thing, and some had 
successfully obtained jobs, mostly in northern Italy in cities such as Ancona, Milano, and Torino.  
However, not all the stories had happy endings.  For example, Aladdine, a 28-year-old Tunisian 
migrant, paid 2,500 Euros, all of his savings from selling hashish, to an allegedly trustworthy 
middleman from Sciacca who promised him a work contract and the necessary papers for his 
permesso di sojiorno.  Then the middleman took the money and disappeared.  Migrants in the study 
population commonly acted in a fraudulent manner for the purpose of obtaining false documents to 
avoid their socio-economic and political exclusion and potential deportation to create access to an 
array of resources enjoyed by “legal” migrants.  Despite this illegality, such acts demonstrate an 
entrepreneurial spirit, resilience, and a strong sense of agency.  De Haas defines agency as “the 
limited but real capacity of individuals to overcome constraints and potentially reshape structure” 
(De Haas, 2010: 241). 
Study participants also talked repeated about hunger strikes, along with threats of 
immolation, as ways to resist, express anger, and attain goals.  Many informants threatened to 
immolate themselves like Mohamed Bouazizi, the young man whose self-immolation in 
December 2010 sparked the 2011 Tunisian uprising.  For instance, Belgacem, a 34-year-old 
Tunisian in detention was placed in solitary confinement because of violent behavior.  He started 
a wild hunger strike to protest the delay in the handling of his application for political asylum.  
He claimed that, if he were deported, Tunisian authorities would immediately arrest him because 
of his business involvement with Imed Trabelsi, a brother-in-law of Ben Ali, who was known for 
his unparalleled corruption and mafia-like involvement during Ben Ali’s rule.  As Belgacem 
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became more certain of his imminent deportation, he threatened to set himself on fire27 if his 
political asylum application was not approved.  His application was rejected, and he was 
deported back to Tunisia where I met him and conducted an interview.  Obviously, Belgacem did 
not immolate himself as he had claimed he would in his threat (Field notes, 08/06/13). 
 Another survival strategy employed by migrants was to not open their mouths, regardless the 
situation.  Many claimed that a deliberate “Al samt” (silence) was the best resistance strategy 
because not speaking does not break any law, compromise their situation, and/or run the risk of 
being detained or deported.  As Beji, a 23-year-old man, told me,  
My silence towards the Italians’ racism and ill-treatment started since the very first 
moment, when the Italian coast guard approached the chqaf (boat).  The first few 
words they uttered were ancora un altra invasioni (again, another invasion) …Tunisini 
di merda (shitty Tunisians).  They probably did not know that some people on the boat 
had been migrants before and knew Italian perfectly.  Yet, we heard those racist words 
and kept quiet because it would be stupid to react.  As they say in Tunisia, koll lil kalb 
ya si kalboun hatta y’chokk biik il waad (call the dog, Mr. Doggy, until he helps you to 
cross the river) (Interview 05/19/2014).  
 
The most common coping strategy for some participants who wanted to forget about the 
oppressive and degrading atmosphere within detention centers and outside in the society was to 
“self-medicate.”  These migrants were addicted to alcohol and zatla (hashish).  I met Lamjed, a 
porter at Palermo’s Ballaro market on a Sunday afternoon.  When I asked him how he copes with 
the difficulties of his daily life, Lamjed responded that “drinking and smoking zatla are my only 
two coping mechanisms. Diima nbambi…diima mkhartil (I am always high...I am always 
stoned).  If I stopped these two addictions, I would probably put an end to my life.  They are my 
oxygen.”  As Yee et al. state, “Substance abuse is used as a coping mechanism for dealing with 
adaptation to a foreign and sometimes hostile social or cultural environment” (Yee & Thu 
1987:78). 
                                                          
27 When tensions were high, members of the study population often threatened self-immolation, using the Italian 
phrase, mi mettermi a fuoco (I will set myself on fire).  
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II. Transnationalism, Social Networks, and Social Media  
Castles uses the term, “transnational turn,” when discussing migrants who, after being integrated 
in the receiving society, maintain their national identity mainly via transnational networks (2009).  
The Tunisian migrants of this study had social networks with their families and friends using 
telecommunication tools such as the telephone and internet.  These trans-border social networks, 
along with the support of local contacts and that of other connections such as NGOs and charitable 
organizations, helped them with survival tactics and strategies to navigate their migration journey, 
to learn about legal issues associated with migration, and to initiate and/or participate in creative 
acts of survival and resistance.  Transnationalism, as discussed in Chapter 2, plays a key role in 
determining the likelihood and level of socio-political participation of a migrant community and its 
ability to nurture various ties and contacts with people and alliances across multiple borders.  These 
transnational networks constitute what Basch et al. (1994) and Levitt and Schiller (2008) refer to as 
the “social field”: “migrant networks are viewed as constituting a single social field created by a 
network of networks,” which can be strategically used as a tool for gaining access to resources and 
countering instances of oppression and subordination in the host society (Levitt et al. 2008:286). 
According to Basch, Schiller, and Blanc (1994), social fields can be defined as sets of 
manifold, intertwined networks of social relationships through which ideas, practices, and resources 
are exchanged, processed, and transmuted within and across borders.  Social fields are multi-
dimensional and include multiple interactions of differing forms, depths and breadths, such as those 
involving organizations, institutions, and movements (Basch et al. 1994). These exchanges not only 
reinforce a sense of community, but also, at times, challenge the host society’s national sovereignty 
and its ability to control its borders.  In other words, social fields endow a migrant community with 
a sense of empowerment for socio-political organization and participation.  According to Portes, 
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transnationalism includes migrant activities “that take place on a recurrent basis across national 
borders and that require a regular and significant commitment of time by participants…These 
activities are not limited to economic enterprises (such as sending and receiving remittances, or 
setting up a business ‘back home’), but include political, cultural and religious activities as well” 
(Portes 1999:464). 
 i. Social Networks 
Migrants’ use of local and/or transnational social networks contributes, I argue, to the 
establishment of support mechanisms and the reinforcement of feelings of assurance, solidarity, 
trust, and loyalty among Tunisian migrant community members.  As Fennema (2004: 439) argues, 
“There is no ethnic community without certain forms of embedded trust.”  The migrants of this 
study came together as a bounded group, especially after their arrival in Lampedusa, with the aim of 
lessening the painful impact of the sea crossing, handling the culture shock of being in a new 
country, and being more at ease in their new environment.  As Rocha-Trindade notes, this grouping 
is an attempt to compensate for certain deficiencies provoked by the migration process (Rocha-
Trindade 1986).  In the case of the Tunisian migrants, the networks of friends and/or relatives were 
crucial in providing the newcomers with survival information and a “kit” of resistance strategies.  
This information included tips on qualifying for political asylum, making appropriate statements to 
authorities, finding an intermediary to acquire the needed documents, and providing contacts for job 
opportunities and housing.  In addition, social networks, via word-of-mouth, informed migrants 
about NGOs that provided free food, used clothes, medications, toiletries, and, in some cases, free 
access to lawyers.   
Transnationalism is based on effective communication and transport systems that “facilitate 
the growth of circular or temporary mobility, in which people migrate repeatedly between two or 
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more places where they have economic, social or cultural linkages” (Castles and Miller, 2009:30).  
Tunisians, at home, are well known for sustaining strong ties through the practice of reciprocity, 
i.e., providing assistance and support to one another in times of need.  This social trait contributes to 
strong social support networks, especially when they are abroad, and allows them to acquire social 
capital, which paves the way for access to the host society and builds the type of empowerment that 
enables them to claim their rights.  Moreover, the migrants in this study did not break the links they 
had with their Tunisian compatriots elsewhere.  Networks with family, friends, and acquaintances in 
Tunisia, France, Germany, Sweden, and even Canada were carefully maintained and nurtured.  For 
example, Abdel Jabbar told me that he chatted almost every day with his cousin, Samir, who lives 
in Lyons, France.  Samir had escaped Tunisia after the uprising, crossed the border between Italy 
and France, and arrived in Lyons where he received shelter, food, and other types of support from 
his friend Atef who has been living there for almost a decade.  Samir had financed Abdel Jabbar’s 
harqa and had recently sent him 250 Euros so that he could pay his last share of rent, clear his small 
debts, and get a train ticket to Lyons.  Samir also promised to give him shelter, feed him, and help 
him get a job as a night guard in an Auto Repair Garage where he had been working for the last two 
years.  Samir and Abdel Jabbar chatted via Skype, Viber, WhatsApp and Facebook Messenger, 
exchanging visual information such as photos and small videos of their living conditions, visited 
places, family events, food, selfies, and romantic adventures.  Abdel Jabbar’s ideas about Lyons 
were very positive and based exclusively on information provided by his cousin.  Notably, it is 
common for a migrant to give a rosy picture of his new life, which is far from reality, in order to 
show family and friends that his migration has been a “success story.”  Although study participants 
generally had strong social networks, a few had ones that had weakened, failing to meet their 
purpose, or disappeared altogether. The latter usually occurred when either a relative or friend lost 
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his job and was no longer able to provide financial support or when he had been deported, a 
frequent occurrence.   
 ii. Social Capital 
Social capital is an important concept in migration and social networks studies that analyze the 
various relationships and strategies of migrant populations.  Meyerson (1994) defines social capital 
as the pool of valuable relationships that a person has collected over time.  Bourdieu (1985) 
describes social capital as follows: “The aggregate of the actual or potential resources which are 
linked to the possession of a durable network of more or less institutionalized relationships of 
mutual acquaintance or recognition” (Bourdieu, 1985:248).  Thanks to social capital, migrants have 
resources that provide access to jobs and social benefits such as those provided by family, friends, 
and charitable organizations.  Social capital also helps migrants avoid the police, arrest, and 
deportation because networks provide information on tactics of visibility and invisibility. 
Social capital, deriving from migrants’ social networks, can be classified as either material or 
cultural.  Although the study population needed money and goods, their most important social 
capital was cultural, i.e., the information communicated to them via their networks before and after 
their migration experience that helped them minimize risks and resist attitudes of social stigma, 
oppression, and humiliation.  Abdel Jabbar demonstrated the importance of this support when he 
described conversations with his cousin Samir: 
When things get tough, I call my cousin and ask him to send me some money. During 
our frequent conversations, he does not hesitate to give me tips and share his 
experiences so that I can learn and refrain from making the same mistakes he did.  I 
enjoy talking to him because he knows how to listen to me, and he carefully keeps my 
secrets.  I also take his advice very seriously because he went through a lot of hardships 
and struggles, but he was successful and is now working and leading a good life in 
France” (Interview 09/15/2014). 
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iii. Social Media 
The migrants’ virtual support systems, created by these social networks, rely heavily on the 
power of social media to spread information freely and instantaneously across an unlimited number 
of locations and to link protagonists who not only share ideas and strategies, but also build new 
relationships, sustain friendship ties, and nurture trust.  Most members of the study population had 
cell phones connected to Wi-Fi, including those who were homeless.  They used the phones to 
Skype with distant family members, get small jobs that were on-demand, listen to music, watch 
movies, and connect to Facebook.  Although most migrants in this study could not afford to buy 
shoes, they willingly bought the latest mobile phones in brands such as Blackberry and the Apple 
iPhone —the latter was pricy, but favored by most.  Cell phones were also used to secretly take 
pictures in detention centers, which were later posted on Facebook and other social media to 
document detention practices for global consumption.  In sum, the newly formed political 
generation, engendered by the North African popular uprisings, created a new space for 
decentralized, non-institutional activism through its members’ shrewd use of social media and 
cyberspace (Singerman 2014; Khalil 2014).  
III. Trans-border and Local Movements  
Migrants have the ability to subvert structures of political power by becoming active agents who, 
through their daily practices, destabilize the border regime (Euskirchen et al 2007; Papadopoulos et 
al 2008).  They also contribute to this destabilization by local and trans-border manifestations, 
which started with the demonstrations against the G8 summit in Genoa in 2001.  The riots and 
various demonstrations, some of which were very violent, constituted “the first encounter between 
the global movement and grassroots migrants’ organizations” (Mezzadra & Neilson, 2003).  
Important movements took place in other European countries, such as the Mouvement Sans Papiers 
(Movement of the Undocumented) in France during the mid-1990s.  This movement “made a 
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fundamental challenge to notions of democracy, politics, civil rights and citizenship” (Wright, 
2003: 5) by contesting the very notion of citizenship and what it means to be political (Isin 2009; 
Nyers 2010).  The Sans Papiers protestors used church occupations and hunger strikes to protest 
processes of criminalization and violations of migrants’ rights (Barron et al. 2011; McNevin 2006).  
The basis of this movement was that migrants from former French colonies have the legal right to 
live in France because of colonial, economic, and cultural ties (McNevin 2006).  Similar protests 
took place in the U.S. when millions of irregular migrants took the streets in 2006 to demand their 
regularization and to protest against their disenfranchisement and vulnerability to exploitation. With 
these pro-regularization movements, “migrants now demand recognition of their social and 
economic contribution and their pre-existing rights as political subjects.” (McNevin 2007:667). 
These various movements challenged migration policies and disrupted the logic and legitimacy of 
the concept of the nation-state, creating new avenues for the formation of trans- and post-national 
alliances and resistance narratives.   
Transnational, political activism is often perceived of as a challenge to the sovereignty of the 
nation-state.  As Thobani (2007: 4) states, the nation-state is increasingly vulnerable to arrivals of 
“outsiders [who] have routinely been depicted as making unreasonable claims upon the nation,” 
problematizing issues of spatiality, migrants’ resistance, national sovereignty, citizenship, 
representation, and political belonging.  Migrants’ struggles against deportation and exclusion have 
been strongly supported by human rights NGOs, humanitarian organizations, and “activists from the 
antifascist and so called autonomist spectrum of the European Radical Left” (Euskirchen et al, 
2009: 1).  Anti-deportation and anti-detention protests, often mediatized, draw public attention 
towards the plight of irregular migrants and refugees who are increasingly framed as “political 
subjects,” rather than “powerless victims.”  The transnational space crafted by these empowered 
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migrants could be said to include “subaltern” voices, i.e., those who are socially, politically, or 
culturally outside of hegemonic power structures (Spivak 1988).   
In addition to the protests in Italy, irregular migrant communities in France, Germany, and 
Belgium have held protests with large numbers of demonstrators, including migrants, local left-
wing opposition supporters, church-based activists, and members of NGOs and human rights 
groups. These protests often use targeted, spatial strategies of resistance by occupying certain 
symbolic spaces, such as churches, e.g., Chiesa Madre in Lampedusa, public squares, e.g., Al 
Qasba in Tunis, government headquarters, e.g., La Municipalité in Paris.  This stratagem draws 
public attention and global media to their plight and creates and/or builds global support and 
empathy.  Targeted acts of resistance “…temporarily [re-signify] the meaning of […] space […] as 
one of political contention” (Leitner, Sheppard, and Sziarto 2008: 162).  Global popular protests, 
such as the Occupy Movement, have taken place in cities around the world, and their sit-ins, 
demonstrations, and other organized campaigns have been strong and effective.   
Transnational, border-protest groups have emerged among migrants and refugees.  For 
example, “Lampedusa in Hamburg,” is comprised of migrants and refugees who arrived in 
Germany from Lampedusa and have claimed their right to stay and move freely in Europe.  
Another migrant group, Le Collectif des Tunisiens de Lampedusa, (The Collective of Tunisians 
in Lampedusa) was created by those Tunisians who were given a six-month permit to move 
freely in the Schengen space, following a bilateral agreement between Tunisia and Italy in April 
2011.  In May 2011, this Collective occupied the municipal building of the 19th Arrondissement 
in Paris and succeeded in publicizing the need for regularization and freedom of movement.  
Another success of Le Collectif des Tunisiens de Lampedusa was a protest that pushed Italy into 
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providing more temporary, humanitarian, resident permits for a number of Tunisians who had 
arrived in April 2011.  
 i. NGOs’ Support, Mobilization, and Public Visibility  
During my interviews with informants, most said that their mobilization towards resisting was 
supported and influenced by Italian activists and local NGOs who were sensitive to their cause and 
determined to help them.  This assistance was significant because it inspired the desire and 
motivation to protest, shaped their decisions, and laid the ground for more public visibility.  Having 
the organizational and logistical support of local NGOs was crucial for the majority of the study 
population because many of them did not speak Italian, did not possess the necessary organizing 
skills, and did not know how to strategically articulate their claims and voice their protest.  This 
latter type of knowledge has roots in political participation and organization; however, most young 
people in pre-uprising Tunisia lacked political experience because freedom of association was 
quasi-absent.  In fact, any form of political action in Tunisia before 2011 was considered a threat to 
the government and hence was systematically repressed by the police state of Zine Al Abidine Ben 
Ali.  This repression meant that many youths remained uninvolved in post-uprising politics, 
including those who escaped to Lampedusa, most of whom remained skeptical about political 
activism and hesitant to defend their rights.  As Ayoub, a 32-year-old man from Al Hansha, Sfax, 
said, 
If we had faith in our politicians or politics as a whole, we would not have escaped to 
Lampedusa after the thawra (revolution).  We could have stayed to build our country 
from anew and use all our efforts to improve Tunisia and make it a great country. Yet, 
we all decided to come here. Why do you think we did it?  The answer is simple.  We 
did it because we know these politicians very well.  Ben Ali left, now we have many 
Ben Alis! [Laugh...] (Interview 05/14/14). 
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I argue that the lack of experience, apathy towards politics, and distrust of politicians contributed to 
an inability for some participants to articulate their concerns, strategically voice their issues, and 
eloquently express them to the public.   
 ii. Migrant Advocacy Organizations  
Migrant organizations, as described by Rosendo and Carita (1993), are vehicles that promote 
migrants’ social integration and stimulate political participation, while, at the same time, becoming 
a voice that represents the interests of their members in the political field, i.e., a mediator between 
the migrant community and the political powers of the receiving society.  Unfortunately, there are 
only few Tunisian migrant organizations in Italy.  A typical example is a group in in the coastal 
town of Mazara Del Vallo, Sicily that brings the Tunisian migrant community together by 
reinforcing and preserving homeland culture and traditions through activities such as Ramadan 
dinners, galas, and culinary events.  Organizations that address migrants’ rights and other socio-
political issues are more frequent in France and Germany, which host much older and more 
established Tunisian migrant communities.  The lack of Tunisian migrant groups in Italy meant that 
migrants have had to operate under the auspice of local Italian NGOs, such as Askavusa, Caritas 
and the Italian NGO (ARCI).   
Askavusa is a Lampedusan association that advocates for the rights of migrants and 
promotes a positive image of migrants as energetic agents, rather than passive victims.  It organizes 
different activities including festivals, press conferences, debates, film screenings, and 
demonstrations.  For instance, Askavusa organized a large protest to show support for Tunisian 
migrants during the visit of Marine Le Pen, the leader of France’s far right party in March 2011.  
The association also strives to raise awareness by disseminating information about migrants’ rights 
and bureaucratic problems such as the tedious asylum procedures.  In addition to these activities, 
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Askavusa also runs a small museum, displaying various objects left by migrants along the shore or 
brought to Lampedusa by the waves of the Mediterranean.  Salah, a 28-year-old, active, Tunisian 
protestor, told me that the slogans of a recent demonstration were prepared with support from 
Askavusa, which also helped to translate the texts of banners from Arabic to Italian.  I was surprised 
to learn that most banners, in addition to Italian, had Arabic writings of the slogans used during the 
2011Tunisian uprising such as “Khobz w’ maa w’ Lampedusa laa (Bread and water, but no 
Lampedusa) and “Awfiya awfiya li arwah al shuhada” (Loyal, loyal to the souls of the martyrs).  
With the help of NGOs and migrant advocacy organizations, a number of Tunisian migrants 
started to engage with new forms of socio-political expressions that denied the traditional concept 
of migrants as passive objects of control and conceptualized them as political subjects able to thwart 
their normative representation and the dynamics of power in place.  Since many protesters were 
irregular migrants who wanted to avoid the police, most acts of resistance, especially those 
organized outside of detention centers, were peaceful.  During manifestations, the demonstrators 
constantly reminded each other that there should be no violence involved.  Some would even 
repeatedly say out loud, “Il onf laa wil klem izzayid laa (No violence and no foul language),” to 
ensure that their resistance came across in the most peaceful way possible. 
 A small demonstration of solidarity, in which Salah and I took part denounced the conditions 
at the Lampedusan reception centers and the overall oppressive policies, stigma, and discrimination 
against the Tunisian migrant population. Various slogans, in Arabic and Italian, and photographs of 
missing Tunisian migrants were held by a number of migrants and activists with labels such as 
“Pace” (Peace), “Migrants rights are human rights,” “Respect for refugees,” and “FRONTEX is 
Criminal.”  The atmosphere was one of celebration with music and dancing as well as food and 
drinks.  Italian protesters sang the antifascist resistance movement song, Bella Ciao, while Tunisian 
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migrants clapped and sang Mahla Al Gaada Al Mayya...Mahla Al Thawra Al Tounsiyya (It is 
beautiful to sit on the sea shore…It is beautiful for the Tunisian uprising to bring us together), a 
famous song chanted at the Al Qasba sit-in after the uprising.  The demonstrators also chanted the 
Tunisian national anthem Houmat Al Hima (O defenders of the Homeland), jumping quickly to its 
famous last refrain written by Tunisia’s first poet, Abu Al Qacem Echebbi, which states, “When the 
people will to live, Destiny must surely respond. Oppression shall then vanish. Fetters are certain to 
break.”  The protesters also shouted Shoghl, hurrya, karama wataniyya (“Work, freedom, national 
dignity), a slogan that was very popular during the Tunisian uprising.  Clearly, the study 
participants in this demonstration had acquired a new way of conducting politics, by spontaneously 
exporting Tunisian slogans into the liminal space of the island and blurring, in a striking way, the 
boundaries separating the two rims of the Mediterranean. The words, karama, Hourriya, and even 
the French word, Dégage (Out), were expressions, vocal and in graffiti format, that started to 
circulate on the island and in other parts of Sicily, defying all geographical and cultural boundaries.   
On one Sunday afternoon in July 2014, when I was in Palermo, some 35 Tunisian 
migrants congregated near the Teatro Massimo (Massimo Theatre). They were protesting in 
collaboration with the Forum Antirazzista di Palermo, a local organization, holding banners and 
cardboard signs with different slogans such as “Migrants rights are human rights,” “No human is 
illegal,” “Freedom for all,” and “Proud to be Tunisians.”  The police remained for the entire 
demonstration but did not stop it.  A few local Palermitans and tourists took pictures and videos 
with their mobile phones. As soon as I got close to the crowd, I was stunned to hear a group of 
Tunisians who joined the march, shouting, Ya twansa Maadish khouf…Ben Ali Hrab...Il Mojrim 
Hrab (Tunisians, there is no fear…Ben Ali escaped...the criminal escaped)— These extremely 
famous expressions, filmed by someone’s cell phone from an apartment balcony down town 
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Tunis on January 13th, 2011, were used by a lawyer and activist named Naser Layouni, who went 
into Habib Bourguiba Avenue, in spite of the curfew, right after Ben Ali gave his last famous 
speech “Fhemtkom” (I have understood you). The expressions uttered by Layouni became very 
famous, as they were broadcasted by many regional and European televisions and social media 
networks.  
Again, it appeared that the Tunisian uprising with its rioters, heroes, songs, and slogans was 
resonating beyond North Africa and entering Lampedusa and Sicily, re-configuring their spatial as 
well as political dimensions.  As Salah said to me,  
We did not foment a revolution to come here to Lampedusa and remain silent and 
accept being beaten-up, abused, and humiliated.  We have to show our anger and tell the 
world what we are going through in this Al Jazeera Al Habs (prison-island).  You know 
we all call it ‘Guantanamo’ [laugh…] (Interview 06/22/2014).  
 
The word Habs (jail), as the disciplinary space of incarceration, was frequently used as a 
metaphor by Tunisian migrants to refer to Tunisia under Ben Ali and also to the island of 
Lampedusa.  As Kamel, a 22-year-old, told me,  
Lampedusa zaada habs, il wahid dima fiha makhnouq (Lampedusa is also, in addition to 
Ben Ali’s Tunisia, a prison, one is often choking).”  Kamel continues “Ahna awled al 
thawra” (We are sons of the revolution) and we are powerful and very strong. Ben Ali 
and his absolute power were toppled. We have nothing to fear. No one can conquer us 
except Allah” (interview 08/12/2014).  
 
Foucault’s conception of revolts echoes nicely with Kamel’s testimony. According to Foucault, 
“The impulse through which a single individual, a group, a minority or an entire people says: I will 
no longer obey, and throws the risk of their life in the face of an authority they consider unjust, 
seems to me to be something irreducible” (Foucault 1994: 449). 
IV. Conclusion 
In this chapter, I demonstrated how migrants either individually or collectively, i.e., with the 
support of other migrants, NGOs, and social networks of families and friends, could affirm their 
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“right to claim a right” (Isin 2009:380).  During the period, I conducted research, the escalating 
oppression of, marginalization of, and discrimination against these migrants in Italy and 
following them to Europe was met with forms of resistance: collective, individual, local, and 
transnational.  In their resistance, the Tunisian migrants I studied used different “weapons of the 
weak,” e.g., burning finger tips, lip-sewing, hunger strikes, silence, and threats, to disrupt Italian 
political power structures, oppressive border politics, and the regime of tight mobility-control 
vis-à-vis migrants and refugees.  As the ethnographic evidence shows, Tunisian migrants’ 
movements and riots in Italy took on a transnational aspect via the use of the internet and social 
media, thereby influencing and mobilizing migrants’ struggles taking place in other European 
countries.  I demonstrated that the reliance on trans-border social networks, in addition to the 
support of local contacts in Italy and Tunisia, e.g., friends, family, Italian NGOs and charitable 
organizations, provided migrants with strategies to navigate their migration journey and to adopt 
and engage in various resistance strategies.  The chapter concludes that old conceptions of 
migrants as victims and passive objects do not always hold true for the study participants who—
to some degree—were able to thwart their normative representation, to unsettle geopolitical 
power dynamics, and to express themselves as political subjects.  Arguably, not all migrants can 
be so effective because many face obstacles that can hinder resistance and political participation, 
such as not being able to speak Italian, to organize collectively, i.e., through a lack of time, 
human potential, material resources, and social capital, to access public space, to overcome 
political apathy, and to surmount their fear of being deported. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
CONCLUDING THOUGHTS AND OBSERVATIONS 
I.  The Study: Research and Results  
In this dissertation, I investigated the irregular migrant experience of 60 Tunisian young men 
who, after their country’s uprising in 2011, risked crossing the Mediterranean Sea and entered 
southern Italy, where they experienced stigmatization, humiliation, and rejection.   
 i. Research Questions and Strategies  
This investigation was undertaken to explore three research questions: 1) how Italy criminalized 
and dehumanized the irregular migrant such that he became the “Other,” and the violence 
perpetrated against him was permitted and rationalized; 2) how the irregular migrants experienced, 
negotiated with, and resisted their socially constructed “illegality” and “criminality”; and 3) how 
trends in anti-migrant violence and oppression within Italy affected the irregular migrants’ identity, 
daily struggles, and survival strategies. To address these questions from a theoretical perspective, I 
drew from transnational migration scholarship that is particularly influenced by the idea of 
“permeability” of national boundaries and the resulting economic, socio-cultural, and transnational 
political exchanges taking place across borders (Appadurai 1991, Schiller and Blanc 1993, Ossman 
et al. 2007).  To find answers to these questions, my research steps were as follows: 1) I examined 
human rights’ abuses perpetrated against the irregular migrants by Italian authorities primarily in 
police stations and detention centers; 2) I documented of their dehumanization at the hands of both 
Italian authorities and non-state actors, i.e., employers, media, and the larger public; 3) I collected 
narratives and oral histories from participants of this study to explore their personal lives, 
predicaments, feelings, hopes, and fears; and 4) I ethnographically explored the constructions of the 
Tunisian irregular migrant as the “violent other,” “potential criminal,” or “hidden terrorist” 
throughout the stages of a migration journey.  
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 ii. Research Findings 
This study focused solely on a particular set of Tunisian irregular migrants; however, I argue that 
many of its findings are not restricted to this group. Rather, the findings may be applicable to the 
broad swathe of humanity that has flowed, and continues to flow, from one country to another, 
driven by wars, internal conflicts, environmental degradation, and ongoing climate change.  As 
such, the study population and this research provide a small but significant window into today’s 
global, transnational migrations.   
 1. Al Harqa: A Transnationally Manufactured Phenomenon 
The first, preliminary finding of this study was that the Tunisian migration to Italy is part of a 
transnationally manufactured phenomenon that is tightly linked to the vast and sprawling nature of 
the global market with its commodities, ideologies, technologies, and culture.  Within this market, 
Tunisian migration is subject to the law of supply and demand, and Italy’s demand for cheap labor 
is such that an impoverished Tunisian citizen at the edge of the border and within geographical 
proximity believes that he will find job opportunities once he successfully makes it across the sea.  
However, despite this need for inexpensive workers, the Italian government took an immediate 
decision to deport Tunisian migrants back to Tunis.  These deportation procedures, as I have noted, 
are strictly prohibited under international, regional, and domestic human rights and refugee law, and 
thus constitute a violation of the non-refoulement principle.  As my research demonstrates, most of 
these deportation procedures were handled by Italian police and involved harsh treatment, including 
verbal and physical violence, which often happened at night to avoid retaliation or rebellion. 
Due to the massive influx of migrants and the inability of the Italian authorities to deal with 
the sudden “emergency situation,” Tunisian migrants were either captured and put in detention 
centers, awaiting their asylum applications to be treated, or escaped and were roaming around 
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Lampedusa and towns of Sicily.  Of the latter, some were lucky enough to get jobs, but others less 
fortunate lived on handouts from charitable organizations and intermittent income from the 
underground economy or seasonal work.   
The data showed that irregular migrants, who had no status but obtained jobs, constituted a 
cheap and exploitable labor force that was compelled to take any kind of employment under any 
working and living conditions.  Needless to say, these jobs, mostly in the underground economy, 
paid very low wages and provided no social security or health care benefits.  Without any doubt, 
geographical proximity was the main reason that post-uprising Tunisians chose to flee to Italy.  
However, other factors also fueled the massive and repeated departures to Lampedusa after the 
2011 uprising: 1) the state of lawlessness and chaos in Tunisia during and after the uprising; 2) 
established social networks in Europe that provided information and incentives; and 3) increased 
legal and illegal labor opportunities that promised good livelihoods. 
 2. The Italian/European Response and the “Migration Industry” 
The flow of Tunisian migrants into Lampedusa not only pushed the Italian government to engage 
in collective deportation procedures, but also to adopt stricter policies on migration, visa rules, 
asylum rights, and most importantly, a tougher border-control system.  These measures raised many 
human rights concerns because they encompassed legal contradictions, such as different visa 
procedures for different nationalities and choosing to subject those who were captured to arbitrary, 
violent arrests and inhumane detention conditions while the non-captured were not pursued and thus 
enjoyed some freedom of movement and a limited access to resources. 
 Paradoxically, the Italian and Western European migration-control strategies, such as restrictive 
border-control policies, increased surveillance, and expulsion of migrants, did not discourage the 
“migration industry,” in general, or the study population, in particular.  Instead, these control tactics 
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“induced shifts in the human traffic,” thereby creating new migrant routes to Europe and innovative 
methods of irregular entry. (Andreas 2012:94).  The many forms and degrees of increasing 
mobilities are clearly proof of the failure of Italy and the EU to effectively control population, 
territory, and borders.  These mobilities take place each day, turning human smuggling into a very 
lucrative business that functions according to the same rules as the global market.  As Massey et al. 
aptly put it, the strong demand for cheap global labor creates “a lucrative economic niche for 
entrepreneurs and institutions dedicated to promoting international movement for profit, yielding a 
black market in migration” (1993:450). 
 
Fig 14. The various migration routes to Lampedusa and Sicily 
For Tunisians, Italy’s restrictive immigration laws and harsh border policies were not an 
overwhelming obstacle.  Rather, they engendered a greater desire to infiltrate Lorop28 and 
encouraged greater influxes of Tunisian irregular migrants.  The cat-and-mouse game between the 
Italian state and the Tunisian “intruders” resulted in an unprecedented increase in migrants’ 
dependence on criminal networks of human smuggling that operated from Tunisia and, more 
recently, Libya.  These networks are well organized, seek out new routes, and rely on more 
                                                          
28 Lorop is the French transformation of the word l’Europe used in the Tunisian vernacular to refer to Europe 
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professional, well-equipped human smugglers in an attempt to circumvent surveillance.  As a result, 
they have a high level of competence in finding more effective means of transpiercing borders. 
 3. Populist Rhetoric and the “Other”  
As immigration laws grew more oppressive, the rhetoric around migration was also changing 
in Europe.  Migrants, who had once been important contributors to the economies of European 
countries, became a “security issue,” i.e., a threat to the cultural, economic, and physical safety 
of European societies.  Italy was no exception, and the irregular migration from Tunisia to Italy 
became increasingly associated with criminality, socio-economic problems, cultural deprivation, 
and most recently, with terrorism.  I demonstrated that the Italian populist discourse and the 
security argument were combined with the nationalist, xenophobic, and racist discourse that 
resulted in exclusion but, more importantly, in the “criminalization” of the Tunisian migrant as 
“Other.” According to Italian migration laws, irregular migrants were “illegal immigrants,” who 
had committed a crime by their “illegal” entry and stay in the Italian territory.  The Italian 
populist agenda sought to obtain a consensus about the Tunisians through widespread, emotional 
arguments based on an opposition between “us” and the “others” that was grounded in an ethno-
national idea of identity.  Thus the ethnographic evidence showed the Italian people were afraid 
of Tunisian migrants because they changed, or would change, the cultural, socio-political, and 
economic landscape.  
Accordingly, study participants became the target of many different, threat-fueling public 
discourses through both populist speeches and inflated media rhetoric and imagery.  Security 
rhetoric was at the core of Italian national politics and has been successful, thus far, in the 
perpetuation of xenophobic discourses that evoke migration as a national threat.  This populist 
rhetoric was employed both by extreme right political parties, such as the Lega Nord, who 
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wanted to gain electoral consensus, and the media, who reported events involving migrants in 
sensationalist ways to improve their ratings.  In fact, current Italian migration policies seem to 
have been shaped more by populist rhetoric and ideologies than by the type of thoughtful and 
dispassionate debate that could have resulted in rational, realistic migration policies aimed at 
controlling irregular migration.  
The criminalization of migration through the transformation of cultural and religious 
differences into a “security threat” has taken much of its authority from the homogenizing and 
essentializing discourses of culture and identity. Thus popular rhetoric, using culturalist and 
religious discourses, tries to establish a dialectical and hostile relationship between “native 
Italians” and “foreign Tunisian migrants.”  Populist and right wing politicians as well as 
conservative sections of the Italian society construct their arguments on this essentialized and 
“racialized” binary alignment of people.  By doing so, they can link issues such as the erosion of 
national identity, cultural values, tradition, and amorality to the threatening existence of the 
irregular migrant population within their society. 
This criminalizing discourse becomes not only mainstream, but also more legal and thus 
dangerous for migrants, through national legislative texts that officially associate irregular 
migration with illegality, crime, and violence.  When this occurred, the ideologies of power and the 
Italian nation-state apparatus further subordinated the Tunisian migrant of this study by putting him 
into a normalized status of potential criminality.  Interestingly, in a symbolic visit to Lampedusa on 
Monday, June 8, 2013, Pope Francis I made a powerful statement in which he criticized Italy’s 
treatment of Tunisian migrants as “criminals” and emphasized the dynamics of cooperation and 
development.  He endorsed an “integrated perspective” in dealing with migrants and stated that 
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Italy should be capable of seeing and valuing migrants’ potential, rather that viewing them “as a 
problem to be confronted and resolved” (Official Vatican Network). 
 4. Living in the Shadow of Islamophobia 
Throughout the dissertation, I described how members of the study population were trapped in 
their status of irregularity, with no power to change it.  The majority of the participants lived in 
constant fear of confrontations with Italian authorities that so compromised their mobility that 
some did not even look for jobs. This fear became internalized, impacting their well-being and 
shaping their social interactions and everyday life.  For example, some of them even resisted 
taking the bus, preferring to walk tens of kilometers because they could not produce a residence 
permit to validate their “legality.”29  The deportable nature of irregular migrants made my study 
population nothing less than a disposable entity in the hands of the Italian authorities.  For them, 
“the possibility of removal [...] casts a long, dark shadow over their daily lives, threatening at 
any moment to take away from them the little they have gained by residence in the host country 
and their hopes for the future” (Gibney and Hansen 2003: 43). 
The migration debate in Italy and Europe today is primarily framed in terms of the socio-
economic, political, and cultural stability of European nation-states, in which the Muslim 
migrant has become reified as the enemy who threatens terrorism.  The already prevalent 
discriminatory actions and rhetoric feed into a xenophobic and “criminalizing” attitude.  In 
analyzing Islamophobia, I was motivated, less by the challenge of determining its connotations, 
than by an effort to recognize its politicized aspect and variability.  Throughout the analysis, I 
sought to identify ways in which the image of the Tunisian migrant as a “threat” was constructed 
and propagated, depicting its function as a form of cultural racism or, to use Balibar’s (1991) 
                                                          
29 Under Bossi/Fini law, ticket inspectors who catch an irregular migrant without a valid ticket can be rewarded with 
€550. 
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expression, “racism without race.”  In the process, I maintained that the highly politicized, 
migratory debates, in connection with Islamophobia, were used by a number of far right 
politicians to mask the real foundation of Italy’s failure to address its socio-economic, political, 
financial, and cultural problems. 
My ultimate goal was to demonstrate what it was like for the study population to live in 
the shadow of Islamophobia.  First, I put the concept into anthropological and ethnographic, 
socio-cultural categories to better understand its complex relation with the processes of 
securitization, stigmatization, and criminalization.  I then determined that there was hardly any 
culture of integration in Italy; rather, the national emphasis was on migrant assimilation that 
required a complete, public rupture with their background, e.g., hiding Muslim visibility.  As 
Meher, a 32-year-old man, eloquently explained, 
There is no way anyone would show any racist attitude or make a derogatory comment 
on my being Muslim.  Yakhi maktoub ala jbini “Muslim” (Is it written on my forehead 
that I am Muslim)?  There is nothing about me that says “I am Muslim.”  I could even 
look Sicilian. And, if they are racists, I have a big mouth.  I can easily stop them and turn 
the attack against them, but in a very calm and peaceful way.  But, I have to learn more 
Italian.  And I will [sigh...] (Interview 09/12/2014).  
However, research showed that, although Islamophobic attitudes and negative, 
derogatory representations of Muslims were demeaning and dehumanizing for study participants, 
they also functioned as a starting point for various types of resistance strategies and adaptation 
skills.  Many participants demonstrated an ability to act as counter-hegemonic agents of social 
change either individually or in a collective—resistance that played a significant role in exposing 
the myriad forms of exploitation and human rights abuse they were experiencing. 
 5. Migrant Resistance and Success 
In the last part of the dissertation, I highlighted the importance of viewing the study participants 
as “transmigrants” because treating them as “victims,” “criminals,” or “objects” overlooked the 
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concrete experiences of their everyday life and the sophisticated agency and heroic attitudes they 
displayed throughout their challenging migration experience.  In particular, I emphasized the 
concepts of “transnationalism from below,” “weapons of the weak,” and “social networks,” which 
allow for a more contextualized, historicized, and in-depth way to comprehend, on one hand, 
participants’ mundane activities and daily struggles and, on the other, the processes affecting power 
relations, cultural, and economic interactions, and more specifically, socio-political organizing 
within and across borders.   
By analyzing social network theory, and using some ethnographic examples, I validated 
that, despite the restrictive policies of the Italian state to limit mobilities, transnationalism through 
its various resources, i.e., human, financial, ideological, and symbolic, will constantly encourage, 
sustain, and maintain migrant flows, i.e., lubricate the mobility engine.  Some of these resources 
have empowered the post-uprising Tunisian migrant community by providing them with tools to 
build social capital within their networks, to creatively navigate their migration journey, and to craft 
survival mechanisms that resist myriad forms of social violence, exclusion, and alienation, whether 
in detention centers or out in the society.  Unfortunately, space did not allow me to discuss, in-
depth, situations in which social networks failed or ceased to exist.  However, arguably, the social 
network model is not always a steady and self-perpetuating process because it is shaped by multiple 
macro-geopolitical and economic forces, as well as international and national migration policies 
over which individuals have little or no control. 
Using the concept of “weapons of the weak,” I was able to describe the resistance acts of 
study participants as a set of socio-political processes that aimed to disrupt and unsettle the 
Italian, hegemonic, border narrative.  Such resistance, when collectively enacted, enabled them 
to become more politically active, transforming the political space by forging alliances with 
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NGOS and Italian/trans-border grassroots groups to voice their struggle and claim their rights.  
The Tunisian migrants in this study became more empowered by entering new sites of struggle 
where they were able to “assert agency in navigating, negotiating, and resisting border controls” 
(Rygel 2011: 13).  Degrading detention procedures and control of migrant bodies was often 
circumvented by migrants in resilient and creative ways during encounters with the Italian 
authorities.   
Based on the ethnographic findings, I contended that the Tunisians’ collective departures 
and mass landings in Lampedusa, i.e., their creation of what was referred to as the “North 
African emergency,” could be viewed an enactment of their freedom of movement.  Freedom, 
along with other human rights, had been crushed during the 23-year rule of Ben Ali, and the idea 
of it as “a freedom in everything” entered into slogans during the 2011 popular protests.  One 
slogan, Choghl/khobz, hourriya, karama wataniyya (Work/bread, freedom, national dignity) had 
been brought into Italy, and I heard it recycled in Lampedusa.  The study population perceived 
their harqa to Lampedusa to be an enactment of this freedom, and they viewed it as one of their 
basic rights as human beings.  As Bigo notes, “under liberal governmentality, mobility is 
translated into a discourse of freedom of circulation, which reframes freedom as moving without 
being stopped […] freedom has often been reduced to freedom of movement” (Bigo, 2010:31).  
II.    Research Significance 
Despite the growing empirical and theoretical research conducted on irregular migration, 
there remains a large gap in the current anthropological literature on Tunisian migration to Italy 
and to Europe as a whole.  Hence, this study is “a pioneering project” because it deals with an 
extremely under-represented group in the study of transnational migration and expands the study 
of transnational movements to countries, such as Tunisia, that have long been understudied and 
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overlooked in the larger migration literature.  Secondly, by examining the human rights abuses of 
irregular Tunisian migrants in a post-uprising context, this project attempts to engender more 
comprehensive and cross-cultural approaches to the study of irregular migration as a whole.  
Thirdly, transnational migration is a relatively new phenomenon, and the issues it raises can, in 
general, foster new debates and break new analytical ground.  By examining how post-uprising 
Tunisian migrants collectively reacted to their human rights violations, this project builds on 
recent efforts to engage in more comprehensive methodological and theoretical debates on 
transnational migration. In sum, this type of research is not only timely and necessary, but is also 
invaluable as a fresh anthropological contribution to the ongoing policy and legislative debates in 
the field of transnational migration, human rights, and social movements. 
III. Future Research 
One aspect of the irregular migrant experience that has not been investigated by scholars is 
the post-deportation return to the homeland.  For both the study participants, their families, and 
their fellow citizens, deportation was considered a disastrous calamity.  As Jameliddine said, 
“When you get deported back home, it is akbar kartha (this is the biggest tragedy).” Another 
young man told me, 
Now I am here, and tihchaali (a pejorative word with sexual connotation meaning ‘I 
was trapped already’), and I can never go back to Tunisia.  It will never ever happen.  
What do you want them to say?  That I failed?  That I am bidoun (a loser) …that I am 
not good enough?  That will never happen, I am telling you.  I am able to endure more 
than racism and oppression and remain here until I start my life as a human being.” 
(Interview 07/13/2014). 
 
However, a significant number of deportees from Italy did return to Tunisia, and the ones 
that I spoke to confessed to feelings of extreme levels of guilt, shame, and stigma because they 
failed in their migration project.  Moreover, their deportation had increased their vulnerability 
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and marginalization in Tunisia, making their re-adaptation difficult.  According to these 
interviewees, they had become useless, social entities: an out-group.  As Hamadi told me,  
Everyone here in Hay Ettadhamen perceives us to be the source of all ills in the 
township.  We are continuously pushed to the fringes of society, and everyone avoids 
talking to us.  We are often referred to as Ghabbara (pejorative term for people selling 
cocaine) and no one trusts us (Interview 09/2013). 
 
There is a saying in Tunisia that goes, ghaab wash jaab? (He was absent, now what has he 
brought?), and unfortunately, most deportees returned empty-handed.   
Clearly, the Tunisian migrants who returned, either as deportees or for some voluntarily, had 
the burden of re-integrating in an unwelcoming social environment; they were “failures,” suspicious 
individuals, and m’jarrma (criminals).  The shame of deportation and the pejorative labels attached 
to them, such as ghabbarat Italia (the drug dealers of Italy) and l’expulsé (the deportee), negatively 
impacted their well-being, self-esteem, and sense of belonging.  Indeed, the stigma, precariousness, 
alienation, and social exclusion instilled in them a desire to re-migrate and re-launch their “rite of 
passage,” i.e., migration.  As Massey puts it, “For young men, and in many settings young women 
as well, migration becomes a rite of passage, and those who do not attempt to elevate their status 
through international movements are considered lazy, unenterprising, and undesirable” (Massey et 
al.1993:452-453).  As a matter of fact, a number of the study participants that I interviewed in Sicily 
had come back to Italy after one or multiple deportations.  
Only a few studies exist on what happens to migrants’ post-deportation and the challenges 
they face in their re-adjustment and re-integration in the socio-economic fabric of their homeland.  
Hence, the post-deportation experience could be the topic of future ethnographic research, which 
would have the potential of critically addressing the impacts of deportation on migrants, their 
families, and the larger social environment. 
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 Future empirical research on this post-deportation topic could be enriched by the analysis of 
the plethora of cultural production pertaining to irregular migration in the fields of literature, 
poetry, theatre, film, street art, song, memoir, etc. This research could be grounded within a 
framework where Tunisian irregular migrants could be either cultural producers or consumers, or 
both. This particular area, despite its significance, was beyond the scope of my dissertation. 
However, to close this manuscript, I will use a rap song by Balti, one of Tunisia’s best-known 
rappers, to illustrate such agenda. Baltis’ song titled “Clandestino” demonstrates that music can 
play a significant and creative role in providing migrants with a sense of identity, by illustrating 
their stories of displacement, evoking the larger socio-cultural and political underpinnings of the 
overall harqa phenomenon.   
 
 
Clandestino - ﻮﻨﯿﺘﺳﺪﻧﻼﻛ30 
Balti Ft. Master Sina 
Clandestino 
Perché senza soggiorno 
Perché senza la mamma 
Perché senza ritorno 
Clandestino 
                                                          
30 Clandestino is the term used by Italians to refer to irregular migrants. In my disssertatioin I did not use the term 
‘clandestine’ but ‘irregular’ and I provided an explanation for my choice in chapter one. 
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Io voglio diventare ricco 
Facendo contento la 
mamma 
Senza cadere a picco 
[ ﻲﻄﻠﺑ لوﻷا ﻊﻄﻘﻤﻟا] 
نﻮﺷ ﻲﻓ ﻚﺒﻠﻗ و دﻼﺒﻟا ﻲﻓ ﻚﺨﻣ 
 ياﺰﯿﻠﯾﺰﻧ  
 ﺔﻣﻮﺤﻟا ﻦﯿﺑ و قاروﻻا ﻦﯿﺑ ﺢﯾار
ياﺰﯿﻔﯾد 
 ﻦﻣ ﻲﺸﻤﺗ كﺮﮭﺿ ﻰﻠﻋ ود ا كﺎﺻ 
ﺮﯿﻏ GPS 
ﻞﻣ ﻒﯾﺎﺧ سﺎﯿﻜﻟا ﻲﻓ ﻢﯾﺎھ CRS 
 ﻦﻣ ﻢﺣﺮﯾ ﻻ ﻲﺴﻔﻧ ﺔﺷﺮﺑ كدﻼﺑ دﻻو
تﺎﻣ 
 ﻲﻤﻋ ﻦﺑ ﻲﻠﻘﺗ ﻻ ﻲﺣور ﻲﺣورﻞﻣ  
دﻼﺑ 
 و ﺶﺣﻮﻟا دﺮﺒﻟا و ﺔﺑﺮﻐﻟﺎﺑ ﺖﯿﺿر
ىذﻻا ﻻ 
 ﺶﺣﻮﺘﻣ ﺔﯿﺴﯿﻨﻜﻟا تﻮﺻ ﻰﻠﻋ ﻖﯿﻔﺗ
ناذﻷا 
 سﻮﺴﺑﺎﺑإ نﺎھد حﺎﺒﺼﻟا ﻲﻓ
نﺎﯾﺮﯿﺠﻟأ 
 ﻢﻠﺤﺗ نﺎﻛ ﻲﻨﯿﻋ ةﺮﻜﺳ 
نﺎﯿﻠﻄﻠﻟ ﺔﺻﻼﺒﺑ 
راﺪﯿﻠﺑ ﻚﯿﻠﻋ ﻮﻟﺎﻗ دﻼﺒﻟا ﻦﻣ يﺎﺟ ﻮﻟﺎﻗ 
 ﻲﻛ ﻢﻤﺨﯾ ﺎﻣا فﻮﻠﺤﻟا ﺶﻠﻜﯾﺎﻣ
رﺎﻔﻜﻟا 
ﺲﯿﺴﻧﺮﻓ رﻮﻜﯾﺪﻟاو ﮫﯿﺑﺮﻋ ﺔﻐﻠﻟا 
ﻮط ﺐﯿﺠﺗ ﺐﺤﺗ رﺎﻨﯾﺪﻟا ﺐﯿﺟ ﻚﻟا
ﺲﯿﻓوﺪﻟﺎﺑ 
 ﻚﻟﻮﻘﻧ ﻮﺗ ﺲﯿﺳ وﺮﯾﺰﻟا ﻲﻠﻋ ﻲﻨﻤﻠﻛ
يﺮﻛو يﺮﻛو 
 يدﻼﺑ طﻮﯿﺣ ﻦﯿﺑ ﻢﯾﺎھ ﻲﺑﺮﻋ
يﺮﻜﻌﻟا 
Clandestino 
Perché senza soggiorno 
Perché senza la 
mammaPerché senza 
ritorno 
Clandestino 
ﻻﻮﯿﻧﺎﺒﻟﺎﺑ قﻮﻓ ﻮطﺎﺒﻟا 
Non devo dire grazie a 
nessuno 
Perché la mia vita l'ho 
fatta da solo 
E quando da bimbo tu 
aspettavi il regalo 
Io ero fuori a raccogliere 
il denaro 
 
Clandestino 
Perché senza soggiorno 
Perché senza la mamma 
Perché senza ritorno 
Clandestino 
Io voglio diventare ricco 
Facendo contento la 
mamma 
Senza cadere a picco 
Non devo dire grazie a 
nessuno 
Perché la mia vita l'ho 
fatta da solo 
E quando da bimbo tu 
aspettavi il regalo 
 
Io voglio diventare ricco 
Facendo contento la  
mamma 
Senza cadere a picco 
[ﻲﻧﺎﺜﻟا ﻊﻄﻘﻤﻟا ﺎﻨﯿﺳ ﺮﺘﺳﺎﻣ] 
Sono venuto in Italia 
venuto da piccolo 
Arabo in Italia quello che 
dicono 
Scappato dal paese su una 
barca 
ﺖﻔﺷ ﻰﻠﻋ ﺎﯾﺎﻨﯿﻋ دﻻو يدﻼﺑ شﺎﻔﯿﻛ 
ﺎﻗرﺎﻏ 
C'è chi s'è salvato chi è 
morto 
Ki è negato senza ritorno 
Buongiorno l'italia, ciao la 
tunisia 
برﺎھ ﻞﻣ دﻼﺑ و ﻦﻣ كاﺮﺗﺎﻣ 
ﺎﯿﺴﯿﻟﻮﺒﻟا 
Mi sono arrangiato ho 
sbagliato 
Mi hanno taggato per 
maleducato 
Io sono cresciuto ho 
pagato 
ﻲﻣﻻ حوﺮﻧ مﻮﯿﻟا 
Clandestino 
Perché senza soggiorno 
Perché senza la mamma 
Perché senza ritorno 
Clandestino 
Io voglio diventare ricco 
Facendo contento la 
mamma 
Senza cadere a picco 
Pensami, pensami, 
pensami 
Che io penso a te.. 
 
My Own Translation of 
‘Clandestino’ from 
Tunisian and Italian to 
English: 
 
Clandestine… 
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Because without a 
soggiorno31 
Because without my 
mother 
Because without return 
Clandestine… 
I want to become rich 
I want to make my mother 
happy 
Without staggering  
 
Your brain is at the bled32 
and your heart is at the 
Champs Elysees 
Divided – between your 
documents and the 
neighborhood 
Back-bag on your 
shoulders, walking without 
GPS 
Wandering in the streets 
afraid of the Police 
Many Tunisians around, 
but no one offers to help 
Each one to himself, even 
my own cousins 
I accept my homesickness 
and the cold weather, 
better alone than in bad 
company 
You wake up to the 
Church’s bells missing the 
Adhan33 
In the morning a painter, at 
an Algerian company 
I close my eyes dreaming 
about a ticket to Italy 
 
                                                      
31 The residence permit in 
Italian. 
 
32 Bled is the Tunisian term for 
Home. 
 
33 The call to prayer. 
They said he comes from 
the bled. They said he is a 
bastard 
He does not eat pork, but 
he thinks like the ‘infidels’ 
 
The language is Arabic, 
the décor is French 
You want to convert the 
Dinar into foreign currency 
Call me at the 0634 and I 
will tell you ‘there is no 
place like home’ 
An Arab idle between the 
walls of my Akri35 country 
 
Clandestine … 
Because without a 
soggiorno 
Because without my 
mother 
Because without return 
Clandestine … 
I want to become rich 
I want to make my mother 
happy 
Without staggering  
I have no thanks due to 
anyone 
Coz I am the one who 
crafted my own life 
When you were a child 
waiting for gifts 
I was outside collecting 
dinars36 
I came to Italy when I was 
little 
In Italy, they say ‘The 
Arab escaped on a boat’ 
                                                      
34 The cell- telephone code for 
Paris. 
 
35 Akri an old term referring to 
‘colonizing’ France. 
 
36 Tunisian currency. 
I saw my own fellow 
Tunisians drowning 
There are those who got 
rescued and others who 
died 
There are those who can 
never return 
Good morning Italy, bye 
bye Tunisia 
Fleeing the bled and the 
police baton 
 
I tried to fix things, but 
made many mistakes 
They said I am a thug 
I grew up and paid the 
price 
I will return to my mother 
with a car  
I have no thanks due to 
anyone 
Coz I am the one who 
crafted my own life 
When you were a child 
waiting for gifts 
I was outside collecting 
dinars 
 
Think of me…I will think 
of you… 
Clandestine …  
 
Because without a 
soggiorno 
Because without my 
mother 
 
Because without return 
Clandestine … 
I want to become rich 
I want to make my mother 
happy… 
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